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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent decades, the agencies tasked with science funding and science policy in the 
U.S. have increasingly embraced new ideas about the role and duty of science in society. They 
have opened up to the idea that science and technoscience -- the intersection of science and 
technology -- have duties to the public beyond simply providing discoveries and innovative 
technologies. This is reflected in changes in an expansion of science policy to accommodate 
new concerns, like ethical and societal implications, and new actors, including lay publics. In this 
dissertation, I trace these changes historically through three emerging technoscientific projects: 
recombinant DNA, the Human Genome Project, and the National Nanotechnology Initiative. I 
show that while each of these cases involved a significant expansion in what was considered 
acceptable science policy, those expansions were met with efforts to constrain the degree of 
change they brought about for technoscientific development. The constraints were intended to 
protect scientific authority and autonomy in the face of the changes that the expansion of 
science policy brought with them. This dissertation questions the degree to which upstream 
changes to science policy – those motivated from the top-down by scientists and science 
agency administrators – will bring about critical reflection by policymakers about technoscientific 
development and governance. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
In this dissertation, I will argue that there have been changes over the last 
several decades in what scientists and decision-makers at science funding agencies in 
the United States consider relevant for policymaking around science and technology. 
Since the 19th century, scientists in the U.S. often saw their work as existing apart from 
politics and the larger social world, except for the social good that their discoveries 
provided. With the rise of environmental movements and public activism around issues 
of science and technology, American scientists and those in the agencies that support 
them began to change their view. This led to changes in what was considered 
acceptable science policy, from a purely technocratic focus on scientific concerns to 
increasingly broader concerns about the ethical and societal implications of research 
and the role of publics in science policy. Additionally, this led to new programs for 
investigating these questions and the inclusion of new actors, such as ethicists, social 
scientists, and publics, who came with forms of expertise that scientists and science 
agencies had not previously regarded as relevant. These changes could have limited 
scientific authority and autonomy. However, whether and to what extent which this 
occurred is an empirical question that this dissertation will answer. Two questions guide 
the research for this dissertation. First, why did attention to ethical and societal 
concerns and public engagement emerge for some research projects and not others? 
Second, how did scientists and science agencies negotiate their autonomy and 
authority in the context of these new non-scientific actors and non-technical concerns? 
This dissertation charts three moments where ideas about what constitutes 
acceptable science policy shifted. In the Recombinant DNA (rDNA) debates of the 
1970s, scientists decided to postpone their research in order to give them time to 
consider the health and safety issues posed by their research. They did not, however, 
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consider as relevant or legitimate any broader ethical concerns or the participation of 
non-scientists. In the second case, the Human Genome Project of the 1990s 
incorporated new actors, bioethicists and scientists acting as ethicists, but fought 
against the idea of a possible moratorium like that of the rDNA debates. In the final 
case, the National Nanotechnology Initiative re-negotiated the role of professional 
ethicists and included another new actor, the lay public. It too excluded any possibility of 
a moratorium, though for different reasons than the Human Genome Project. In these 
three cases, we see how ideas about what was considered acceptable science policy 
has shifted. As I will show in this dissertation, these suggest that scientists have 
increasingly accepted non-scientific actors and concerns in order to maintain their 
autonomy against social and political influences. 
This chapter introduces the theoretical tools that I will use in this dissertation. I 
begin by qualifying the data for this dissertation and the discussion to follow as being 
particularly American. Other national contexts, such as England, France, and Germany, 
have had their own trajectories in changing science policy. This also helps us 
understand the important relationship between science and democracy and how they 
co-construct each other. I then turn to a discussion of credibility, expertise, and 
autonomy. Contests around credibility and expertise have often been used to set the 
boundaries of science, which, in the context of this dissertation, have been used to 
influence science policy and governance. Finally, I will discuss certain key ideas in 
science and technology studies (STS) scholarship, which I will use to make sense of 
these policy changes. 
Before I move on to the substance of discussion, I should make a note about 
some of the terms I will be using and how I will be using them. I will refer to the research 
for each of these cases as “technoscience.” Technoscience acknowledges the 
inseparable connections between scientific research and the technologies it produces. 
Technoscience avoids the idea of science as a purely epistemological endeavor and the 
idea of technology as a purely instrumental one. Where I refer to the public, I do so 
because that is how the actors I study imagined the totality of people outside of their 
domain. As Dewey argued, there is no one public, but rather many different and 
overlapping publics who come into existence around issues of public concern (Dewey 
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[1927]2012). It would be inaccurate, however, to impute this understanding onto actors 
who evidence a monolithic view of the public. 
Expansion of Science Policy 
This discussion of expanding ideas about acceptable science policy uses the 
idea of symbolic boundaries and their capacity to create social boundaries (Lamont and 
Molnar 2002). This discussion of boundaries should not be confused with boundary 
work in science (Gieryn 1999). Scientific boundary work determines science from non-
science. While the boundary work discussed here does deal with “doing difference” 
(Bourdieu 1979, West and Fenstermaker 1995), the core activity in scientific boundary 
work, for the most part I will not discuss the difference between what is and is not 
science or scientific research. Rather, I will discuss the boundaries of science policy to 
refer to the ways in which conceptual categories about what is and is not acceptable for 
consideration as issues for science policy reinforce technical scientific authority (Tajfel 
and Turner 1985). This is a process whereby a symbolic distinction becomes a social 
distinction, by using a category to keep out certain ideas or actors deemed threatening 
to the technoscientific enterprise or to the authority and autonomy of the insiders who 
maintain the boundaries. 
Science, Policy and American Liberal Democracy 
In order to understand how and why ideas about acceptable science policy in the 
United States have changed, it is important to understand the particularly American 
context in which these emerge. Specifically, it is important to understand how science 
and American liberal democracy construct one another and the way this has framed 
science policy. To explore this, I will use theories particularly from two STS scholars, 
Yaron Ezrahi and Sheila Jasanoff. 
Ezrahi argues that all theories of liberal democracy have been informed, in part, 
by scientific inquiry. This goes beyond the ideology of rational inquiry, the appeal to 
reason, and a repudiation of arbitrary rule that came out of the Enlightenment. 
According to Ezrahi, one of the most important aspects of the liberal democratic 
tradition is a visual culture attuned to the public demonstration of politically relevant 
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facts (1990:74). Unlike monarchical rule, liberal democratic rule is fundamentally 
oriented towards the public scrutiny of the government. Thus, this requires a new visual 
culture. The visual culture in monarchical rule was intended to dwarf its subjects in 
feelings of wonder and awe. In liberal democratic visual culture, however, the intention 
is to “attest, record, account, analyze, confirm, disconfirm, explain, or demonstrate by 
showing and observing examples in a world of public facts” (215). He calls this the 
“attestive visual culture.” Central to this culture is “the assumption that reality, including 
political reality, is inscribed…on the visible surface of the situation” (215). This liberal 
democratic visual culture clearly borrows from scientific models of credibility and 
legitimacy. In Leviathan and the Air Pump, Steven Shaping and Paul Schaffer (1985) 
study the battle between Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle who fought about the 
scientific legitimacy of experimentation. Boyle’s mode of experimentation only won 
because his experiments were put on display before a set of respected “gentlemen 
witnesses” who gave the experiment its epistemological legitimacy. In the visual 
attestive culture, the experiment has been replaced by appeals to facts and figures and 
the gentlemen witnesses have been replaced by the governed public. Political actors 
present and defend their actions in instrumental and technical terms that appeal to a 
fundamental and objective reality accessible to all, including the public. In presenting 
themselves to the public, political actors perform their governance publicly in way that 
gives the appearance, at least, of transparency and openness to public scrutiny1. 
Science policy is no exception. Science policy in America is supposed to give the 
appearance of consistency with liberal-democratic modes of decision-making and public 
values (Jasanoff 1990, 2004). The visual attestive culture of liberal democracy supports 
a more technocratic mode of policy- and decision-making. To some degree, then, all of 
liberal democracy is informed by the principles of scientific inquiry. Not all liberal 
democracies, however, manifest scientific reasoning and visual attestive culture in the 
same way. 
Liberal democracy in the United States manifests a particular instance of 
scientific ideology and visual attestive culture that contextualizes science policy and a 
                                            
1 Ezrahi notes that the visual performance may take precedence over the instrumentalism of appealing to facts and 
reality (121). This “ritualistic instrumentalism,” as he calls it, can prove less costly than substantive instrumentalism 
based on real facts and figures obtained through research.  
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specifically American mode of liberal democracy.  I will highlight two of these that Ezrahi 
explains. First, American liberal democracy relies on a shared ontological reality and the 
presentation of public facts to a greater extent than France and Germany. In German 
democracy, authority not based on appeals to facts plays a larger role, as well as 
appeals to speculative thought and experiential understanding over empirical 
knowledge. Second, the American “predisposition for simplicity, plainness, functional 
realism, and honest explicit serviceability” become the elements of a more technological 
logic of democracy (1990:132). American democratic bureaucracy is modeled on the 
ideal of the well-functioning and efficient machine. The steam engine, Ezrahi argues, is 
the perfect model for early American democracy. Not only is it an efficient machine, but 
its influence stretched across the vast American landscape, bringing prosperity and 
taming the wild frontiers. It is not only a model of efficiency, but of civilization, order, and 
the action at a distance required of large-scale governance. This differs from 
democracies elsewhere, such as in England, where machines were regarded as rough 
and without culture. English liberal democracy favored aestheticism, culture, and 
traditional authority. In American democracy, these look like dirt in the machine. Culture 
and aestheticism introduce qualities not based in observable reality. As such, they can 
only clutter the efficient operation of an ideally mechanistic bureaucratic order. 
What does all of this have to do with the present discussion about the expansion 
of acceptable science policy? There are two key points to take away from this. First, the 
discussion to follow takes place almost entirely in the American political and judicial 
context. European models of democracy and science policy do come to influence the 
final case, nanotechnology. For the National Nanotechnology Initiative, administrators in 
the NSF, in particular, borrow from their European counterparts who, in turn, had been 
influenced by scholars working in STS, risk studies, and public communication. 
Otherwise, the decision-making processes about what was considered acceptable from 
unacceptable science policy developed within the ideological context of these 
specifically American cultural ideas of democracy and technocracy.  
Second, Ezrahi’s discussion sets the stage for a discussion of the tension 
between democracy and technocracy. We see this tension emerge in attempts to set 
effective science policy around emerging technoscience research. Following the lead of 
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Theodore Porter (1995:146), I will use the definition of “technocracy” given by Richard 
Kuisel (1981). Kuisel writes that technocracy assumes that: 
Human problems, like technical ones, have a solution that experts, given 
sufficient data and authority, can discover and execute. Applied to politics 
this reasoning finds interference from vested interest, ideologies, and 
party politics intolerable. Its antithesis is decision making through the 
weighing of forces and compromise. Technocrats thus tend to suspect 
parliamentary democracy and prefer the ‘rule of the fittest’ and a managed 
polity. 
The American approach to technocracy is focused on impersonal rules, credible 
technical knowledge, the power of experts, and the quantification of inputs to decision-
making2. As Kuisel indicates, technocratic and liberal-democratic modes of decision-
making exist side-by-side. Indeed, Porter argues that modern democracy necessitates 
some measure of technocratic decision-making. Technocratic modes, however, are in 
tension with more participatory modes of liberal-democracy. This is noteworthy, in part, 
because American democratic ideology tends to place more value on direct or 
participatory modes over more representative modes, such as parliamentary democracy 
(Perrin 2009). This is true even for decisions about technical issues. As Sheila Jasanoff 
notes, Americans often think “even the most technical policy decisions require a 
judicious mixture of scientific and non-scientific judgment” (1990:9). Decision-making 
around science policy must at least give the appearance that it has functioned with 
democratic legitimacy. 
In Ezrahi’s terms, this tension is fundamentally between the degree to which 
science policy discussions privilege appeal to empirical facts versus the public 
witnessing and scrutiny of policy actions. Ezrahi explored this tension but did so mostly 
to problematize how developments in American democracy and science subverted the 
role of scientific logic in democratic decision-making and power of the visual attestive 
culture. Particularly, he put the blame on increasingly privatized science and the decline 
                                            
2 Porter contrasts this with the French approach to technocracy, which focused on expertise and managerial authority 
but did not evidence the preoccupation with quantification that is the hallmark of American technocracy. 
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in public culture. The public, he argues, views science by private industries as biased 
and therefore less legitimate for making visual-attestive appeals. Additionally, the 
decline of public culture has meant that the attestive culture once based on appeal to 
facts and reason has become mere spectacle. It is the performance itself that drives 
public opinion rather than the reality, which the performance makes visible to the public. 
Ezrahi laments this since he views modern science as a model for liberal-democracy 
much in the fashion of Michael Polanyi’s “Republic of Science (1962).” And while we 
should not adopt Ezrahi’s attestive visual culture wholesale, given that it ignores the 
many ways in which science is deployed to obscure the expression of state power 
rather than reveal it (Jasanoff 2004, Foucault 1978, Scott 1998), it does set the stage 
for an important tension that this dissertation will follow. This is the tension between 
technocratic and democratic visions of science in society. The cases for this dissertation 
are all different attempts to negotiate the tension between technocracy and democracy 
in the context of science policy. The scientists and administrators do so by adjusting 
what is considered acceptable to science policy. In the Asilomar conference, for 
instance, scientists took a strongly technocratic approach. They adopted what seemed 
to them a new idea – the postponing of laboratory research – in order to address the 
technical concerns of their own research. They did so, however, without public scrutiny 
or the inclusion of outside actors. In the case of nanotechnology, by contrast, funding 
agencies enrolled social scientists and publics to discover the public’s non-technical 
concerns about the technology. They did not entertain the idea of postponing research. 
Each formulated ideas about science policy in a way that seemed to fit the social 
pressures that scientists or funding agencies anticipated. 
Sheila Jasanoff explores the tension between democracy and technocracy in 
greater detail in The Fifth Branch (1990), her historical study about the role of science 
advisers on American science policy. She uses several “flawed decisions” by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National 
Cancer Research institute, in part, to probe the differences between regulatory science 
and laboratory science. Regulatory science, she argues, operates under political and 
democratic pressures that laboratory science does not. To give just one of many 
examples, laboratory science can take its time getting to new discoveries while 
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regulatory science must acquire knowledge quickly and often moves forward with 
imperfect information. Ultimately, regulatory science is more open to political and social 
pressures than laboratory science. In her definition, “science policy” is the hybrid 
decision-making process that emerges from this tension between scientific and 
democratic influences, including “both scientific and policy considerations” (49). In The 
Fifth Branch, Jasanoff shows us different regulatory eras, in the balance between 
scientific-regulatory decision-making and judicial decision-making, and their deference 
to one another, can lead to “flawed decisions.” A decision may not be flawed only 
because it leads to some crisis, such as in thalidomide, but because it regulates 
unnecessarily, as was the case with saccharine. The point, for our purposes, is that 
science policy is that particular arena in which scientists and policymakers try to strike 
the balance between democratic and technocratic visions of governance.  
Although I will borrow Jasanoff’s definition of “science policy,” it is important to 
note that this dissertation concerns a different aspect of science policy than that of 
Jasanoff. The regulatory science that Jasanoff studied functions under different political 
and judicial pressures than laboratory science and forces it to draw different boundaries 
than laboratory science, but regulatory science is, nonetheless, still science. In the 
cases for this dissertation, I do not follow the regulatory science aspect of science 
policy. There are several reasons for this, but most importantly, we come to each of 
these cases – rDNA, the Human Genome Project, and nanotechnology – in their 
earliest stages. At that point, there would have been little for them to regulate, and thus 
little to study in terms of regulatory science.3 I study, instead, the early approaches by 
scientists and administrators to deal, prophylactically, with the democratic pressures 
they know that they are going to face. I study their attempts to imagine an effective 
balance between democratic and technocratic visions of their scientific endeavor and 
the way these play out once their attempts are executed. 
In terms of considerations about acceptable and unacceptable science policy, 
and the balance of democratic and technocratic visions, I argue in this dissertation that 
                                            
3 Nanotechnology complicates this somewhat. In some ways, “nanotechnology” became a term to envision future 
possibilities in science, while it also functioned as an umbrella term that covered research already being done in 
materials science. Some of those materials could have been subject to regulatory scientific research, but they would 
not have been “nanotechnology,” properly speaking. Once they were included under the umbrella of nanotechnology, 
they benefitted from the science-policy boundary setting done for the larger National Nanotechnology Initiative. 
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scientists and administrators have moved increasingly towards the appearance of 
embracing the democratic vision when establishing ideas about what constitutes 
acceptable science policy. As I stated earlier, the Asilomar conference was more 
strongly technocratic while the NNI was more strongly democratic. The Human Genome 
Project, unsurprisingly, falls between the two. This project evidenced changes in what 
non-scientific (e.g. ethical) ideas scientists were willing to consider as well as what non-
scientists to whom they would listen. The shift towards a more democratic vision of 
science, however, seems to have been partly spectacle. In his critique of the decline of 
public culture, Ezrahi argues that the attestive visual culture in America has given away 
to mere spectacle. The performance of proper actions, even devoid of meaningful 
consequences, can often stand in for more substantive and consequential actions. As 
scientists and administrators adopted more democracy, they also relied more on the 
appearance of democratic engagement. I will argue, however, that this had more to do 
with the limitations inherent in the science policy domain – in the case of democratic 
engagement, administrators not knowing what they wanted democratic engagement to 
achieve or how to measure its impacts –than bad intentions. Perhaps the most 
fundamental epistemological limitation to effective science policy, however, is the nature 
of risk, to which we now turn. 
Science and Trust in The Risk Society 
Much of the work of science policy boils down to the management of risk and 
uncertainty. There are historical reasons for this. In the early twentieth century, people 
had much more faith in science as the arbiter of progress and not a potential arbiter of 
crisis. Following several high-profile public health crises, particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s, most famously as depicted by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), people 
began to question the sanctity of science. Since then, much of science policy has been 
directed towards the question “Is this technology safe enough?” (Wynne 2005). 
Answering this question for areas of emerging technoscience has proven enormously 
difficult. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck helps us understand why. 
Beck argued that risk and uncertainty have emerged as defining elements of 
modern society (1992). He was a German scholar working in a particularly German 
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context. Germany’s experience with Nazi science has given its citizenry an enduring 
anxiety about uncontrolled or harmful science, particularly when it comes to the 
biosciences (Gottweiss 1998). Risk, Beck argued, has changed fundamentally from the 
pre-industrial to the industrial to the modern eras. This change is summarized in Table 
I.1 (Beck 1992, Zinn 2008). Risks in pre-industrial times were a product of the caprice of 
nature. No one was to blame, for instance, for the eruption of a volcano. Industrial era 
risks were better understood and so were both theoretically controllable and therefore a 
subject of blame for not having controlled them. If factory managers, for instance, can 
identify dangerous working conditions and fix them, then workers can blame them for 
failing to avoid an accident. Reflecting a classic liberal ideology, however, Beck argues 
that workers are always free to work somewhere else than in the factory. Industrial risks 
are therefore controllable and voluntary.  
 
Table I.1 Temporal Typology of Risks adapted from Zinn (2008) 
 
Risk Source Voluntariness Control 
Pre-industrial God or Nature Involuntary & Unpredictable Uncontrollable & Blame-free 
Industrial Man-made Voluntary & Individual Controllable & Blame-Worthy 
Modern Man-made Involuntary & Dispersed 
Collectively 
Not Controllable & Blame-
Worthy 
 
Modern risks, on the other hand, are neither controllable nor voluntary. The 
development of modern science leads to risks that cannot be contained. For this 
reason, Beck refers to science as a form of “organized irresponsibility” (1992b). Michel 
Callon (2009) takes the problem a step further. Callon argues that the “term” risk has 
become a catchall for what are really two phenomena. Risk, he argues, should refer to 
phenomena about which the possible outcomes are knowable, but their likelihood 
remains unknown. Uncertainty, on the other hand, should describe phenomena about 
which we cannot even know the range of possible outcomes, to say nothing of their 
likelihood. Emerging technoscientific projects more often pose problems of uncertainty 
rather than simply quantifiable risk. 
Beck argues that this sets the stage for a rise in the public distrust of science. 
The public, he argues, can tell that scientific development subjects them to risks over 
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which they have no control. This leads to a general feeling of alienation from the project 
of scientific progress at the heart of modernity (Jasanoff 1999). To take a modern 
example, no one whose Samsung phone battery exploded in 2016 could have known 
that an exploding phone was even a possibility, much less have made decisions to 
mitigate their risk. Has the public become more fearful of science? The answer is 
complicated. In general, it does seem that there has been a decline in trust in science in 
the U.S. and Europe. One factor in the decline of trust in science seems to be related to 
one’s education in science (Allum et al. 2008, Gauchat 2008, 2010), though the 
statistical significance for this finding is not strong. Nonetheless, scientists and science 
agency administrators have used this finding as the focal point for their efforts in 
bolstering public trust in science. We will turn to this in a moment. A more important 
factor seems to be one’s political and religious beliefs. The decline of trust in science in 
the U.S. since the 1970s is not just a general decline but is rather far more pronounced 
among conservatives and more religious people (Gauchat 2012). If alienation from the 
project of modernity is the root of the public’s distrust in science, that alienation is not 
experienced evenly among the populace. However, it may not be felt evenly within 
individuals as well. Often people have both fears and hopes about the future of 
emerging technoscience, leading to a general ambivalence (Cobb and Macoubrie 
2004). I have called this a public trust problem, but Beck’s insight was that it is really a 
science and modernization problem. People distrust science because it is like the 
Golem from Jewish legend: equally powerful and uncontrollable (Collins and Pinch 
1993). The key, it seemed, was to try to control risks through quantification. 
The effort to manage risk through quantification came from a general desire to 
stabilize bureaucratic administration and, as such, was imbued with social, political, and 
institutional values and judgments that led to its development. Risk analysis began as a 
way to facilitate capital investment in overseas endeavors and the earliest insurance 
industries (Hacking 1990). Investors were more likely to invest capital if they knew they 
were covered should the ship sink. For life insurance, both capital investors and 
customers need to know that the company will make decisions such that it continues to 
exist (Porter 1995).  These risk estimates relied on local managerial knowledge and 
expertise about individuals, nearby populations, and local conditions. With the 
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expansion of society, and bureaucratic management that increasingly had to operate at 
long distances, the actors involved did not necessarily trust the expert judgment of 
someone far away (Porter 1995). The problem of trust over long distances that we see 
for capitalist ventures like shipping and life insurance was equally true for expanding 
polities. Calls for objective methods of quantification, in this case cost-benefit analysis, 
arose in the U.S. in the context of large-scale water projects. The most vociferous calls 
for objective quantification did so to downplay the validity of expert human judgment at 
the Army Corps of Engineers. It should come as no surprise that quantification found a 
more fertile cultural climate in the U.S. than it did in France, with its greater embrace of 
cultures of expertise, or Germany, with its broader acceptance for different forms of 
authority (Jasanoff 1990, Porter 1995). The point for our purposes is that supposedly 
objective methods of quantification, such as actuarial estimates, mortality tables, and 
risk assessments, cannot escape their basis in human judgment and the institutional, 
political, and social pressures that influence the gathering and interpreting of such data. 
Uncertainty and the methods for dealing with it reveal a certain form of politics. 
Additionally, methods of quantification, despite their admitted power and flourishing 
capabilities, can never achieve the “perfectly objective, god’s-eye view” that it would 
take to solve the problem of uncertainty (Jasanoff 1999). Finally, the very act of 
reducing the problems associated with emerging technologies to risk and uncertainty, to 
the exclusion of all other types of moral and ethical concerns, presupposes a worldview 
in which technological change and social progress through science are values held 
above most others. As Beck argues, and as the distrust of science by conservatives 
should indicate, this worldview is anything but universal. 
Given the difficulty in taming risk itself, several approaches have emerged to deal 
with the public trust problem in science and technology (Fischhoff 1995, Jasanoff 2011). 
I will highlight three trends in the course of these developments for modes of 
governance of science, borrowing from examples in the siting of hazardous facilities and 
from the handling of environmental crises.  
In the first mode, scientists and industries, particularly those that pose 
environmental hazards such as chemical and power plants, simply hope that publics will 
not scrutinize them too heavily. Industry efforts to avoid a health or environmental crisis 
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boil down to “getting the numbers right” (Fischhoff 1995), meaning they do adequate 
early risk assessments. It should be clear that his emerged directly out of the cultures of 
quantification discussed above, which was most prominent in the U.S. In the event of 
public opposition or worse, an environmental crisis, the relevant industry would turn to 
public relations for damage control of their public image. That public relations work is 
largely oriented towards defending whatever had been decided prior to the opposition or 
crisis. This has been dubbed the Decide, Announce, and Defend (DAD) model (Bennett 
2010, Ducsick and Austin 1979, Covello et al. 1988, Renn 2008). The siting of a nuclear 
waste storage site in Yucca Mountain in Nevada is a good example. The site had been 
studied by the Department of Energy (DOE) since 1978 and construction was supposed 
to begin receiving spent nuclear waste by 1998. It was met with bitter local opposition 
by people from the Western Shoshone tribes and two-thirds of non-native Nevadans 
(Stern and Fineberg 1996). They argued that they should not have to store spent 
nuclear waste when Nevada had no nuclear power plants. Congress and the DOE did 
not anticipate, when making their decision, how local people would respond. They made 
their decision, announced it, and spent years trying to defend it against opposition 
groups. 
The second mode also involved communicating with the public but moved 
“upstream.” These efforts were upstream in two senses. In the first sense, these efforts 
are upstream temporally, in that they came before decisions had been made or a crisis 
unfolded. Second, this engagement was upstream administratively, in that it was 
motivated by scientists, regulators, and industry actors instead of displeased citizens, 
grassroots organizations, or civil society groups (Kasperson and Kasperson 2005). This 
approach to communicating with the public raised another problem. Many scientists felt 
that the public did not always understand science enough to respond properly to their 
communicative efforts. The public, some scientists felt, overestimated the degree of 
risk, failed to understand the nature of the risk or, worse yet, had value-laden concerns 
outside of the realm of risk and benefit entirely (Reyna 2004, Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). To address this, a branch of psychology arose to figure out what the public 
thought about science, how they evaluated it, and ultimately to train the public to think in 
more scientific terms. This came to be known as the “deficit model” of public 
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engagement and gave rise to specialized journals such as the Public Understanding of 
Science. The deficit model is so named because it focuses, as I indicated earlier, on the 
public as the source of the distrust problem rather than anything to do with how science 
and technology are developed and implemented (Irwin 2001, Lezaun and Soneryd 
2007, Wynne 2005, Yearley 2000). The deficit model is still probably the modal 
approach in communicating to publics about science. Besides what most agree is an 
ongoing failure to properly train the public another problem arose. Many of the publics 
so engaged by these models identified a deficit of their own, this time found in the 
approach by science and industry. Scientists, they thought, too readily dismissed public 
concerns, especially ethical and moral concerns that were not strictly scientific or 
concerned with risk and benefit (Frewer 1999, Frewer & Salter 2002, Hess 2010, Irwin 
2001, MacNaughten 2005, 2008, Powell and Kleinman 2008, Scheufele and Lewenstein 
2008, Wynne 2005, 2006). The most recent efforts have begun trying to address the 
problems with the deficit approach. 
In the final and most recent mode, scientists and science funding administrators 
in the U.S. began borrowing strategies from their counterparts in Germany, the U.K. and 
Denmark, adopting models of public engagement to supplement deficit models of public 
communication (Habermas 1991). Ideally, this constituted a move away from the “deficit 
model” to a more inclusionary paradigm. This inclusionary paradigm attempts to take 
public concerns seriously in situ, without trying to pre-determine the relevance of those 
concerns (Irwin 2006, Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007). In practice, however, public 
engagement in the U.S. often breaks from the normative theory that motivated it, with 
the effect that it still contains some elements of the deficit model that preceded it. For 
instance, most public engagement events still start with an expert panel or the 
presentation of scientific information, which frames the range of possible issues for 
public discussion. Often these informational presentations set a tone favorable to the 
science in question or even preclude discussion of certain issues. For instance, I 
participated in a series of NIH-funded public engagement events in 2013 where 
participants discussed informed consent around biobanking. Biobanking involves the 
storage of DNA for purposes of research. Participants were supposed to deliberate 
about a mode of informed consent for obtaining DNA from donors. New to the idea of 
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biobanking, however, participants often wanted to discuss their concerns about storing 
DNA, to say nothing of the informed consent used to obtain such samples. They were 
not allowed to do so, however. The informational sessions that began the session 
framed biobanking in a decidedly positive light, stressing the value of biobanks and the 
many safeguards they employ to protect DNA samples and donors’ identities. 
Scientists, funding agency administrators, and scholars in the social sciences 
and humanities have voiced their support for this turn to public engagement, albeit 
probably for different reasons and different understandings of public engagement. 
Scientists see it as one solution to their public trust problem, policymakers and funding 
administrators use it to symbolically evidence their commitment to public accountability, 
while scholars see it as making science more democratic (Jasanoff 2003, Wynne 2006). 
While few argue against the democratic intentions of engagement, several argue that it 
fails in practice. Jasanoff (2003), who advocates for the inclusion of citizens in 
technoscientific development, critiques these engagement practices as too narrowly 
focused on technocratic considerations, to the exclusion of normative questions like the 
very purpose of technoscientific development. The “technologies of hubris,” that exclude 
moral and normative concerns, should become “technologies of humility.” Alan Irwin 
(2006) argues that the new modes of governance are too tainted by older modes to 
constitute a new paradigm. Brian Wynne (2006), original critic of the deficit model, says 
that the new engagement models do not allow their own science-policy culture to 
become a matter of dialogue – one of the core components of Habermas’s theory of 
deliberative democracy. Instead of fostering trust, it is more likely to foment distrust of 
that practice. Cooke and Kothari (2001) call this turn to engagement the “Tyranny of 
Participation.” According to them, engagement is simply a new means of enforcing the 
will of industries and state governments, with the added benefit that they can dress up 
that enforcement in the trappings of democracy. With a somewhat less insidious focus, 
Kasperson and Kasperson (2005) consider engagement a solution ill fitted to its 
problem. Engagement has become a bandwagon upon which policymakers and 
scientists have blindly jumped without knowing what makes engagement effective or 
when it has successfully improved public trust. U.S. policymakers adopted public 
engagement as the most recent strategy for fostering public trust and securing support 
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for technoscientific development by performing their accountability to the public. In its 
ideal form, public engagement fosters more democratic science development and even 
helps train citizens in civic engagement. In its less than ideal forms, however, it is little 
more than a spectacle, in Ezrahi’s terms, meant to bolster support for technoscience 
without changing the substance of its development. 
Each of the cases for this research is a technoscientific subfield or research area 
in the U.S. fearful of public anxiety and backlash. In each, scientists and funding 
administrators must deal with the risk and uncertainty of science and the public distrust 
to which those elements give rise. In each case, scientists or administrators have used 
one or a combination of these strategies to fix their trust problem and, ultimately, protect 
their autonomy from too much public scrutiny or regulatory overreach. In so doing, 
scientists in each research area or scientific subfield studied here worked to maintain 
their autonomy, in part, by solidifying the power of their scientific credibility and 
expertise. The fact that their research finds itself embroiled in the concerns of the risk 
society, however, presupposes an influence from outside of science itself. Thus, their 
practices for dealing with public concerns wound up re-defining credibility and expertise 
in light of public concerns, in order to protect their autonomy. 
Autonomy  
The motivation to secure public trust was first and foremost motivated by the 
need to protect scientific autonomy, which seemed threatened by the deconstructing 
potential of too much public scrutiny (Irwin 2006, Jasanoff 1990, 2011, Slovic 1993). 
Autonomy is of central concern to scientists, who have had to fight for it since the dawn 
of science (Gieryn 1999). What does it mean for science to have autonomy? Robert 
Merton seemed to reflect scientists’ preferred vision of their enterprise when he framed 
autonomy as freedom from external influence. Concerned about what he saw as anti-
science viewpoints would do to science, he wrote that “the social stability of science can 
be ensured only if adequate defences are set up against changes imposed from outside 
the fraternity itself” (1938: 328). Two elements of this stand out. First, the autonomy 
Merton describes is conditioned upon exclusion. Changes emanating from without 
science require defenses. Second, insufficient autonomy threatens the very existence of 
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science. In this, Merton reflects many earlier thinkers, such as Condorcet, Bacon, and 
Saint-Simon, who thought that scientists should be left alone, not only so that they could 
get on with their work but also because the empirical and objective nature of scientific 
work provided the model of an ideally rational society (Turner 2008).  
Although scientific autonomy has never been free from political and social 
influences (Guston 2000, 2004, Jasanoff et al. 2006, Pielke Jr. 2004, Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985), there is a pervasive sense, particularly among scientists, that science 
once enjoyed far greater autonomy. It is now a matter of scientific lore that science 
enjoyed a Golden Age of peak autonomy in the 1950s, much like that of medicine of 
that same era (Guston and Keniston 1994, Lewenstein 1999, Parsons 1951). Scientists 
and doctors had near total authority to conduct their work as they saw fit. For scientists, 
this usually harkens back to a speech by Vannevar Bush in 1945 titled Science, the 
Endless Frontier that led to the passage of the National Science Foundation Act of 
19504. With the passage of the NSF Act came a new “social contract for science” in 
which the federal government would fund basic research and, in return, science would 
produce “a steady stream of discoveries that can be translated into products, medicines, 
or weapons” (Guston and Keniston 1994:2). In this arrangement, “the federal 
government provided the money” while “science provided the discoveries and kept its 
own house in order” (13). David Guston and Kenneth Keniston show how this was 
never really the case. Even in the supposed Golden Era, federal funding did not mean a 
“blank check” and science was never apolitical or free from social influences. The 
patronage of the federal government came with significant strings attached. Those 
strings led most directly back to science funding and regulatory agencies, however. As I 
will argue in the context of the Asilomar conference, scientists in the U.S. did not yet 
always see the force of what Jasanoff has called “civic epistemology,” the larger set of 
institutions, agencies, and concerned public who evaluate the results of scientific 
practice. This recalls Elliott Freidson (1970) who argued, in the context of medicine, that 
autonomy is not something established from within a field but rather as a product of the 
patronage and protection of the state, which effectively grants such autonomy. Michel 
                                            
4 Daniel Kevles argues that the idea for the NSF actually came earlier, from a now-forgotten New Deal senator, Harry 
Kilgore, Jr. (Kevles 1977). Nonetheless, even recent scholarship treats Bush and his speech as the seminal moment 
for the NSF. 
18 
 
Callon (Callon 1987, Callon et al. 1986) and Bruno Latour (1987) developed this into a 
larger theory of enrollment. The most successful scientists, they argue, effectively enroll 
a variety of non-scientific actors and material resources that make scientific work 
possible.5 Enrollment works both ways, however. Enrolling an actor into a project 
means being enrolled yourself by that actor as well. Susan Cozzens (1990) interpreted 
enrollment as a challenge to the Golden Age view of scientific autonomy. The most 
successful scientists are often the ones most enrolled by those whom they enroll. In the 
social contract for science, the federal funding agencies became the most important 
single actor for individual scientists or research projects to enroll. Additionally, Latour 
observed that enrollment works both ways. Scientists who enroll important actors and 
resources are in turn enrolled by those same actors and resources. Accepting federal 
research funding means also adopting state goals and being subject to state scrutiny. 
Despite his ideal vision of scientific autonomy, Merton actually understood this 
process of enrollment. He saw it, however, more as a problem to be avoided or 
corrected rather than simply the way science is done. Using Nazi Germany as an 
extreme case, Merton argued that the politics of the nation state intervene on science, 
infecting it with non-scientific values and goals. The public, fooled by “myths…clothed in 
scientific jargon,” can only hinder scientific progress by forcing scientists to deal with 
their irrational fears (1938: 333). Science, in Merton’s view, deserves more autonomy 
than it receives. Scientists generally agree. It was not until the controversy around rDNA 
research, the first case of this project, that scientists began to accept what Guston and 
Keniston (1994) call the “populist tension” between science and democracy. This 
tension arises from the fact that while democracy must pay heed to citizens’ concerns, 
science traditionally has not had to do the same. Although scientists and their political 
allies often make discursive use of the scientific Golden Age and the ideal of Mertonian 
autonomy, the cases for this research show moments where they have embraced the 
populist tension and what it means for scientific autonomy.  
Susan Cozzens has described scientific autonomy as “mastery or control over 
the relevant environment” which “combines resource acquisition and defensive policy 
                                            
5 We may even see parallels in the social movement theory of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977). 
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clout along with self-governance” (1990:167). She defines scientific autonomy by 
dividing it into four types, common to STS and social science scholarship: 
1. The condition of a collectivity that has established a social identity, a 
relatively stable resource base, and a system of internal control. 
2. The exercise of discretion by individuals in their work. 
3. The ability of scientists to set long-term career or project goals and have 
the resources to carry them out. 
4. A condition of science as a whole or the science of a particular nation. 
Cozzens’s motivation for this typology came from a paradox she identified in 
Latour and Callon’s concept of enrollment. From an enrollment perspective, the most 
autonomous science would be the least successful and the most successful science 
would be the least autonomous. She wanted to understand how the most enrolled 
scientists retain any autonomy. To explain this, Cozzens borrows from Weberian 
concepts of power and authority. She offers two ways in which scientists’ power and 
authority help them retain a modicum of autonomy: influence and competitive edge. 
Influence is the respected afforded to authoritative proclamations, like the scientific 
advice of a science adviser. Competitive edge is the ability to exert one’s will against the 
will of others. In those domains where scientific expertise enjoys a high degree of 
authority, such as within the laboratory or in science funding agencies, influence and 
competitive edge function best. For scientific work, then, a scientist may enroll others 
while still acting from a privileged position. These expressions of power and authority 
function less well, however, for domains that only intersect with science, or where 
scientific authority is not at the top of the authority hierarchy. In science policy domains, 
for instance, scientific authority runs up against the populist tension discussed above. 
This does not stop scientists from trying to treat the science policy domain as if it were 
strictly a scientific domain where their base of authority can ensure greater autonomy. 
Autonomy plays centrally for this dissertation for two reasons. First, autonomy 
remains one of the chief concerns of the scientists studied here. It is fundamental to 
scientists’ sense of themselves, the importance and value of their work, and their 
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confidence in the health of science overall. The pursuit of autonomy, therefore, occupies 
much of their thought and actions. Second, this research challenges a common view of 
autonomy as either: (1) simply a process of excluding the influence of non-scientists or 
(2) something that only scientists and their immediate allies can maintain.  This 
research suggests that autonomy is no longer solely concerned with the strict 
demarcation between the inside and outside of scientific inquiry. Rather, scientists win 
autonomy through a carefully managed process of inclusion and exclusion. Scientists 
and science agencies have become aware of the populist tension and the situated 
nature of their autonomy in a world where science and its modes of governance co-
produce one another (Callon et al. 2009, Funtowicz and Ravetz 1995, Jasanoff 2004). 
Although I will discuss co-production in detail below, it is enough to say here that 
science is not developed purely in laboratories free from the influence of other 
institutions of governance and even public opinion. Rather, science develops in a larger 
social and political context of which, I will argue, scientists and science agency 
administrators have become increasingly aware. In this dissertation, I argue that, in 
order to accommodate this, scientists and administrators at funding agencies have 
increasingly enrolled non-scientific actors and non-scientific ideas into technoscientific 
development. By non-scientific actors, I mean not just non-scientists broadly. Scientists 
enroll a common set of non-scientists into the usual development of technoscience, 
particularly policymakers, representatives of private industries, capital investors, and 
regulators. This dissertation studies the enrollment of social scientists and the lay 
public, whom scientists and administrators historically have not directly enrolled into 
non-medical laboratory research. By non-scientific ideas, I refer to moral and ethical 
concerns that scientists have historically discounted as too value laden to warrant 
consideration for technoscientific development (Proctor 1991). To accommodate these 
new elements, scientists and administrators introduced changes in how they defined 
acceptable science policy and adopted a view of their own autonomy that sees it as a 
more negotiated process rather than simply being left alone to do their work. 
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Credibility 
Credibility is one of the foundations for the scientific claim to epistemic authority 
and autonomy. Credibility practices, such as peer review, are largely internal to the 
scientific field in question6. It is one ways that science “keeps its house in order” under 
the social contract for science. Scientific practices for earning and maintaining 
credibility, argues Steven Shapin, transform what would otherwise be unsubstantiated 
belief into authoritative knowledge (1995). Latour and Woolgar similarly framed 
credibility as playing a central role for scientific knowledge-production. They viewed 
science as a system of “literary inscription,” a social process whereby laborious 
research leads, most importantly, to publications. In this process, earning, maintaining, 
and recognizing credibility serves as scientists’ main motivation ([1979]1986). So, 
credibility shapes the production of scientific knowledge but how does it shape the 
boundaries of science? 
Thomas Gieryn (1999) gives us three ways in which credibility supports 
autonomy. It does so through processes of: (1) exclusion, (2) expansion, and (3) 
expulsion. These function variously to maintain a boundary in place or to move the 
boundary. As a practice of exclusion, credibility stops anyone from entering into the 
scientific domain who does not have the requisite training, certification, and experience. 
As I have indicated earlier, the rise of citizen science and “maker-spaces” (informal 
experimental spaces) in recent years have challenged this exclusion to some degree 
(Bonney et al. 2004, Irwin 2002, Lindtner 2014). It would take a broad recognition by 
many scientific communities to change, fundamentally, what counts as credible for 
these to be fully recognized as science, however. Taken on its own, credibility functions, 
in part, to keep out those individuals and ideas that have not gone through well-
established vetting procedures or successful negotiation of worksite practices in the 
laboratory for inclusion into science (Latour and Woolgar 1979). Second, credibility 
helps scientific subfields expand into new areas when scientists in those fields identify 
                                            
6 Kinchy and Kleinman (2003) have argued that even scientific credibility intersects with public values and thus is not 
strictly internal to science. They give the example of scientists engaging the public. The public introduces ideas of 
“purity” and “utility” in their own ideas of scientific credibility. They deem scientists with deep ties to industry as less 
credible. While true, I think this has limited application here since their case involved direct contact with the public that 
scientists try to avoid. In other words, whether or not there is a social element to scientific credibility, scientists try to 
keep credibility practices internal to their domains. 
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problems to which they can contribute or even solve. This expansion is similar to the 
practice of medicalization (Conrad 1990, Freidson 1970, Zola 1972). Physicians attempt 
to expand the power of medicine by applying it to previously non-medical realms. The 
more social worlds over which an institution claims authority, the more power that 
institution enjoys. The most common example is alcoholism. Alcoholism was effectively 
medicalized once it became a disease rather than a moral failing. There are limits to the 
value of such expansion. Being enrolled into ethical debates, for instance, can threaten 
a scientist’s credibility because doing so violates the fact-value divide that is key to the 
epistemic authority of science (Proctor 1991). Jonathan Beckwith, bioscientist and early 
member of the activist group Science for the People, reflected upon this. “A rule of the 
culture of science until then [the 1960s to early 1970s] had been that scientists didn’t 
contaminate themselves with public contact.” He continued, “Those of us who raised 
concerns about the social consequence of science were mistrusted by other scientists” 
(Beckwith 2002:157-158). This is less true for high-status, late career, or otherwise well-
established scientists, but can negatively impact early career scientists. Carl Sagan, for 
instance, took early criticism for getting involved in the popularization of science before 
he had secured his professional credibility (Gregory and Miller 1998). Finally, scientists 
who fail credibility contests can either have their research expelled as scientific 
knowledge or even find themselves expelled as scientists. Andrew Wakefield’s article 
attempting to show a connection between vaccines and autism is one example of 
knowledge that was eventually expelled (Godlee et al. 2011). Gieryn gives us an 
example of expelled scientists in the chemists Martin Fleischman and Stanley Pons. 
Fleischman and Pons made headlines in 1989 when they announced to major media 
outlets the early results of their research into “cold fusion.” The discovery would have 
meant essentially limitless energy at almost no cost. They violated scientific norms of 
credibility, however, by turning to the news media about their research before it had 
been properly vetted through any kind of peer-review. They were vociferously criticized 
by their fellow scientists, some calling them outright frauds. Their research could not be 
replicated. The cold fusion energy revolution never came to fruition. After this, both of 
them left the United States to work for a Toyota research laboratory in France. 
Fleischman and Pons’ crucial mistake was to externalize what should have been an 
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internal credibility contest. They used the media and public excitement to get attention 
for their research before it had been given the scientific stamp of approval. They so 
violated the norms of credibility that they had to leave academic science. 
This dissertation shows instances where scientists and administrators deploy the 
rhetoric of credibility when (re)negotiating ideas of acceptable science policy. 
Importantly, science policy is not science, not even the regulatory science that Jasanoff 
describes, so these are not credibility contests as Gieryn defines them. Nonetheless, 
scientists and administrators borrow from the institutional logics with which they are 
most familiar, including the language of credibility and expertise, when arguing about 
what non-scientific ideas and actors should be considered acceptable for science policy.  
Expertise 
While credibility refers to a social vetting process, expertise refers to the authority 
afforded certain epistemological or experiential training. In the context of science, 
credibility is used to exclude or expel people whose research or training are not 
recognized by other scientists as appropriate or relevant. Expertise is both an element 
in that determination – whether one has credible expertise to be deemed credible – and 
a product of that – the social recognition of one’s expertise is partly dependent on 
community recognition of the authority and credibility acquired by the institutions 
provided one’s training (Jasanoff 2004, 2005, Ottinger 2013, Wynne 1996). Thus, 
expertise and credibility are intimately connected. Harry Collins (1985) argues, for 
instance, that if you try to trace expertise to its roots, you wind up with credibility. The 
expertise we afford someone who has conducted an experiment boils down to the trust 
we have that their experiment was conducted faithfully and accurately.7 At some point, 
we trust the experiment and the expert because they have built up past credibility. 
Similarly, Peter Dear (2004) argues convincingly that expertise cannot be separated 
from one’s scientific authority, which is also a product of credibility. Expertise is 
constructed with networks of people who not only hold heterogeneous levels of 
knowledge, but also power and authority (Ottinger 2013). This is not to say that 
                                            
7 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2010) have written about the difficulties in reproducing many experiments 
which, according to scientific method, is supposed to be the source of faith in an experiment.  
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expertise has no basis in rarefied knowledge and skills or even reality. Brian Wynne 
(2003), in his critique of Collins and Evans, admits that some kind of realism is 
unavoidable when talking about expertise. Expertise, however, is contextually 
dependent. One has expertise in some field or body of knowledge and expertise in 
scientific domains does not necessarily translate to expertise in the science policy 
domain. We will say more about this momentarily. There are two salient points for now, 
though. First, expertise is socially constructed, but often is not treated as such, 
especially among more technocratically-minded scientists, administrators, and 
policymakers in the U.S. When the social construction of expertise goes 
unacknowledged, it comes to look universally authoritative for all questions of science in 
society. Scientific expertise renders scientists the only relevant actors in science, even 
for ethical issues, political issues, and issues related to the public good. Other kinds of 
expertise are treated as irrelevant. Second, whereas credibility is a social process more 
often deployed by scientists to police the internal boundaries of science against other 
scientists, they use expertise to police the external boundaries of science against non-
scientists. This is not a strict rule, however, as a scientist in one area may argue that a 
scientist in another area lacks the expertise to have credible insights into the former’s 
field. Furthermore, scientific credibility is not a monolithic type that a scientists either 
has or does not have, but rather a process continually negotiated in the laboratory, in 
conferences, and in peer review, among other venues (Frickel and Moore 2006). 
Nonetheless, these credibility processes are directed more at scientists and scientific 
claims rather than non-scientists.  
One of the key threads of STS scholarship on expertise are the difficulties it 
creates for the ideology of liberal democratic governance (Blok 2007, Ezrahi 1990, 
Jasanoff 1992, 2007, Sclove 1995, Weinberg and Elliott 2012). Scientists enjoy a 
privileged place in an epistemically unequal arrangement. When the issues are purely 
technological or scientific, such as whether vaccines really do cause autism, then strictly 
scientific expertise is relevant. When the issues intersect with ethical or moral concerns 
or democratic values, however, then strictly scientists can extend their authority into 
realms in which they do not have sufficient expertise (Kleinman 2000, Sclove 1995, 
Wynne 2003). As Brian Wynne (2003) notes, in commenting on Collins and Evans, 
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there is a significant difference between scientific expertise extended to the public 
domain for “technological artefacts” and issues related to the scientific discipline on the 
one side and “wider interventions” that issues of public meaning, including narratives of 
science in society and networks of power. Scientific expertise cannot answer these 
questions for a democratic society as these have more to do with the distribution of 
resources, national priorities, and commonly held values. Nonetheless, scientific 
expertise usually enjoys a privileged position in these decisions as well. 
While having expertise often gives scientists a privileged position in policy- and 
decision-making domains, not having it justifies the exclusion of non-scientists from 
those same domains. Studying breast cancer and life-form patent activism, Shobita 
Parthasarathy (2010, 2017) calls this the “expertise barrier,” which she defines as "the 
formal and informal rules of a science and technology policy-making domain which 
make it difficult for those without technical expertise to engage as equals" (2010:355). 
Parthasarathy joins other scholars in showing how activists have overcome this 
expertise barrier (Epstein 1996, Frickel and Moore 2006, Frickel et al. 2010, Hess 2007, 
2010, Kinchy 2012, Moore 2009, Tesh 1988). Brian Wynne call these forms of activism 
“uninvited participation” (2007). The fundamental lesson, besides the fact that the 
expertise barrier can be overcome, is that it usually must be overcome in the first place. 
Scientists were not inviting these individuals into the domains of research or policy to 
share their opinions. If an activist overcomes the credibility problem by successfully 
proving their relevance to a scientific issue, usually by making themselves a problem for 
science or industry in some way, those resisting their efforts will erect the expertise 
barrier, arguing that they do not have sufficient expertise to participate.  
Furthermore, in deploying strategies to overcome the expertise barrier, activists 
do not always challenge the fundamental power and authority of scientific expertise. 
Instead, they either make themselves scientifically credible or supplement scientific 
expertise with expertise of another kind. Steven Epstein’s AIDS activists, for instance, 
acquired sufficient scientific expertise to gain credibility and legitimacy in medical 
domains. They essentially gained entry into the technocratic domain on terms set by 
that domain. Brian Wynne’s Cumbrian sheep-farmers supplemented physicists’ 
somewhat flawed knowledge of radioactive decay with knowledge about the behavior of 
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sheep. Policy around sheep farming in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster focused only 
on physicists’ knowledge about soil and radioactive decay (1996). It failed to take into 
account sheep-farmers’ expertise about sheep and land with the result that many sheep 
were unnecessarily tainted with radioactive fallout. Neither of these approaches fully 
supplant the privileged role of scientific expertise. 
Activists have used strategies that have presented a more fundamental 
challenge to scientific expertise. Parthsarathy (2017) gives us three examples of this in 
her research on life-patent activism: (1) introducing new kinds of facts, (2) introducing 
new policy-making logics, and (3) attacking bureaucratic rules. For each of these, 
activists have obviated the power and relative privilege of scientific experts by moving 
the discourse away from scientific expertise. David Hess (2010) gives another example. 
His research into scientific counter-publics shows cases where social movements have 
been able to affect what scientists research. They use the power of large-scale public 
activism to supplant the authority of scientists in making these decisions. Nonetheless, 
scientific expertise is something to overcome, side step, or add onto in order to carve 
out a space for other kinds of knowledge, other kinds of claims, or other kinds of actors. 
There has also been a strain of theory about expertise that attempts use it to 
justify the inclusion of non-scientists in decision- and policy-making. This, ultimately, 
was Brian Wynne’s argument in his research into the Cumbrian sheep-farmers (1996). 
He wanted to show that even for an issue as seemingly purely scientific as the 
irradiation of sheep following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, other forms of expertise 
proved relevant and consequential. Harry Collins and Robert Evans turned this into a 
general principle with their somewhat contentious theory of expertise. They argue that 
the problem of public distrust in science, discussed above, is essentially a “legitimacy 
problem” in scientific governance whereby the political legitimacy and authority of 
scientific expertise has diminished. They give us three types of experts: (1) contributory 
experts who contribute to the production of new scientific knowledge; (2) interactional 
experts who may understand some set of scientific ideas well enough to teach them or 
speak intelligently about them, but cannot contribute to the production of new scientific 
knowledge – science teachers, museum employees, and even informed social scientists 
of science may be included here – and (3) non-experts, who simply have no scientific 
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expertise. This leaves them irrelevant for purposes of science policy- and decision-
making. Collins and Evans (2007) later sub-divided the “no expertise” category to reflect 
gradations of scientific knowledge among the lay public. They called this “beer mat” 
knowledge and the knowledge that comes from paying attention to informed public 
discourse. Robert Evans and Alexandra Plows tried to turn this theory of expertise into 
an argument for the inclusion of lay people in science policy- and decision-making. 
Their theory, which has a surface resemblance to Wynne, defines lay people as experts 
in “the good life” (2007). Wynne has critiques Collins and Evans, however, for arriving at 
a theory of expertise that ignores its social construction and the practices of credibility 
and authority that give it its power (Jasanoff 1998, 2004, Ottinger 2013, Wynne 1996). 
Additionally, Wynne counters that the “legitimacy problem” that Collins and Evans 
identify in terms of respecting expertise is really a problem of public meaning. Scientists, 
administrators, private industries, and policymakers do not always respond to people’s 
reasonable concerns about the development of technoscience. That takes us back to 
the problem of public trust, however, which we have already covered. For our purposes, 
it is important to note that Collins and Evans’ theory of expertise gives scientific 
expertise a privileged place. Technoscientific expertise is only challenged by other 
forms of expertise and it is the benchmark against which other forms of expertise are 
measured and valued. In the cases for this dissertation, we will see many instances 
where scientists use an idea of expertise like that of Collins and Evans to justify their 
own authority over issues of science policy, even if those issues are not strictly 
technological. Similarly, they use this idea of expertise to question the relevance of non-
scientists or non-allies in science. 
In terms of exclusion, expertise functions as a way to exclude non-scientists. This 
may be the wholesale exclusion of all scientific non-experts, where expertise is treated 
as binary, or the exclusion of some subset of individuals lacking the hierarchical 
gradations of expertise identified above. In the latter case, scientists may see an 
industry representative as relevant if they have the appropriate “interactional expertise.” 
The expertise barrier is only overcome by possessing another form of relevant expertise 
that can compete with or supplement scientific expertise, by either redefining the terms 
of discourse away from a monopolistic focus on scientific expertise or by exercising 
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political power in such a significant way that expertise loses its privileged position in 
policy- and decision-making domains. Two important features stand out about these 
struggles between science-experts and non-science-experts. First, they take place in 
domains far removed from those in which scientific knowledge is produced. These 
struggles take place in courts, in public meetings, and in the streets. Where they do 
influence scientific knowledge-production more directly, they do so in terms determined 
by scientists who adjudicate the credibility of public inputs. Scientific standards 
determine whether the data citizens have collected counts as evidence (Frickel et al. 
2010). Second, these struggles are usually motivated by non-scientists seeking to 
redress some perceived wrong. Sympathetic scientists may support a public cause, but 
they are rarely the ones leading the charge. Groups like the Union of Concerned 
Scientists are a noteworthy exception. 
Political Imaginaries, Civic Epistemology, and Public Reason 
The research for this dissertation follows changes in what was considered 
acceptable boundaries for science policy for each of the cases studied here: the 
Asilomar conference for recombinant DNA research, the Human Genome Project, and 
the National Nanotechnology Initiative. These policy changes were a product of 
changing conditions in the social and political context in which each of these 
technoscientific projects developed. I will use several concepts from Sheila Jasanoff to 
understand how and why science policy expanded and how science agency 
administrators and scientists controlled this expansion. Particularly I will use her 
concepts of civic epistemology (2005), co-production (2004), and public reason (2012). I 
will situate these within Yaron Ezrahi’s concept of the political imaginary.  
Jasanoff used civic epistemology to understand how publics perceive and 
receive the development of technoscience in democratic societies. Hers is a culturally 
specific politics of biotechnology in Britain, Germany, and the U.S. It is a theory of public 
knowledge production and engagement in technoscience that stands in contrast to the 
public understanding of science (PUS) model discussed earlier. She criticizes this 
model, more commonly referred to in STS scholarship as the deficit model, for 
assuming what citizens ought to know or do know about science and turning this into a 
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de facto theory of democracy based on “ignorant publics…in need of rescue” 
(2005:254). While her theory contains normative elements about science, policy, and 
democracy, it is grounded in the practicalities of public perception in general, and of 
technoscientific development in particular. She takes seriously the fact that people live 
in overlapping systems of meaning making of which scientific “understanding” is but a 
part. Far from being dupes, publics mobilize both impressive cognitive faculties and 
cultural repertoires as they make judgments about not only the technical aspects of an 
emerging technoscience but its moral value, its social purpose, and how it should be 
governed. In short, “civic epistemology refers to the institutionalized practices by which 
members of a given society test and deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for 
making collective choices” (Jasanoff 2005:255). Publics are not the passive recipients 
but active participants in the development, deployment, and governance of 
technoscience.  
Civic epistemology in the U.S. is marked by several factors that differentiate it 
from other cultural contexts. Due to the large and heterogeneous nature of the 
American citizenry, public reasoning in the U.S. is pluralist and based on interested 
parties – actors from non-governmental organizations, industry, and academia, to name 
a few (Ezrahi 1990, 2012, Jasanoff 1990). For biotechnology, at least, publics began 
from a position of distrust (Bennett 2010, Nisbet et al. 2003). Decisions about 
governance and regulation of biotechnology in the U.S. were adversarial and publics 
often turn to courts to adjudicate these issues (Hurlbut 2017).8 Publics in the U.S. are 
persuaded by scientific claims when they are put into technical arguments backed by 
numbers. These serve as the bases for objectivity, similar to what Theodore Porter 
observed. 
Although I will use the concept of civic epistemology to help make sense of the 
cases for this dissertation, this is not a project on civic epistemology. To do so, I would 
have to follow Jasanoff’s lead and provide a sustained inquiry into the reception of each 
technoscience and the social and political conditions of its development and 
governance. Instead, I use civic epistemology as a tool for understanding how scientists 
                                            
8 In an earlier work, Jasanoff argues that regulatory agencies in the U.S. are often stymied when there is an improper 
balance between scientific and juridical authority (2004). 
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and agency administrators effected changes in what was considered acceptable 
science policy – what ideas and actors they considered credible or relevant at different 
times and for different technologies. In other words, in changing what was considered 
acceptable science policy, scientists and science agency administrators were 
responding to an imagined civic epistemology. They worked in the realm of imaginary 
for two reasons. First, we take each of these cases at the emergence of a new 
technoscientific field or research project. When they began to think about how to 
approach rDNA research or nanotechnology in terms of policy, there was nothing like a 
broad public idea about them. Second, scientists and administrators felt that they did 
not know enough about the public in general. They drew, as best they could, on 
precedents from other contexts – other fields and other countries – and from the 
literature on the public understanding of science. In the end, though, they had to 
imagine how the real public might response, or civic epistemological process, would 
play out. 
Imagination is an important component and worth explaining in more detail. The 
actors in these technoscience projects had to respond to an imagined public and an 
imagined civic epistemology. Imagination became a tool in acting at a distance. The 
distance in this case was not only geographic, but also epistemic and cultural. In his 
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1991) argued that the nation-state must 
constantly engage in practices of “nation-making,” through the strategic use of symbols 
like the flag, and technologies like the census, to establish its authority and its ability to 
represent a large and disparate set of individuals. Nation-states engage in imagination 
work, in part, because of the problem of distance for a large and heterogeneous society. 
Citizens cannot see their communities, their representatives, or the centers of power 
and authority. But in providing an imagination of itself, the nation-state must imagine its 
own citizenry as well. Decisions about the design of the national census, for instance, 
operationalize one imagination of the citizenry over others.  
In Imagined Democracies, Yaron Ezrahi builds on his argument about the role of 
public witnessing (1990) to argue that imagination work constitutes “the fabric of political 
world-making, the core of the political order, and the clue to its formal architecture and 
informal dynamics” (2012:38). These political imaginaries, as he calls them, refer only to 
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imaginaries that have the power and authority to drive regulation or structure the 
political order. Political imaginaries help create modes of governance. In the context of 
science policy, this makes imagination work a form of co-production. Sheila Jasanoff 
(2004) showed that the ontological work of scientific knowledge production produces the 
simultaneous construction of governance systems. The technical and democratic orders 
– the ontological and the normative, what is and what ought to be – co-construct one 
another. Although not scientific knowledge production per se, science policy 
nonetheless provides one link between scientific work and the modes of governance in 
which that work is embedded and which it helps constitute through various political 
imaginaries. It is one domain of the co-production of science and governance, if not the 
most visible one. How is this relevant for this project? 
Scientists and administrators for the research projects for this dissertation 
engaged in crucial imagination work by deciding how to approach the potential ethical 
issues of their research and, later with nanotechnology, the public perceptions of it. 
They imagined both a public and a mode of governance when they made decisions 
about which health and safety hazards were worth pursuing and which were not. They 
imagined a public when they held hearings and workshops in which they tried to discern 
what might frighten people about their research and how to address those fears. They 
imagined a mode of governance when they promoted one vision of science and science 
policy over others. These are exercises in what Stephen Hilgartner has called 
“vanguard visions’ (Hilgartner 2015). Vanguard visions are a subset of Jasanoff and 
Kim’s concept of the sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff et al. 2006, Jasanoff and Kim 
2015). Sociotechnical imaginaries are “collectively held, institutionally-stabilized, and 
publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of 
forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in 
science and technology” (Jasanoff 2015:4). Vanguard visions are similar to 
sociotechnical imaginaries but differ in that they have not yet achieved the same 
stability and widespread public recognition. They are visions of the future, often the very 
far-flung future, which visionaries hope will structure and motivate contemporary 
actions. The promoters of these visions wanted to define the future of both scientific 
development and modes of governing science. For this reason, they are a form of 
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future-making. Since these vanguard visions are usually a negotiated process among 
scientists, science agencies, policymakers, industry, and publics, I refer to this as 
“imagination work.” Imagination work describes the effort of promoting one vision of 
science and the future against others. 
We should not see imagination work as coming from a monolithic set of scientists 
or science agency administrators. Consistent with past scholarship on American 
science policy, this dissertation shows that imagination work is an adversarial 
competition to promote different imaginaries of science, science policy, and the public 
by different actors with the authority to do so (Jasanoff 1990, Laurent 2017, 
Parthasarathy 2017). The actors I present here promoted their own ideal imaginaries 
about the authority and autonomy of science, the role of publics in science, and the 
modes of governance that constituted acceptable science policy. The prevailing 
imaginaries were constituted, in part, by the prevailing social, political, and cultural 
conditions of the time, as they always are. They often evidenced, however, a deep 
anxiety and ambivalence about both the nature of the public and its power. By this, I 
mean that prevailing imaginaries about these emerging technoscientific fields and their 
governance did not always fully account for how publics would perceive and receive 
these fields. Scientists were often surprised by what people feared and what they did 
not. The effect of this was that each subsequent effort to imagine publics and modes of 
science policy was conditioned, in part, by what came before or what was happening 
elsewhere. Scientists and NIH administrators for the Human Genome Project borrowed 
from their own past experience with the Asilomar Conference and its fallout. 
Administrators for the National Nanotechnology Initiative, particularly at the NSF, 
borrowed from the Human Genome Project and from Western Europe’s experience with 
public responses to biotechnologies. 
This borrowing led to an overall expansion in what was considered acceptable 
science policy but one limited in key ways by those doing the imagination work 
described above. The expansion involved the inclusion of new ideas about what issues 
scientists and science agencies should consider, what actors they should include, and 
what practices they should engage in when funding and regulating science. I refer to 
this as an expansion because the cases for this dissertation evidence a trajectory from 
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considering only technical issues, to accepting ethical issues, to accepting a role for 
social scientists, and eventually lay publics in issues of science policy. These changes 
came with new ideas about expertise and relevance. Social scientists, for example, 
were accepted in the National Nanotechnology Initiative as experts in public perceptions 
of science. Although the trajectory among the cases was one of expansion, it was also 
an exercise in the bureaucratic production of public reason. This limited the scope of the 
policy expansion by producing technically credible concerns and rational publics. I 
follow Sheila Jasanoff who uses public reason to refer to the “institutional practices, 
discourses, techniques and instruments through which modern governments claim 
legitimacy in an era of limitless risk – physical, political, and moral” (Jasanoff 2012:5). 
Public reasoning is a way to understand the political response to the risk society. It 
refers to the political and institutional production of modes of governance as well as the 
logics for justifying those particular modes of governance. Jasanoff is clear that she 
does not follow the definition of public reason according to John Rawls, who sees it as 
the rational deliberative process of a citizenry, in a sense very similar to the 
Habermasian ideal (Habermas 1991, Rawls 2002). J. Benjamin Hurlbut, a student of 
Jasanoff’s, has shown how governmental ethics bodies, science policy actors and 
science funding agencies deployed the Rawlsian ideal of public reason to determine 
what “right reasoning” should look like (2017:27). We will see a similar process in the 
case of nanotechnology, once publics were invited, they were constructed in a way that 
was consistent with the Rawlsian concept of the reasonable deliberator. This was not 
the only way that public reason, in Jasanoff’s use of the term, was used to narrow the 
boundaries of science policy even as they expanded to include new ideas and actors. 
In several ways, the public reasoning of science agencies, Congress, and key 
scientists were used to determine what constituted elements of science policy discourse 
and how those elements should be discussed. Hurlbut, again, has described as 
disciplining discourse (2017). He used the American political and bioethical struggles to 
define the embryo to show that it also involved a tacit set of arguments about how 
publics should reason. Ideas such as the pre-embryo – an attempt to define the first two 
weeks after fertilization as not an embryo – were attempts at disciplining discourse 
around the embryo. One could not speak about anything prior to this two-week period 
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as an embryo, a term heavily imbued with moral and ethical claims. At least one could 
not do so in any context that the term pre-embryo was taken as real. This has clear 
affinities with the Foucauldian notion of power-knowledge, where the construction of 
knowledge becomes an exercise in power, making certain truth claims more prominent 
and others unthinkable (1972). I will borrow the concept of disciplining discourse to 
show how scientists, funding agency administrators, and eventually social scientists 
worked to contain and stabilize the expansion of ideas about acceptable science policy. 
In their minds, an unstable science policy boundary constituted a threat to the autonomy 
and authority of science. Indeed, the very fact that the boundary was expanding at all, to 
include these new issues and new actors, looked threatening to many. Thus, for them, it 
needed conditioning. 
I will show three key ways in which discourse was disciplined. First, discourse 
was disciplined by determining what ideas were relevant and credible. These ideas 
most often concerned which issues were worthy of consideration and which were not. 
Issues related to environmental health and safety, for instance, were the most 
acceptable while the distributive justice of a technology’s risks and benefits, essentially 
who gets the benefits (e.g. people who can afford a new product) and who gets the risks 
(e.g. poor people who live near a factory or dump site), was a more contested concern. 
Apocalyptic fears were entirely discarded as science fiction. Second, discourse was 
disciplined by determining the kinds of actors that could participate in the newly 
expanded boundaries of science policy and the conditions of their participation. Social 
scientists were included in the Human Genome Project and lay publics included in the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative. Publics had to reasonable, in Rawlsian terms, and 
both had to be supportive of technoscientific development and commercialization. 
Finally, discourse was disciplined by what funding agencies and policymakers would 
accept from these new actors and ideas. In other words, it was up to the science 
agencies to move forward on an issue of concern identified by an ethical body looking 
into the societal implications of a technology or a public deliberation. Simply not doing 
anything with a report is an easy way for science agencies or policymakers to discipline 
public discourse, assuming that the issue identified does not get socially amplified in 
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some other way, such as the actions of a committed civil society group (Hess 2008, 
Slovic et al. 1993). 
These modes of disciplining discourse involve normative claims about credibility 
and expertise. Sometimes these take the form of scientific boundary work. We already 
saw an example of a credibility contest above with the example of Fleischman and Pons 
and their research into cold fusion. In these cases, we see a credibility contest between 
engineer K. Eric Drexler and physicist Richard Smalley to define what is technically 
possible for the emerging technoscience. Drexler had introduced a particularly 
frightening environmental crisis and Smalley wanted to define it away. Drexler 
eventually loses the contest and, with it, his credibility as a scientist. Their argument 
was technical, but they were both aware that what they were really fighting for was the 
ability to define nanotechnology and its future. In other places, we see similar exercises 
of authority that do not constitute boundary work as described by Thomas Gieryn. In 
other words, they are not used to define science. They are used, however, to stabilize 
what is considered acceptable science policy. Scientists and agency administrators 
made claims about expertise and credibility, for example, to exclude publics or even just 
certain publics from policy discussions even as they gave broad vocal support to the 
inclusion of lay publics in policy, broadly speaking. 
The Study and Research Design 
Research Design 
The concepts that I have reviewed provide the theoretical scaffolding for 
answering my research questions: why attention to ethical and societal concerns and 
public engagement emerged for some research projects and not others and, second, 
how scientists and science agencies negotiated their autonomy and authority in the 
context of these new non-scientific actors and non-technical concerns. I chose three 
cases to answer these questions because they exemplify upstream attention to non-
scientific concerns for high-profile research. I began with the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (1999-2015) because literature about deliberative democracy heralded it as a 
“unique opportunity” to realize the potential for democratizing science in the United 
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States (Barben et al. 2008, Davies 2006, Delgado et al. 2010). I chose the Human 
Genome Project (1989-1999), with its program in Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications 
because it was the next most recent high-profile, large-scale research initiative with 
significant attention to non-technical concerns and which treated a certain sub-class of 
non-scientists, social scientists and professional ethicists specifically, as relevant actors. 
Additionally, the National Nanotechnology Initiative followed, temporally, directly on the 
conclusion of the Human Genome Project. I wanted to analyze the degree to which the 
NNI borrowed from the HGP in designing its upstream approach. Finally, Asilomar 
(1973-1977) is framed as one of the earliest attempt by scientists to deal with the non-
technical concerns of science in an upstream manner (Abels 2005, Hurlbut 2015). 
Asilomar was not yet a major scientific initiative but became one over the course of the 
debates about it.  
These cases, then, offer an informative temporal perspective on the evolution of 
approaches to upstream handling of non-technical issues for science and, with that 
evolution, the negotiation of scientific autonomy and authority with changes that each 
research endeavor faced. Specifically, this dissertation analyzes changes in the 
pressures these initiatives faced and in what scientists and science agencies 
recognized as relevant concerns, expertise, and the role of publics. These analytical 
categories are summarized in Table I.2. Research on rDNA faced little outside pressure 
from concerned publics. However, it did face pressure from other bioscientists 
concerned about the safety of rDNA research. Since they came from other scientists, 
these concerns were purely technical in nature and, as such, did not warrant the 
inclusion of non-scientific actors or non-technical concerns. The whole Asilomar 
Conference was an exercise in protecting a strong version of scientific autonomy and 
authority. The Human Genome Project faced some external pressure from people and 
groups concerned about what would be done with a completed human genome. The 
Human Genome Project codified attention to non-technical concerns with its program in 
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI). Although publics still had no role, other 
than as objects of research, social scientists and ethicists were invited to participate in 
policy-making around the project. Their inclusion brought new kinds of expertise into 
what would have previously been a strictly scientific discussion. This should have made 
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scientific autonomy and authority a more negotiated process, as scientists no longer 
had ultimate authority in determining what mattered about their research and how to go 
about doing that research. Finally, the National Nanotechnology Initiative represented a 
further expansion of concerns, publics, and expertise. The program in Societal and 
Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology (SEIN) was motivated by a strong fear among 
scientists and science agency administrators of a public backlash against 
nanotechnology. The SEIN program included exercises in upstream public engagement, 
giving a direct role to publics in the initiative and further expanding the kinds of expertise 
considered relevant. The inclusion of publics and their concerns, along with 
consideration of ethical concerns and societal implications, should have motivated a 
further renegotiation of scientific authority and autonomy. Again, since we take these 
research initiatives in their early stages, most of their approaches to these concerns, the 
role of publics, and expertise constitutes imagination work. 
Other cases I considered, but decided not to pursue, were contemporary 
research into synthetic biology and geoengineering and the Super-Conducting 
Supercollider project of the 1990s. While synthetic biology and geoengineering 
evidence exercises in upstream public engagement, those efforts have not been funded 
in any way comparable to the National Nanotechnology Initiative. Furthermore, as of the 
time of this writing, they are not high profile or large-scale initiatives like the Human 
Genome Project and the National Nanotechnology Initiative. The Superconducting 
Supercollider constitutes an interesting case in failing to deal with non-technical 
concerns in an upstream manner. The $4.4 billion project that was already 20% finished 
and employed 2000 people was cancelled, in part, because scientists failed, in their 
imagination work, to show Congress how the project would benefit the United States 
either economically or in terms of scientific innovations (Appell 2013). It would have 
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Table I.2 Cases and analytical categories 
 
  Dominant Imaginaries  
 Pressures Relevant Concerns 
Relevance 
of Publics 
Relevant 
Expertise 
Scientific 
Autonomy 
rDNA / 
Asilomar 
Little direct 
outside pressure 
on research. 
Strong inside 
pressure from 
scientists. 
Only 
technical 
concerns. 
No role for 
lay publics.  
Only scientific. 
No new actors. 
Strong 
scientific 
autonomy and 
authority. 
HGP/ELSI 
Concern about 
possible outside 
pressure. Strong 
inside pressure 
from scientists. 
Technical 
plus ethical 
concerns and 
societal 
implications. 
Publics an 
object of 
concern, but 
no role for 
lay publics. 
Scientific and 
ethical/social. 
Inclusion of 
new actors: 
ethicists and 
social 
scientists. 
Negotiated 
autonomy with 
the inclusion of 
new actors. 
NNI/SEIN 
Strong concern 
about outside 
pressure (public 
backlash). Little 
inside pressure. 
Technical 
plus ethical 
concerns, 
societal 
implications, 
and public 
opinion. 
Publics an 
object of 
concern. 
Role given 
to lay 
publics. 
Scientific, 
ethical/social, 
publics/lay-
publics. 
Inclusion of 
new actors: lay 
publics. 
Autonomy 
further 
negotiated with 
the inclusion of 
more new 
actors. 
 
been an interesting case showing the value of an upstream approach to the non-
technical issues of science. I think that the Asilomar Conference and its backlash makes 
that point sufficiently, however, without introducing another case just for that purpose. 
 
Methods of Data Collection 
I collected different types of data for each of these cases. For the rDNA debate, I 
relied entirely on secondary sources. These included books and articles about the 
Asilomar conference including two books written by journalists who attended the 
conference (Rogers 1977, Wade 1977).9 For the Human Genome Project, I also relied 
heavily on secondary sources, again mostly books and articles, several by people with 
direct experience with the project and its ELSI program (Andrews 1999, Beckwith 2002, 
Duster 2002). For the Human Genome Project, I supplemented this with data on all of 
                                            
9 These citations, and the ones below for the Human Genome Project’s ELSI program, do not constitute a complete 
bibliography for these initiatives but only reference those people who were directly involved. 
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the funded projects in the Ethical, Legal, and Societal Implications program (n=186). I 
read the abstracts for each of these grants and categorized them according to two sets 
of criteria. First, I categorized them according to whether they involved research on 
people (e.g. studying public opinion through surveys), ethical issues, institutional 
practices, the institutions themselves (e.g. historical research), or research involving 
people (e.g. observational research about people’s decision-making in a hospital 
setting). Second, I categorized those grants that dealt with the public according to the 
knowledge each tried to obtain of the public. These grants were intended to increase 
understanding of public perceptions, public actions and reactions, education, best 
practices in dealing with the public, other outcomes (a catch-all category).  
For the National Nanotechnology Initiative, I analyzed 17 Congressional hearings 
related to nanotechnology, 38 NSF workshop reports, the National Science Foundation 
budget documents from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2015, and six pieces of proposed 
legislation dealing with nanotechnology. To deepen my understanding of upstream 
public engagement for nanotechnology, I studied five upstream public engagement 
exercises around nanotechnology. I obtained the background documents given to 
participants for two of these events and full transcripts for one of them. I analyzed 
published documents and interviews with the people involved for all five of these 
exercises.  
I interviewed a total of 33 people associated with the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative and its Societal and Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology Program. 
Interviews were semi-structured and tailored to the experiences and background of the 
particular person being interviewed. To prepare for each interview, I read all relevant 
publications or accessible presentations by the interviewee. Although I tailored each 
interview to the respondent, interviews shared several broad themes. These included 
how a participant became involved with nanotechnology, the details of the upstream 
public engagement events they organized or helped conduct, how they interacted with 
other scholars involved in the engagement events, their personal and professional goals 
for public engagement, and any insights about the relationship between the project and 
science funding agencies. Interviews gave me important insights into these aspects of 
upstream public engagement that official documents could not reveal. I solicited 
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interviews from anyone who had been involved in these public engagement exercises, 
in the Science in Society Centers that organized them, or in the relevant administrative 
agencies tasked with the oversight of the Science and Society Centers. I obtained the 
names of my interviewees from publications and from the list of co-primary investigators 
listed on the NSF grants for this upstream public engagement work. I solicited 
interviews from agency administrators at the NSF and DOE who oversaw this public 
engagement work. I solicited a total of 51 people with a resulting 33 interviews for a 
response rate of 64%.  
The 33 interviews I conducted, included interviews with persons directly involved 
in the public engagement exercises (n=28). These interviews focused primarily on the 
engagement exercises, respondents’ role in organizing or moderating them, and their 
assessment of how well the exercises worked and the challenges of organizing them. 
These interviews also included questions about respondents’ professional backgrounds 
and involvement in the NNI, as well as broader questions about public engagement. In 
addition, I also interviewed representatives of administrative agencies overseeing the 
Science and Society Centers (n=2), including two former NSF Program Directors, 
focusing more generally on the role of the NNI in fostering public engagement and their 
views of the successes and challenges of these efforts. Finally, I interviewed several 
individuals serving in a leadership role for a civil society group (n=3) that had been 
recruited as part of an initiative to encourage engagement in issues of science policy, 
and my interviews focused on their experiences with this initiative. 
 I conducted interviews over the phone or using a video conferencing program 
such as Skype or Blue Jeans. Interviews lasted between 35 minutes and two and a half 
hours with the average interview lasting one hour. The interviews were audiotaped and 
transcribed. With the exception of the individuals from civil society groups, who 
permitted me to reveal their identities, all interviewees have been given pseudonyms to                                                                                                                              
protect their identity. This project was approved by the University of Michigan IRB. 
 I coded the interviews, event transcripts, background materials, and 
Congressional hearings in Atlas-Ti at the paragraph-level according to several themes. 
These themes included upstream public engagement, ethical and societal concerns, 
modes of governance, research logics, and outcomes, among others. I did not code the 
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other public documents to the same degree of specificity but rather performed a close 
reading of them.  
I was unable to include sufficient qualitative data for the Human Genome Project 
and its ELSI program or for the Asilomar conference because I was unable to interview 
enough people who had worked on those projects. None of the individuals associated 
with the ELSI program returned my requests for an interview. Three of the people I 
interviewed for the National Nanotechnology Initiative had experience with the Human 
Genome Project, but I did not deem that sufficient to include them as data for that 
section. 
Summary of Dissertation Chapters 
In this dissertation, I will use public documents and interviews to understand how 
and why ideas about acceptable science policy were expanded and how policy-relevant 
discourse was disciplined for these cases. I have already referenced the story to come 
several times as I explained the relevance of the ideas brought in here to this 
dissertation. Therefore, this summary will be brief. I should say, however, that I focus 
more on the emergence of the public in the National Nanotechnology Initiative and the 
cases prior to this are mainly used to illustrate the novelty of this expansion in ideas 
about acceptable science policy. 
In Chapter II, I explore the debate about recombinant DNA (rDNA), with a 
particular focus on the Asilomar Conference and the Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications (ELSI) program of the Human Genome Project. The data for the rDNA 
debate come from secondary sources. The data for the Human Genome Project and its 
ELSI program also come mainly from secondary sources, but I also obtained the 
records of all funded ELSI projects from 1990-1999 to have a better understand of what 
kinds of research took place. I show how, for rDNA research, ideas about acceptable 
science policy came to include a new idea, the voluntary moratorium, while excluding 
new participants. Working in a fully technocratic mode of governance, bioscientists 
researching rDNA trusted only themselves to identify relevant issues with their research. 
They hoped that their actions would serve as evidence, in a manner reflective Ezrahi’s 
visual-attestive culture, the safety of rDNA research and their commitment to doing 
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responsible science. The Human Genome Project expanded this boundary further. With 
the creation of the ELSI program, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the 
Department of Energy (DOE) included a new set of actors: social scientists. This is a 
hybrid technocratic order comprising both science and social science, whereby social 
scientists were supposed to bring a new set of concerns based in new kinds of 
expertise – particularly legal, ethical, and sociological – but were supposed to do so in 
ways that did not fundamentally challenge the value or legitimacy of the larger initiative. 
This mode does not upend the privileged place of technical experts in favor of any direct 
public witnessing, but rather adds a new kind of expertise into the technocratic mode. 
In Chapter III, I turn to the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to understand 
how and why social scientists and public engagement became acceptable as science 
policy. The data for this chapter come from mainly from public documents, including 
Congressional hearings, National Science Foundation (NSF) reports, budget 
documents. There were several reasons for this. In part, it was a response to the latent 
potential of nanotechnology. Advocates for nanotechnology made incredible promises 
and the public seemed to pose the most important threat to realizing this promise. The 
inclusion of lay publics was also a case of institutional learning on the part of science 
agencies from happenings in Western Europe. Crises of public trust around genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and the response of European agencies served as a 
warning to American science agencies about what can go wrong if you do not effectively 
imagine the public and its responses to new technologies. Finally, the inclusion of lay 
publics also came from battles within the emerging field of nanotechnology about its 
societal implications. Efforts to discipline the discourse of those within the field of 
nanotechnology led to the realization, among science agency administrators and 
policymakers in Congress, that it might be necessary to include lay publics in policy 
discussions, if only to discipline their discourse around nanotechnology.  
In Chapter IV, I follow the public engagement work for the NNI. The data for this 
chapter come almost entirely from 33 interviews I did with the social scientists whom the 
NSF enrolled to do this engagement work, two former NSF program directors, and three 
representatives of science-related civil society organizations. I show that while this 
engagement work was an innovative expansion in ideas about acceptable science 
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policy, it also represented a certain disciplining of discourse around nanotechnology. 
Discourse was disciplined in three important ways. First, it was disciplined by the 
organization of public engagement by the NSF. Second, it was disciplined by the social 
scientists themselves in constructing the deliberative publics for their engagement 
exercises and in the issues that would be discussed. Finally, discourse was disciplined 
by the impact these engagement exercises were allowed to have on science policy. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Asilomar Conference and Human Genome Project 
 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with two different approaches in changing ideas about 
acceptable science policy: the rDNA debates of the 1970s, culminating in the Asilomar 
Conference, and the Human Genome Project’s Ethical Legal and Social Implications 
(ELSI) working group. In terms of inviting new ideologies into a scientific domain, the 
Asilomar Conference of 1975 and its related meetings and events remains one of the 
most interesting and noteworthy cases. The conference dealt with recombinant DNA 
(rDNA) research. Scientists, not publics, began to worry about the public health risks 
associated with the way that this research was being conducted. This alone makes the 
case noteworthy. Usually it is only because public concerns begin to pressure scientists 
or industry that the latter responds to risk concerns. With rDNA, scientists were the ones 
calling for attention to this. They had clearly begun to learn some of the lessons of the 
Risk Society, that a crisis of public health can sink public support for research. 
Additionally, scientists decided to postpone their research through a voluntary 
moratorium until they discovered the risks associated with rDNA research. 
These were new ideas to the scientists in the rDNA debate. They represented a 
creative way of securing scientific autonomy for a potentially controversial new line of 
biological research. The bioscientists working in rDNA embraced a moratorium and 
even the possibility of total relinquishment of the research because it gave them time to 
address the most fundamental problem of the risk society: that scientists cannot control 
the risks involved with their own work. The moratorium was intended to protect scientific 
autonomy by keeping outsiders out of the scientific domain and thereby reinforcing the 
privileged place of scientists to determine the nature of their own work. Over the course 
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of the rDNA debate, the ideas of moratoria and relinquishment were eventually deemed 
blasphemous.  
The Human Genome Project and its program in the Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications (ELSI) of the genome represented a different approach. For the ELSI 
program, moratoria and relinquishment were considered blasphemous. Discursively 
framing them out of the ELSI mandate was the first activity of the ELSI working group 
and a key component of disciplining bioethical discourse around the project. Instead of 
deferring research, so that scientists could address all of the problems, the Human 
Genome Project enrolled a new set of experts tasked with addressing the ethical, 
health, and safety issues so that the science could move forward unimpeded. There 
were two types of new experts: social scientists, from outside the fields of the 
biosciences, and ethically minded scientists. Nonetheless, their approach to these 
issues reflects a technocratic logic of solving social issues like regular research 
questions. 
Each of these cases represents a different imagination about the public context 
for these emerging technoscientific projects and different approaches to science policy 
and governance. Whereas the Asilomar Conference attempted a purely technocratic 
approach to the potential issues of rDNA research, the Human Genome Project still took 
a technocratic approach to ethical and societal issues. It expanded the boundaries of 
science policy to include new actors with expertise in social and ethical issues, but 
ultimately expected those actors to treat social issues as if they were technical ones: 
objectively discoverable like natural facts. 
rDNA Research and the rDNA Debate 
Recombinant DNA research involves cutting DNA at some point in the chain and 
reassembling it. Usually scientists wanted to insert a new sequence of DNA into a cell’s 
genome, but they may also simply want to excise a sequence. This was the start of 
genetic manipulation by means other than sex-selection. It was the first direct 
manipulation of a DNA strand rather than generational change. The process at that time 
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was not easy by the standards of technology today.10 Scientists used an enzyme to 
“cut” DNA at a certain point in the strand. That cut leaves what scientists colloquially call 
“sticky ends,” because of their propensity to attach, or stick, to their complementary 
base pair (Rogers 1977). Doing this once, however, would only yield a single strand of 
altered DNA, which by itself, is not very useful. In order to alter the form or function of 
an organism, the altered DNA must replicate throughout the organism. A single strand 
of altered DNA would not propagate in an organism because even if that single altered 
cell replicated well, it would be drowned out by the abundant replication of non-altered 
cells in the organism. To get the new DNA to propagate well, biologists had to use 
either a virus shell or a bacterial. These would “infect” surrounding cells with the newly 
altered DNA. Viruses act like little hypodermic needles, inserting new DNA into the cells 
around them. Bacteria have a natural mechanism, the plasmid, which allows them to 
share DNA. This is what makes bacteria so effective at mutating in response to anti-
biotics. It only takes one bacterium to mutate in such a way as to render an antibiotic 
ineffective. That bacterium can then share its mutation with nearby bacteria via 
plasmids, without having to wait to reproduce as almost all other organisms would. The 
rDNA research discussed here involved propagating a new DNA sequence in bacteria 
using the plasmid method. 
 While these kinds of genetic transfer might spark concerns for many people, this 
is not what ultimately sparked concern among scientists or the rDNA debate. Rather, 
scientists became concerned about the choice of DNA to alter and the choice of 
bacterium in which to propagate the new DNA. Scientist do not use just any DNA or any 
bacteria when they engage in experiments like these. Instead, they use those 
organisms and DNA that are most often used for other experiments by other scientists. 
This makes research easier, since much is already known about the idiosyncrasies of 
the materials used. They also give a degree of scientific control to the otherwise 
complex and messy nature of biological research.11 Thus, when Stanford biologist Paul 
                                            
10 CRISPR makes the direct manipulation of DNA much easier than the rDNA method described here. 
11 This can also lead to problems for research. The fruit fly drosophila is the most common object for genetic 
research. Having been propagated in the lab for hundreds of thousands of generations, however, it no longer 
resembles its counterpart in the wild. When scientists want to use other organisms, such as Barbara McClintock’s 
work on corn genetics, they can be met with scorn by their colleagues (Keller 1984). 
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Berg wanted to insert eukaryotic (i.e. non-bacterial) DNA into a bacterium, he chose a 
DNA source and a bacterium that were already well studied. For the DNA that he 
wanted to insert, he chose Simian Virus 40 (SV40). Not only had it been the subject of a 
great deal of research, but it also responded particularly well to existing tools for 
mapping DNA. This made it more likely that it would respond well to being cut and 
inserted into a new organism. When he chose a bacterium into which he would insert 
SV40, he chose Eschelerius coli (E. coli). It had also been the object of a great deal of 
research, more than any other bacterium. Why should this raise concerns? To start, 
SV40 is a viral tumor-causing agent found in primates. Scientists reasonably assumed 
that it would cause tumors in humans as well. Furthermore, the bacterium E. coli is 
found in every human gut. Scientists feared that when SV40 was inserted into E. coli, 
Berg might inadvertently unleash a public health disaster in the form of a communicable 
tumor virus. Moreover, this risk came in the same year that marked the so-called War 
on Cancer. Thus, this risk went against the grain of the most important biological 
research at the time. Furthermore, scientists working with rDNA had research showing 
that laboratory workers exhibited immune responses to the materials they worked with, 
suggesting that containment was anything but perfect. Thus, there were real reasons for 
concern. 
In the Asilomar Conference of 1975, scientists hoped to fully identify and address 
this concern and others for rDNA research. It is now regarded as a seminal event in the 
development of scientific ethics. Only a few at the time had a sense of its real 
importance. The Asilomar Conference was actually two conferences that were part of a 
larger set of meetings among scientists and, later, federal agencies about the risks of 
recombinant DNA (rDNA) research from around 1971 to 1978. The first Asilomar 
conference in 1973 was narrowly focused on the hazards of the SV40 virus. When I 
discuss the Asilomar Conference, I refer to the larger and later one in 1975 that 
concerned rDNA research more broadly.  
A Voluntary Moratorium 
Although historical accounts often begin at temporal beginnings simply for the 
sake of natural storytelling, the way in which the rDNA debates began is actually one of 
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its most important features. Paul Berg had, as explained above, begun experiments to 
insert DNA from SV40 into E. coli. The earliest concerns came from other scientists 
when one of Berg’s graduate students, Janet Mertz, discussed their work at a workshop 
on cell culture at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in June of 1971. Mertz presented the 
research matter-of-factly, unaware that anyone might have concerns about it. The 
organizer of the workshop, Robert Pollack,12 had already expressed concerns about the 
“laissez-faire” distribution of SV40 to biologists seemingly for the asking (Friedberg 
2014, Wade 1977). There were no safety protocols or even a set of agreed-upon best 
practices for the use of this potentially dangerous virus. Pollack and Joseph Sambrook, 
scientists also present at that 1971 meeting, had written a lengthy memorandum about 
the use and availability of SV40. Their memorandum included a section titled “Are there 
any good experiments using human cells and viruses that should not be done?” 
(Friedberg 2014:207). This would prove a groundbreaking question and one which 
would become central to the entire rDNA debate: should even good science that it was 
possible to do ever not be done? Furthermore, should it not be done for reasons that 
had nothing to do with science itself? Berg had introduced laboratory biology to the 
ideas of a moratorium and even possibly relinquishment. 
Pollack responded with surprise and incredulity when Mertz described the work 
she and Berg were planning. He wanted to know how close they were and if they had 
done the work already. Mertz recalled, “I told them that all the technology other than that 
needed for actually generating recombinant DNA molecules was already available in 
Paul’s laboratory and that we were almost at the point where we should be able to 
amplify mammalian DNA in E. coli.” Pollack, in his own words, “had a fit” (Wade 
1977:33). He took a day to calm down and gather his thoughts, after which he 
admonished Mertz, “Do you really mean to put a human tumor virus into E. coli — a gut 
bacterium? Don’t you know that SV40 is a tumor virus?” (Friedberg 2014:206). Pollack 
was not the only one concerned. Berg began to receive calls from others who had 
attended the Cold Spring Harbor workshop. Berg remembered their comments, saying, 
“I think I was upset by the criticism at first, but then I went out and started to talk about 
                                            
12 W. Emmett Barkley, Edwin Lennette, and even James Watson also thought that there should be more stringent 
controls on SV40 particularly and on potentially dangerous reagents in general (Wade, 1977: 30) 
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the problem with a lot of people” (Rogers 1977:37). He came to realize that the concern 
was more widespread than the few vocal people who had actually contacted him. Berg 
decided to postpone his work on the experiment and suggested that others doing similar 
work follow suit. In the early days of the debate, before the issues fully caught on, many 
scientists would repeat Berg’s process of denial and realization. Many, who were at first 
annoyed at what they saw as personal criticism of their work and scoffed at being asked 
to consider non-scientific concerns, later came to accept that these concerns were 
legitimate and needed wider consideration. Although not in a policy context yet, the 
imagination work around rDNA research began here. The people doing the research 
and those concerned about it represented different imaginaries about scientific 
research, its consequences, and the duty, or lack thereof, of scientists to deal with these 
issues in the course of their normal workday. 
For those who would later come to participate in the Asilomar Conference, Berg’s 
moratorium was groundbreaking. There had been voluntary moratoriums on publishing 
the results of potentially dangerous science but, to their minds anyway, never one on 
doing the research in the first place. Berg remarked at the time “It is the first time in our 
field. It is also the first time anyone has had to stop and think about experiments in 
terms of potential hazard” (Rogers 1977:37). One could argue with Berg on a number of 
points here. Medical experiments, for example, have often been deferred for ethical or 
moral reasons. Experimental heart transplants in the era before anti-rejection drugs 
were postponed, for instance, when it became clear that heart recipients simply were 
not surviving beyond a few weeks or, in the best cases, a few months (Fox and Swazey 
2002). To be fair to Berg, though, medical experiments have direct emotional impacts 
on both patients and experimental surgeons. As Fox and Swazey note in their 
ethnography of experimental surgeons, these surgeons treat their patients as “personal 
associates and professional colleagues” in the experimental treatment process 
(2002:95). This process can be long and very intimate as well. Together, the patient and 
experimental surgeon “must bear the emotionally and time-consuming burden of 
constant surveillance of his condition” (107). Biologists in the laboratory are unlike 
experimental surgeons in this respect. They are far removed from the eventual 
outcomes or consequences of their research. In any case, In Berg’s mind laboratory 
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research that scientists were capable of doing and which had been fully funded had 
never before been voluntarily deferred for non-scientific reasons. That Berg decided to 
stop his work, even temporarily, for uncertain consequences well removed from the 
context of his own laboratory was unprecedented. Indeed, many of his colleagues 
feared that it would set a precedent. 
The voluntary moratorium by Berg’s lab did not avert concern by itself. In part, 
this was because it did not receive the same media attention as the work itself. In the 
October 1972 edition of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) 
David Jackson, Robert Symons, and Paul Berg published an account of their rDNA 
work, specifically the extraction of DNA from SV40 and the “sticky ends” of the DNA that 
would allow them to implant it into an E. coli bacterium. A biology correspondent from 
Nature saw the same problems that Pollack and others had seen. In a response to the 
PNAS account, the correspondent wrote: 
What would be the consequences if the reagent Berg and his colleagues 
have made somehow infected and lysogenized E. coli in someone’s gut as 
the result of an accident? This possibility, remote thought it may seem to 
be, can hardly be ignored, and it will be most interesting to learn what 
criteria the group adopts when it decides whether or not the scientific 
information that might be obtained by continuing the experiment justifies 
the risk. Perhaps those involved will decide that the game is not worth the 
candle. (Nature 1972 240:73). 
The public information director at Stanford, Spyros Andreopoulis, having read the 
Nature piece approached Berg to ask whether they should make a public 
announcement of the experiment to avoid possibly negative press and public response. 
Berg responded indignantly that he had already stopped doing the experiment and was 
upset that Nature had somehow not known or failed to report on that (Friedberg 
2014:203). To be fair, the correspondent described the tumor-virus concern as the “fly in 
the ointment which no doubt Berg and his colleagues are well aware of” (Nature 1972 
240:73). Whether or not Nature should have known that they had deferred their 
research is not clear. What is clear is the tension between displaying efforts to respond 
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to scientific uncertainties with public health implications and the consequences of doing 
so. Berg and his team had not made public their concerns about their research nor their 
prophylactic moratorium to deal with those concerns. To do so would have invited 
scrutiny from those either outside of or not allied with their scientific domain and 
potentially reduce the autonomy of Berg and his team. Unwittingly foreshadowing the 
Asilomar Conference to follow, he tried to do the ethics work behind closed doors and 
present the scientific work to the wider scientific world. 
Berg’s personal decision to defer his research translated into a general call for all 
rDNA researchers doing potentially hazardous work to do the same. This started in 
June of 1973 at the annual Gordon Conference. The Gordon Conference was an annual 
three-day meeting for discussing highly technical issues in biological research. Issues of 
risk and uncertainty were not central to the Gordon Conference. In fact, these issues 
came up at the 1973 meeting as an afterthought. Younger scientists, unnamed in the 
historical accounts of the rDNA debate, approached conference co-chair Maxine Singer 
of the NIH and Dieter Söll to suggest attention to the safety issues of rDNA research. 
Singer and Söll set aside fifteen minutes on the last day of the conference to discuss 
these concerns. Around one-third of the participants had already left. The majority of the 
ninety who remained, however, agreed that a letter should be drafted about the safety 
issues or rDNA research. The Singer-Söll letter, as it came to be known, was sent to the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and published in the September 21st issue of 
Science. When Philip Handler, President of the NAS, asked Singer for guidance on how 
to proceed, she directed him to Paul Berg who, by that point, spent the most time of any 
single individual thinking about the issues. Berg, however, saw himself as no expert on 
ethics or even lab safety. He convened a group at MIT to discuss the issues thinking 
that this would be the end of his role. “I naively believed that the advice of the group 
would be passed on to [NAS President Philip] Handler, and once it was in his hands I 
would be free of additional involvements” (Friedberg 2014:240). Berg could not have 
been more wrong. Far from ending, the debate was just getting underway. Additionally, 
since no one was looking outside of the scientific domain for guidance on the ethical, 
health, and safety issues of rDNA research, Berg became the default expert on these. 
That he had no expertise in ethics, and had never professed any, did not seem to 
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matter.  
The catalyst for the larger debate came out of the MIT group. In 1974, they 
drafted and unanimously signed a letter suggesting a voluntary temporary moratorium 
on certain types of research until the risks of that research could be better assessed. 
Several prominent scientists who had not been present at the MIT group wanted their 
names added to the letter. One such person was James Watson, the brash and 
mercurial figure who would later denounce both the letter and the entire concept of a 
moratorium as not only useless but also downright dangerous. The letter was almost 
immediately dubbed the “Berg Letter,” because it was an extension of Berg’s voluntary 
moratorium. The letter also established Berg’s role as the de facto, and completely 
reluctant, spokesperson for the bioethics of rDNA research. Although this broader 
moratorium still only applied to a handful of laboratories, all of which were in the U.S., 
those labs constituted the only ones capable of inserting SV40 into E. coli. This 
effectively made the moratorium a global one. Returning to Pollack’s question, should 
even good research ever not be done, Berg and the MIT group had answered firmly in 
the affirmative. 
Asilomar 
On its surface, the rDNA debate was about the uncertainties inherent in an 
emerging technology. The uncertain consequences of rDNA research led to 
uncertainties about how to pursue and govern such research. In reality, the debate was 
about much more. If it were simply about the research itself or its consequences, then 
the temporary moratorium would have been a mere technical matter to be solved like 
the cleanup work of any piece of Kuhnian normal science. Rather, bitter in-fighting 
erupted around the moratorium between those who thought that uncertainty warranted 
prompt regulatory action and those who thought that uncertainty could not justify any 
regulatory action. For those involved, the stakes were not simply technical, the research 
of only a few labs around the world, but would set a precedent for the biosciences in a 
larger sense. Implicit in the rDNA debates was a debate about the autonomy of the 
biosciences. By meeting and setting the guidelines for their own self-regulation, they 
hoped to give both the lay public and their political representatives no reason to have a 
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role or even to want one. The goal for most of the organizers by that point was to put an 
end to the voluntary moratorium still in place, but to do so in a way that protected public 
health and safety from a crisis caused by rDNA research while protecting science from 
intrusion. They saw Asilomar as a zero-sum game. Success meant autonomy. Failure 
meant the intrusion of federal regulation, a frightening outcome for many bioscientists. 
The Asilomar Conference not only had the goal of protecting scientific autonomy 
but also was itself organized as an exercise in scientific autonomy, leading to several 
problems for the success of the conference. For instance, the organizers of Asilomar 
quite unwittingly and with no prior experience, tried to invent a deliberative consensus 
conference. A deliberative consensus conference is a particular mode of democracy 
made popular by Jurgen Habermas (1991). Essentially, people deliberate a set of 
issues together and arrive at a consensus about how to move forward. Organizers of 
Asilomar wanted to pursue this democratic model, but with only scientists present, no 
one had any experience in doing so. Nothing indicates that they were aware of 
Habermas or the theory of deliberative democracy. The way they describe Asilomar, 
however, is exactly the definition of a deliberative consensus. It is a testament to their 
sense of scientific autonomy, particularly the irrelevance of non-scientists that they did 
not think to look beyond their own domains of expertise when organizing and running 
Asilomar. No one suspected that something like Asilomar already had a great deal of 
theory and practice behind it. Instead, they tried to reinvent the deliberative consensus 
conference and in so doing, made some novice mistakes. David Baltimore, one of the 
chief organizers of Asilomar, began the conference by trying to coerce consensus 
preemptively. He warned that they had to reach a consensus because there was no 
higher authority to turn to in the matter of rDNA. Failure to do so would invite formal 
regulations that nobody wanted. When asked how they would achieve such a 
consensus he responded, obliquely “The procedures by which the consensus will be 
determined will be largely determined by the extent of the consensus” (Wade 1977:43). 
In other words, there was no real plan to achieve consensus. If one did not emerge 
more or less organically from discussion, then they would have to improvise. 
Unsurprisingly, consensus did not emerge easily. They wound up having to improvise. 
One reporter marveled at the lack of organization and the difficulty of consensus. He 
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recalled the trouble they were having getting discussions going. Then “with almost 
audible creaking, did the wheel of discussion begin to turn. And it proceeded to run right 
downhill into chaos. Odd, I thought at the time, that a roomful of leading minds on a 
leading edge of science can’t agree on how to run a meeting” (1977:60). 
In another example of a novice mistake for a deliberative consensus conference, 
certain high-status actors, specifically James Watson and Joshua Lederberg, unduly 
influenced the meeting. James Watson was a Nobel-laureate and co-discoverer of the 
double-helix structure of DNA. Joshua Lederberg was a microbiologist and a Nobel-
laureate. He received his Nobel Prize for discovering the process by which bacteria can 
share DNA. Watson and Lederberg were the two primary voices opposed to any 
substantive considerations of risk. So loud and vociferous was their opposition that 
journalist Nicholas Wade, in attendance throughout the conference, described them as 
“enfants terribles” (1997:43). At one point, towards the end of the conference, several 
people had been calling for a vote to gauge the sentiment in the room regarding an 
ongoing moratorium of rDNA research. Watson and Lederberg loudly and angrily 
protested, saying that the room was intractably split. It was not until Sydney Brenner, a 
well-liked Cambridge molecular biologist, called for an impromptu vote that it became 
clear just how minority a position Watson and Lederberg represented. Support for an 
ongoing moratorium was near unanimous. A puzzled Paul Berg, Chairman of the 
meeting, said: 
It was then that we realized that we’d been listening to the wrong people. 
A few people were doing all the talking, and a lot of people had been 
quiet. And the quiet ones were in favor of coming out with something just 
as we had, and it was the Lederbergs and Watsons and a few others who 
were doing all the talking and confusing us. We thought they were 
reflecting what everybody wanted and felt (Rogers 1977:86). 
 This shows the intersection of status and power in driving the imagination work 
going on at Asilomar. The two dominated discussion at Asilomar despite not 
representing anything close to a majority position. That it took almost the entire 
conference to figure this out shows how much they were learning as they went about 
55 
 
consensus conferences and deliberative decision-making. 
The question of who got to attend Asilomar also reveals it as an exercise in 
preserving scientific autonomy. Krimsky reports that the first Asilomar conference in 
1973 was attended by “individuals from a broad range of disciplines within the biological 
and health sciences” (1982:64). No one from outside those sciences was in attendance, 
including the media. Indeed, the only thing to report would have been the speculative 
nightmare scenario of a communicable tumor virus, which no one in attendance wanted 
to advertise to the public. In the lead-up to the second Asilomar Conference in 1975, 
however, the situation changed. In the two years since the first conference, the news 
media had discovered rDNA research. This was unsurprising. As Krimsky observed, 
rDNA research “has all the prerequisites for a science-fiction thriller: new dread 
diseases possible; cloning; human genetic engineering; human gene maps; interspecies 
hybrids” (1982:100). Recombinant DNA had the key elements for mass public concern. 
Yet few seemed to realize the extent of this potential, especially not so far as to 
consider the lay public, or any non-scientists, in any way relevant for the conference 
itself. A pamphlet titled The Health Hazards of Gene Implantation published by the civil 
society organization Science for the People criticized the conference organizers for 
inviting “predominantly research directors” (Krimsky 1982:109). Nicholas Wade 
described Asilomar attendees more colorfully as “not quite monarchs, but at least the 
paladins of their own special world” (Wade 1977:41). These paladins gathered to define, 
for themselves, the united front that they would present to the larger world regarding 
rDNA research and its uncertainties. 
Some wanted to broaden the scope beyond simply research scientists but those 
people were disregarded. Early suggestions that the conference should have a public 
engagement component or that representatives from the “broader public” should attend 
were not taken seriously by organizers. Organizers feared that including these outsiders 
would make consensus difficult or even impossible in the limited time that they had. The 
closest thing to broader engagement was an invitation to Jonathan Beckwith, a Harvard 
microbiologist and a member of Science for the People, to speak to the social 
implications of the research. Having to decline, he suggested his colleague Dirk 
Elseviers, a post-doctorate researcher whom, he suggested, might represent the views 
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of Science for the People. Berg rejected the suggestion saying that they wanted 
Beckwith’s opinion not that of Science for the People. Beckwith had been invited as an 
insider, another paladin of that special world. His participation in Science for the People 
may have given him a certain added expertise about the social implications of science, 
but that perspective was only valuable by virtue of his status as an insider. Anyone else 
from Science for the People was simply an outsider. The group represented something 
more radical and potentially heretical than organizers of Asilomar were willing to 
entertain. Had someone from Science for the People attended they would have been 
the only representative of a civil society organization at the conference. Incidentally, 
Beckwith later became a founding member of the Human Genome Project’s ELSI 
working group fifteen years later. By that time, though, he was, by his own admission, 
much less radical and no longer supported moratoria on scientific research (Beckwith 
2002). 
Although Asilomar was an exercise in scientific autonomy, consisting mainly of 
insiders, it did include two important kinds of scientific outsiders. These were journalists 
and lawyers. The decision to include them was not without controversy. Scientists did 
not trust journalists, whom they thought would misunderstand and sensationalize the 
hazards posed by rDNA research. Others thought it might be more dangerous to 
exclude them, since the proceedings would have no transparency to the public. In 
Ezrahi’s terms, they needed journalists to perform the all-important role of public 
witness to the proceedings (1990, 2012). The first vote at Asilomar, then, concerned the 
question of whether to allow journalists to participate. The vote determined that 
journalists could attend, but only if they came every day, stayed until the end, and did 
not report on anything until the conference was finished. They were not invited to serve 
as participants but only to bear witness. Many scientists worried about their capacity to 
do this as well, fearing that the same lack of understanding that led scientists to 
question their presence in the first place would lead the journalists to report on Asilomar 
in a negative light. Despite the fact that they were physically present, the, journalists 
were not there as insiders. They were tolerated outsiders. In terms of information, 
Asilomar was to be contained within a hermetic seal until it was over. In one way that 
hermetic seal remains. Organizers had decided to record the entire proceeding but put 
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a 50-year embargo on its public release. At the time of this writing, there are still nine 
more years to go before those tapes become available.  
The inclusion of lawyers was less contentious. This may have something to do 
with the fact that one of the organizers, Maxine Singer, was married to Daniel Singer, a 
lawyer whom she suggested as a participant. Many of the organizers and scientists in 
attendance already knew Daniel through Maxine and, presumably, trusted his 
commitment to scientific autonomy. Maxine’s credibility as a scientist and supporter of 
rDNA was partially transferred to her husband and thereby to the inclusion of lawyers 
more broadly. She made him something more than just another outsider. Nonetheless, 
the participation of lawyers at Asilomar was still discretely demarcated from the rest of 
the discussions. At Maxine Singer’s suggestion, they were given their own plenary 
session to discuss the legal and ethical issues of rDNA research. And like the inclusion 
of ethical issues at the Gordon Conference, the inclusion of lawyers was something of 
an after-thought to the planning of the main conference. Furthermore, the scientists at 
Asilomar seemed to think the lawyer’s plenary session would constitute a small 
addendum to their meeting, simply showing them how to avoid lawsuits. Instead, the 
lawyers’ presentations marked a sobering moment for the scientists in attendance13.  
The lawyers’ presentations forced scientists to recognize that the social 
implications of uncertain research like rDNA came with strong political and practical 
limitations to their professional autonomy, particularly their capacity to retain control 
over issues of regulation, safety, and broader social concerns. The lawyers introduced 
three types of external considerations: the deeply problematic nature of uncertainty, the 
role of ethics in science, and the relevance of non-scientific actors, particularly the lay 
public. Singer was the first to speak. He challenged the assumptions that the risks of 
rDNA research were remote and that it would be morally wrong to place significant 
restrictions on research. In essence, he was defending some measure of long-term 
moratorium. He argued that scientists had a responsibility to prove that their research 
was safe to the public and not only to themselves. He also warned scientists to accept 
the fact that some experiments that, in Krimsky’s words, were “elegant and intellectually 
                                            
13 The lawyers were, in order of their presentations, Harold Green, affiliated with George Washington University, 
Daniel Singer, affiliated with the Hastings Institute and working for a law firm in Washington D.C., Alex Capron from 
the University of Pennsylvania, and Roger Dworkin from Indiana University. 
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satisfying, may be morally reprehensible” (Krimsky 1982:139-140). Despite arguing for 
greater public engagement and relinquishment, his presentation seemed not to raise 
many hackles. This may have been due to his measured and philosophical tone. Singer 
also did not say anything that some of the scientists in attendance had not said already. 
In a sense, the very fact of Asilomar was a testament to their attempt to take his points 
seriously. 
Alex Capron, on the other hand, raised many hackles. Capron told the scientists 
in attendance “they could no longer ignore public participation” (Krimsky 1982:139-140). 
The publics he imagined were laboratory workers and the “broader public.” Both were 
subject to risks from rDNA research over which they had no control. The lab workers, of 
course, most immediately subject to these risks. Capron did not have any real 
suggestions for how to address these various publics. Rather, his argument stemmed 
from a philosophical and pragmatic legal conviction about the limits of intellectual 
freedom and a scientific duty to serve the public good, or at least avoid unnecessarily 
harming it. He reminded the scientists in attendance, as Krimsky summarizes, that 
“freedom of thought does not imply freedom to cause physical injury to others” and that 
restraint is necessary where “irreversible harm is threatened.” Capron said bluntly that 
“this group is not competent to assign overall risk” (Rogers 1977:140-142). Instead, he 
argued that “it is the right of the public, through the legislature, to reach erroneous 
decisions — while it remains your right, and is probably your obligation, to lobby against 
such decisions but to abide by them in the meantime” (141). Rogers describes Capron’s 
discussion as a “merciless ‘outsider’s analysis’ that within moments had jaws dropping 
all over the chapel” (77). 
Capron brought into question the very nature of scientific autonomy. He violated 
what Krimsky called the “key value at Asilomar” (1982:152). In so doing, Capron put into 
doubt the ability of scientists to determine the content of their field and to direct its 
course free from unwanted interference. Essentially, he told the scientists at Asilomar 
that the conference would inevitably fail to achieve what they wanted. This seemed to 
elicit shock and dismay among the scientists in attendance. They had already allowed 
some previously unthinkable ideas into the scientific domain, specifically the moratorium 
of laboratory research, but now they were being told that they had no choice but to 
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invite outsiders into their own domain. This constituted a double-threat to their 
autonomy. If Capron was right, then not only would outsiders cross the science-society 
boundary, but scientists had no choice in the matter. Furthermore, Capron did all of this 
as an outsider himself, one of only five invited to participate within the scientific domain.  
The last lawyer to speak, Roger Dworkin, gave a pragmatic and cynical spin to 
Capron’s otherwise normative philosophical argument. In a manner consistent 
Jasanoff’s (1990, 2004) observation about the particularly American intersection of legal 
authority in issues of regulatory science, Dworkin assured the gathered scientists that, 
given their present course, it was only a matter of time before they were the subject of a 
“multi-million-dollar lawsuit” (Krimsky 1982:152). He too argued for greater transparency 
to the public, as “any appearance of self-serving will sacrifice the reservoir of respect 
that scientists have, and will bring disaster upon them” (Wade 1977:50). These were the 
consequences, according to Dworkin, if scientists continued to hide behind their 
“traditional immunity from being called to account” (Wade 1977:49). Not only was their 
scientific autonomy at risk but, if Dworkin was right, it was pathological as well. 
According to Dworkin, scientific autonomy was the source of public distrust and any 
attempt to maintain or protect it might paradoxically threaten it further still. The one-two 
punch of Capron and Dworkin’s presentations left many scientists in shock. Notably, 
James Watson was unfazed by the lawyers. He assumed that a multi-million-dollar 
lawsuit was inevitable. For him, it was simply the cost of maintaining their autonomy. 
Better to continue as they were and pay a few million dollars here or there than invite 
outsiders whose presence might fundamentally alter their most important value. 
The question of how to proceed with rDNA research, particularly whether to 
extend or lift the moratorium on research, was ultimately decided by a vote among 
conference attendees. Attendees voted on proposals that had come out of various 
smaller breakout meetings among conference attendees. The breakout groups were 
defined by their area of shared scientific expertise. For instance, there was a virus 
group and a plasmid group. The constitution of the groups is not relevant here except to 
note that ideas for the final report of Asilomar were developed in them and voted on by 
the larger set of constituents. This allowed the idea of an ongoing moratorium, and even 
the possibility of total relinquishment, to flower outside of the vocal influence of people 
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like Watson and Lederberg. The results of the voting were to be incorporated into a final 
report submitted to the NIH to guide policy regarding rDNA research. Paul Berg, Maxine 
Singer and a few others stayed up all night drafting the final report for the final day of 
the Asilomar Conference. The final report included one of the breakout groups’ 
suggestion for a three-tier classification schema of high-, moderate-, and low-risk rDNA 
research. The levels of risk were determined by the feasibility of containing hazardous 
biological material and would require different safety protocols. By a majority vote, the 
scientists at Asilomar also included and approved a proviso in the report that “some 
experiments should not be done even in the highest containment presently available” 
(Krimsky 1982:146). The bulk of scientists in the rDNA debate, then, supported not only 
a moratorium of research but also relinquishment, the unprecedented notion that some 
research should simply not be done. Others, like vocal dissenters James Watson and 
Joshua Lederberg, thought that they had just set a dangerous precedent for the future 
of scientific autonomy. 
In the short-term, at least, the Asilomar conference was a resounding success. It 
achieved its two main aims. First, it ended in a rough consensus. In some ways, it was a 
consensus that pleased no one, as consensuses often do. Nonetheless, Asilomar had 
met its goal, since the meeting ended with a set of suggestions for the NIH about how to 
regulate rDNA research. Furthermore, they were able to draft arguments about why the 
NIH should be their main oversight body, arguments that went unchallenged in 
subsequent years. Scientists at Asilomar saw the NIH as an ally and the government 
entity least likely to interfere in their desired autonomy.  
One way to view the rDNA debate is as an experiential lesson into the nature of 
science in the modern Risk Society. Scientists thought that they could identify any 
relevant concerns and fully address them before anyone became aware of what they 
were doing. They did not yet understand that uncertainties proliferate and overflow the 
discursive work to contain them when you cannot be sure either of the risks involved or 
even how to identify them (Callon 2008). In response to such uncertainty, scientists at 
Asilomar generally took one of two positions. The first is consistent with the 
Precautionary Principle. In the face of uncertainty and risk, do everything possible to 
ensure safety for the public and those working in laboratories. This view justified calls 
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for an ongoing moratorium and possible relinquishment of rDNA research. Others took 
the opposite approach. In the face of uncertainty, no action was justified, since you 
could not be sure that it would help. Watson vocally supported that stance. At one point, 
when talking about what to do about the risks of rDNA research, he shouted, “We don’t 
even know the fucking risks [italics in original]!” He was angry at the possibility that they 
might be regulated, and the science impeded, for risks that no one could enumerate, 
and which might not even exist.  
In addition to this disagreement, scientists also disagreed about the fact that 
Asilomar had been closed off to all but scientists. Erwin Chargaff, a biochemist at 
Columbia University, had criticized Asilomar for being exclusive to rDNA scientists. He 
wrote: 
It was with a feeling of deep melancholy that I read about the peculiar 
conference that took place recently in the neighborhood of Palo Alto. At 
this Council of Asilomar there congregated the molecular bishops and the 
church fathers from all over the world, in order to condemn the heresies of 
which they themselves had been the first and principal perpetrators. This 
was probably the first time in history that the incendiaries formed their own 
fire brigade (Chargaff 1975:21, Wade 1977:104). 
Chargaff’s charge of exclusivity and self-dealing at Asilomar would come to haunt 
the discussions of rDNA research and, in some cases, science more broadly after 
Asilomar. Partly because of this, arguments emerged that the public deserved a more 
significant role in scientific policy- and decision-making. 
The Public Emerges 
The whole point of Asilomar was to keep the discourse about rDNA research 
within the confines of the scientific domain. Asilomar had been an attempt by rDNA 
researchers to keep their own house in order, consistent with the traditional social 
contract for science, and to thereby obviate the need or even the justification for 
outsiders like the public, regulators, politicians, and the media, to participate in the 
discourse around rDNA research (Guston and Keniston 1994). Scientists were 
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surprised and somewhat dismayed, then, at the public response to rDNA research 
during and after the Asilomar conference. They had been unable to maintain the 
boundary in such a way as to keep scientific outsiders on the outside of policy 
discussions about rDNA research. 
There was no immediate aftermath, but rather a slow percolation of newspaper 
and magazine articles, television programs, and localized public hearings. The 
coverage as not all negative, but some of it took on a critical or concerned tone that 
scientists found objectionable. As Friedberg (2014:268) writes, Paul Berg expressed 
special appreciation for one journalist, David Perlman, simply because of Perlman’s 
“alarm-free tone and avoidance of gratuitous sensationalism and hyperbole in writing for 
a conversant lay public.” Perlman’s approach, to Berg at least, was not the modal 
approach of journalists to rDNA research. 
Asilomar led to a great deal of public attention mostly at the local level. Nine 
cities considered local ordinances on genetic research (Krimsky 1982:295). Two of 
these cities stand out. The first was the city of Ann Arbor, Michigan, where the 
University of Michigan resides. A group of people in the University of Michigan medical 
school formed the Ad Hoc Committee for Microbiological Safety. In the wake of the Berg 
Letter, the group requested that the Vice President of the university support research 
into the issue of microbiological safety at the university. The result was the Committee 
on Microbiological Research Hazards. One of its subcommittees was supposed to 
investigate “broad policy aspects” of research, including “social and ethical issues [of] 
rDNA research at the university” (Krimsky 1982:295). Although none of the members of 
that subcommittee were scientists, the committee was stacked with people that the 
Committee for Microbiological Safety thought would be proponents of rDNA research. 
Additionally, the university had promised that it would not move forward on building 
facilities for hazardous microbiology research like rDNA until it received that 
subcommittee’s report but wound up doing so anyway. Furthermore, the committee did 
not reach out in any way to the larger community. The mayor of Ann Arbor, who actually 
held a PhD in public health and microbiology from the University of Michigan, expressed 
his displeasure that the university had not included city residents in its decision-making 
process. University of Michigan scientists had innovated on the approach taken at 
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Asilomar. Instead of trying to contain the review and decision-making processes of 
rDNA research within their own scientific domain, they instead enrolled sympathetic 
outsiders. The reviewing subcommittee protected rDNA research at the University of 
Michigan and the scientific autonomy of researchers by giving the decision-making 
process the legitimacy afforded by appearing independent and disinterested. 
The second city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, provides a contrasting case. 
Sheldon Krimsky, who wrote the most comprehensive history of the rDNA debates, 
participated in the citizens’ committee that formed there and so gave a rather detailed 
account of its process. I will only note a few things here, however. First, the context for 
the Cambridge case was different from that for Ann Arbor. Unlike in Ann Arbor, the city 
of Cambridge already had strained relationships with the various universities in the city’s 
confines, particularly Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This 
set the stage for a more protracted debate. Additionally, in Cambridge, scientists did not 
present a united front regarding rDNA research. Indeed, some scientists actively 
opposed rDNA research, even joining a group called the Genetics and Social Policy 
Group, a subsidiary of Science for the People. There was also some broad support for 
holding a public meeting, even by those scientists who did support rDNA research. This 
is very different from the situation at Asilomar in which scientists could not imagine how 
or why the public would be relevant to what they saw as essentially a technical and 
scientific deliberation. In Cambridge, this led to a two-day public hearing in a special 
meeting of the city council on June 23 and July 7, 1976. Krimsky writes that: 
For the first time the public had control of the forum. This dramatic 
displacement of authority caused considerable unease among university 
researchers and administrators. The self-governance of science was 
concretely and symbolically threatened at this town meeting (1982: 301). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the mayor proposed a two-year moratorium on 
rDNA research. This was shot down, but the council decided that a more thorough 
public decision-making process was needed. It formed the Cambridge Experimentation 
Review Board to review rDNA research. The review board spent over 100 hours hearing 
from experts and debating the relative risks and merits of rDNA research. The seven-
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member group had two medical doctors, who were broadly supportive of rDNA 
research, but the other members were neither experts in medicine nor biology. 
Logistical precautions were put in place to ensure that the doctors did not have undue 
influence on the group’s decision-making process. In the end, the Cambridge 
Experimentation Review Board did not support either a moratorium or relinquishment. 
Instead, they suggested safety and containment measures in addition to those laid out 
in the NIH guidelines that had been informed by Asilomar. The city council enacted the 
suggestions in February 1977 leading to the first local DNA legislation in the United 
States (Krimsky 1982:157). Cambridge served as the example for the nine cities and 
states that adopted local ordinances.  
This type of active public response was exactly the kind of thing that Asilomar 
attendees had wanted to avoid. Asilomar was supposed to protect scientific autonomy 
by obviating the need for publics, either directly or in the form of their representatives, 
from taking an active role. Scientists had incorporated new ideas, moratoria and 
relinquishment, into their policy discourse with the hope that doing so would discipline 
discourse in a way that let them retain control of the discourse. Despite their best 
efforts, the public began to assert itself and put pressure on the boundary they had tried 
to stabilize between themselves and scientific outsiders. Advocates of rDNA research, 
particularly at the NIH, were increasingly presented with the problem of how to 
approach these publics. Additionally, moratoria and relinquishment became increasingly 
contentious. Not only had they not worked as intended, but also they stymied research 
in the process. 
The issues of public engagement, a moratorium, and relinquishment came up in 
three important contexts at the NIH. These issues came up in the NIH-sponsored 
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, which was created in 1976. After Asilomar, the 
NIH became the focal agency for further debate about rDNA research and regulation, 
just as Asilomar scientists had intended. The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee 
was intended to help draft regulatory guidelines for the NIH regarding rDNA research 
and later any research in genetics with potential ethical concerns. The question of self-
dealing and the place of non-scientists came up early for the committee. The 
committee’s meetings were only open to scientists when they first began. At the very 
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first meeting, however, several members expressed concern about the lack of public 
members. The committee’s Chairman, DeWitt Stetten, said that he “was…a little 
surprised to find out…that the members of the committee wanted to have at least one 
non-scientist present” (307). He resisted this expansion of the committee, questioning 
the value that nonscientists could add to what he saw as fundamentally scientific issues. 
Chairman Stetten clearly viewed the scientific autonomy of the committee in the same 
way that attendees had viewed Asilomar. The resistance of committee members 
eventually won out, however, and non-scientists were eventually included on the 
committee. It took a little over a year to find the nonscientists who would serve on the 
committee. These were LeRoy Walters, a philosopher-theologian and direct of the 
Center for Bioethics at the Kennedy Institute at Georgetown University and Emmett 
Redford, a professor of government at the University of Texas, Austin. Later Elizabeth 
Kutter was also included. She was a biologist, but came from a small liberal arts 
college, Evergreen State College in Washington, rather than one of the research 
institutions with close ties to the NIH. While not exactly from the lay public, given her 
scientific background, she represented a different viewpoint by virtue of her 
independence from the NIH and any large laboratories. In other words, she was less 
enrolled by institutions like the NIH, which made her something closer to a member of 
the public in the eyes of the committee. 
The enrollment of committee members was tied, in the minds of scientists critical 
of the committee, to the issues of a moratorium, relinquishment, and the place of non-
scientists in scientific policy- and decision-making. Committee Chair DeWitt Stetten 
appointed Stanford geneticist David Hogness to chair the subcommittee that would draft 
the actual guidelines. Hogness received an NIH grant in 1972 to use rDNA on fruit flies 
to develop what would later become genomic research14 (Burtis et al. 2003). Some 
thought that, as a geneticist working in rDNA research, Hogness’ leadership presented 
a conflict of interest. His committee’s proposed guidelines effectively downplayed the 
safety concerns and, in large part, ignored the suggestions that had come out of 
Asilomar. Specifically, the guidelines dropped any mention of a moratorium or 
relinquishment and called for less constraining safety precautions than those proposed 
                                            
14 Genomic research studies an organism’s full DNA profile instead of a smaller genetic subset. 
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by Asilomar attendees. Scientists responded angrily. At a meeting at Cold Spring 
Harbor in 1975 that Elizabeth Kutter had organized around safe cloning procedures, 
discussion turned to the issue of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee’s proposed 
guidelines. The result was a petition that outlined the chief issues with the guidelines. Of 
the three points elaborated in the petition, the first urged a reinstatement of a 
moratorium, saying that “the most hazardous experiments be curtailed until there was 
an experimental determination of risks (Nature 257:637, 1975).” Kutter was instrumental 
in leading the opposition despite having not been appointed to the committee. With 
respect to non-scientists, the committee remained relatively closed to outside groups 
until 1979.  In that year, it opened itself to environmental groups and some civil society 
organizations related to science.  
Moratoria, relinquishment, and the exclusion of non-scientists in scientific 
decision-making were issues being tackled outside of the NIH as well. These issues 
came up in a senate subcommittee meeting chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy two 
months after the Asilomar conference, a few months before the Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee’s guidelines issue would be settled (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-
12). Asilomar was not the sole focus of the senate meeting, but it was clear the media 
attention around Asilomar had been what motivated the meeting to take place. The 
issues driving the meeting went far beyond rDNA or any single type of research. Among 
the focal questions, Kennedy asked, “Was it proper for scientists alone to decide to stop 
and then resume the research? How could nonscientists participate in the process… 
[and] what should be done now in terms of public policy in this area?” Kennedy was 
aware of scientists’ concerns. In his opening address he acknowledged as legitimate 
scientists’ fears of an anti-science sentiment among the public, increasing federal 
regulation of science, and oversight that would might cause “a resultant drop in 
[scientific] productivity” (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). The total lack of public 
involvement at Asilomar, however, also seemed like a problem. Kennedy’s key criticism 
was the exclusive nature of the conference. Neither the public nor any representative of 
the public had any capacity to influence decision-making at Asilomar. Kennedy was also 
concerned about scientists’ desire to end the moratorium of rDNA research. He wanted 
to know what regulatory mechanisms would follow such an action. Essentially, Senator 
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Kennedy took issue with the primary purpose of the Asilomar conference: to retain 
scientific authority by means of effective self-regulation by scientists and only scientists. 
One defender of Asilomar, Stanley Cohen, particularly stands out in that hearing. 
Cohen was an rDNA researcher who had attended Asilomar. He spoke in defense of 
Asilomar, particularly the exclusion of the lay public. He also argued for no restrictions 
on rDNA research. Cohen was polite but persistent in his position that the public, 
depending on how one defined it, either had been included at Asilomar or was 
impossible to include. With respect to the former, Cohen said that the meeting had been 
open to “public scrutiny” because they had “communicated openly to the public at large” 
through the presence of journalists (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). Cohen expounded 
on this by saying that Asilomar was “carried out under full public scrutiny with public 
participation,” because “one of every eight attendees…was a representative of the 
press” (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). Cohen invoked the public witnessing that 
journalists provide to give the legitimacy to the proceedings (Ezrahi 1990). The fact that 
this public witnessing happened only after the meeting had concluded, the decisions 
had been made, and the moratorium had been lifted on terms set exclusively by rDNA 
researchers themselves did not seem to matter. According to Cohen, the public was 
made present in absentia by virtue of the public witnessing of the media.  
When Kennedy did not accept this formulation of “public participation”, Cohen 
espoused his second argument, that public participation was impossible. Cohen argued 
“There was no way to quickly call in the public and get their agreement for a moratorium 
of the experiments” (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). He again pushed his view of 
public scrutiny as sufficient for public participation but also added that future “public 
involvement in the process would occur by the currently available mechanism of 
nonscientist participation on the National Councils concerned with the funding of 
scientific research” (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). The National Council meetings 
are nominally open to the public in the way that the later Director’s Advisory Committee 
meetings were. They are open, but effectively only to people who are physically in 
Washington D.C., informed enough to know that the meetings are happening and, 
interested enough to go. In other words, lay people technically can participate but, 
effectively, almost never do. Both Kennedy and Halsted Hollman, a Stanford geneticist 
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who testified at the meeting, readily conceded to the point that broad public participation 
was logistically impossible for Asilomar, given how quickly it was organized and 
executed. Cohen, however, wanted to take this a step further, essentially arguing that 
public engagement was never necessary. Kennedy’s reason for excusing Asilomar was 
logistical but Cohen’s reason was the nature of scientific credibility and expertise. How 
could publics ever contribute to discussions about fundamentally unknown technological 
issues? Cohen’s approach reflects the technocratic mode of governance that most 
rDNA researchers at Asilomar seemed to operate under, irrespective of their conviction 
that the technology had important implications for public health and safety. 
Contradicting both of his own positions, however, Cohen also seemed to argue 
that more was being done to foster greater public participation. Perhaps he had begun 
to realize, as Asilomar veterans like James Watson later would, that a measure of public 
participation was politically necessary. In any case, he argued, “The goal of the 
[National Academies of Science] committee was to rapidly obtain a moratorium on 
potentially hazardous kinds of experiments, in order to allow time for a full public 
discussion of the issues” (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). Cohen discursively recast 
the entire NAS committee effort as a valiant effort in public engagement and democratic 
science. In reality, it was only intended to figure out the level of threat posed by rDNA 
research and to organize the Asilomar conference to discuss that threat. Not only was 
public participation not the nature of those meetings but rDNA researchers were actually 
quite terrified of public discussion. After having been pressured by Kennedy about the 
insufficiency of a purely voluntary model of self-regulation, Cohen responded by saying 
“at this point formal mechanisms are in the process of being established, with public 
participation, for insuring that compliance [with the new NIH guidelines] continues to 
occur” (Genetic Engineering 1975:1-12). He never gets the chance to explain what this 
participation looks like and whether it is different from the post-hoc public scrutiny model 
he earlier espoused. Furthermore, the NIH guidelines did not contain anything about 
public participation at that point. He might have been referring to the DAC meetings that 
would commence in the following year, but it is impossible to know. 
Recombinant DNA researchers took an important lesson away from Asilomar 
and its aftermath in the public and civil spheres: do not, yourself, invite trouble. Many 
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scientists did not share Cohen’s optimistic opinion regarding even public scrutiny, much 
less public engagement. Krimsky (1982) writes that even those who had called for a 
longer moratorium and even total relinquishment on certain kinds of research began to 
“close ranks” once they saw public and political concern fomenting. Increasingly rDNA 
researchers began to question the wisdom of Asilomar, especially for voluntarily 
addressing issues of risk. Norton Zinder, an rDNA researcher at Rockefeller University, 
said that many scientists said to him “If you guys hadn’t opened your mouth, nothing 
would have happened. It would have all blown away” (Wade 1977:100). Many scientists 
felt the victim of a great injustice, in that in trying to do the right thing they became the 
villains. One scientist, in the aftermath of the Director’s Advisory Committee meeting, 
lamented, “We acted responsibly and now the public is over-reacting (Krimsky 
1982:179).” Others, like James Watson who would later come to direct the Human 
Genome Project and establish its ELSI program, considered it a colossal waste of time 
and resources. In a 2008 interview, thirty-three years after Asilomar, he said, “I was 
depressed about Asilomar because I couldn't see when we were going to be able to 
start our experiments. Was it going to be a six-month delay, several years? As it was, it 
turned out a couple of year delay…and for a couple of years I just thought about 
regulations, not about science” (Meetings that Changed the World: Asilomar 1975 
2008). Scientists thought that Asilomar would be a one-time detour into the unscientific 
realms of ethics, laboratory safety, unknown hazards, societal implications and, later, 
politics and public opinion. These issues, they hoped, could be quickly dealt with so that 
they could get back to work. They would then return to what Capron had called their 
“historical immunity” to such considerations. When that did not happen, it left many 
embittered and skeptical about those extra-scientific issues and those who had 
espoused their importance.  
In an interview in 1975, Maxine Singer still thought that the Berg letter had been 
necessary, despite the controversy it raised among her colleagues. She expressed 
regret, however, at the public attention the letter had engendered about rDNA research. 
 None of us had any way of knowing whether the concerns that we had 
were real…and, therefore, to raise in the public’s mind the notion of 
possible dangers…was premature and might not be productive. It might 
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make some people worry and concerned about something about which 
there is no need to worry. And it’s very hard to undo such things once you 
do them (Krimsky 1982:74). 
Paul Berg, in the same set of 2008 interviews, seemed to take a more optimistic 
approach. He said, “There is a lesson in Asilomar for all of science: the best way to 
respond to concerns created by emerging knowledge or early-stage technologies is for 
scientists from publicly funded institutions to find common cause with the wider public 
about the best way to regulate — as early as possible” (Meetings that Changed the 
World: Asilomar 1975 2008). Essentially, Berg learned that they could not protect 
scientific autonomy and the progress of contentious research by drawing a solid barrier 
between science and society. He learned that scientists had to employ other boundary-
stabilizing practices that included some kind of public participation. 
The Importance of Asilomar 
The Asilomar conference marked an important moment for modern biosciences 
in the U.S. Scientists engaged in rDNA research realized, on their own and without a 
motivating public crisis, that their research posed important potential risks for public 
health and safety. They then set about to deal with those risks prophylactically, both to 
protect public health and safety as well as the autonomy of their work. In so doing, they 
re-defined the interior of their own scientific domain to include the possibility of a 
moratorium or relinquishment, postponing or entirely foregoing an area of research, 
respectively. These concepts stem from a different set of ideological commitments than 
those that laboratory bioscientists in the U.S. commonly embrace. They represent an 
expansion of acceptable science policy. Bioscientists in the U.S. had never, to their own 
thinking at least, postponed or given up on otherwise good research. The ideology 
behind moratoria and relinquishment does not put science at the top of the social value 
hierarchy. Instead, science was put into the service of society. Scientists recognized 
that they had to incorporate something from outside of the scientific domain in order to 
protect the autonomy of their work.  
Yet Asilomar is as interesting for what bioscientists did not advocate in their 
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expansion of the boundary into acceptable science policy. Although the scientists at 
Asilomar incorporated these new ideas and the ideology underpinning them, most of 
them resisted the inclusion of any non-rDNA researchers into the discourse. Actually, 
with respect to the public, it goes even further than that. It did not even occur to the 
organizers of Asilomar that the public might have any role in the discussion of rDNA and 
its risks. Stanford biologist Paul Berg, whose research got the whole debate started, 
became the de facto bioethicist at the center of the rDNA debates. This was not 
because he had any expertise in ethics or public health safety. Rather, it was simply a 
consequence of it being his research and him being the first convert from the idea that 
there was nothing to worry about with rDNA research to the position that it had 
important health and safety concerns. With Asilomar, there was no expansion in what 
scientists saw as relevant expertise. Scientists did include journalists, but only because 
of the public witnessing component that journalists could offer, and which would give the 
proceedings democratic legitimacy (Ezrahi 1990, 2012, Jasanoff 2004). The absence of 
media would bring into question their commitment to safe and ethical science. It was not 
until after Asilomar, when the conference became the subject of criticism, that scientists 
began actively thinking about how they would include non-scientific actors.  
Additionally, discourse was eventually disciplined around rDNA by the attempt to 
expel the ideas of moratoria and relinquishment, elements that were previously central 
to the discourse. The scientists, who once adopted a moratorium and relinquishment as 
new elements of ethical science and, implicitly, expanded ideas about acceptable 
science policy, turned on these ideas when they saw the consequences these concepts 
had for their research. The moratorium of rDNA research did not appease the public or 
politicians and their concerns about health and safety. If anything, it made it look like 
rDNA posed extraordinary risks that most scientists thought exaggerated any true 
danger. For this reason, they later closed ranks to protect the progress and autonomy of 
science against intrusive regulation and public interference. 
The ELSI Working Group of the Human Genome Project 
We now turn to the next case in which acceptable science policy expanded. The 
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) program of the Human Genome Project 
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performed early boundary setting to de-legitimize the value of a moratorium and 
relinquishment. Instead, the ELSI program actively enrolled new non-scientific actors, 
social scientists and ethicists, and hybrid scientific actors, scientists with interest or 
experience in ethical issues, and new ethical ideas consistent with the goals of the 
larger project. Space had to be made, however, for these new actors and ideas, in order 
to convince other scientists and science agency administrators that they were safe for 
inclusion in the larger project.  
The National Human Genome Research Initiative (herein Human Genome 
Project) officially began in 1990 and since its beginning, evidenced a public commitment 
to ethical issues and social implications. The project funded a grant program in Ethical, 
Legal, and Social Implications and a working group dedicated to identifying ELSI issues 
as they arose for the Human Genome Project. The overall ELSI program represented 
the culmination of more than a decade of lessons learned about uncertainty, publics, 
and science. Furthermore, these were lessons that came directly out of Asilomar, for the 
simple fact that most of the original organizers of the Human Genome Project were the 
same players from the rDNA debates. David Baltimore and James Watson championed 
the project against resistance from other bioscientists. James Watson became the 
project’s inaugural director. Paul Berg served as Chairman of the Scientific Advisory 
Board of the project for a time after Watson left. Jonathan Beckwith, who had worked 
with Science for the People and had been forced to decline his invitation to Asilomar, 
served on the inaugural ELSI working group. 
To understand why the Human Genome Project exhibited such a commitment to 
ELSI issues, we need to understand the institutional and science-cultural context in 
which it emerged. The goal of the project was to make a map of the entire human 
genome. No one knew how big the human genome was, and so nobody really knew 
how long the project would take or how much money it would cost. In 1988, the National 
Research Council and the Office of Technology Assessment estimated that it would 
cost $3 billion over 15 years, or $200 million per year (NHGRI 1991). Bob Moyzis, 
Johns Hopkins biochemist and advocate for the Human Genome Project, wrote “by the 
standards of the biological community, the Project’s funding makes it seem very much 
like Big Science, and as such it’s been a target for criticism” (Cooper 1994:82). The 
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project met with early opposition that came not from outside groups fearful of genomic 
research or potential health and safety crises, but from other bioscientists who feared a 
burgeoning culture of Big Science. Bioscientists whose research did not fall within the 
purview of the Human Genome Project worried about reduced federal support for their 
own research. Scientists critical of the project thought that it would absorb all bioscience 
funding for those decades. Worse still, if the former CEO for Biogen, Walter Gilbert, was 
right, then the genome project would not even employ that many scientists. He 
proposed that thirty scientists could spend the first decade sequencing the most 
important 1% of the genome. After that, the process could be automated, given 
advances in sequencing technology that were certain to follow, with a ten- to hundred-
fold increase in efficiency to sequence the rest of the genome the following decade. 
Thus, the Human Genome Project could eat up the biggest portion of the federal budget 
for the biological sciences for twenty years and support just a handful of scientists 
(McElheny 2010:42-57). Scientists like Bruce Albert at U.C. San Francisco worried that 
the shift to larger labs would mean less contact between senior scientists and their 
graduate students or post-docs, changing the very culture of American bioscience over 
the long-term (McElheny 2010:42-57). They also worried that it would lead to a 
permanent shift in the nature of federally-funded biological research from a high number 
of smaller research projects in universities of all sizes distributed across the country to 
just a few highly-funded, large-scale projects centralized in a handful of elite 
universities. Additionally, seeing all of the political wrangling involved in funding the 
Human Genome Project, many scientists feared that this too would become the new 
norm if research funding shifted towards such large-scale projects (McElheny 2010:42-
57).  
Essentially, many bioscientists were concerned that the Human Genome Project 
would bring a significant loss of autonomy. The threat to autonomy was two-fold. First, 
federal agencies might have too much power to direct research, threatening the ability 
of scientists to determine the content of their field and direct their own work. In a way, 
these scientists were operating on the myth of the old social contract for science, in 
which federal funding agencies passively supported scientific research without directing 
it (Guston and Keniston 1994). Although, as we saw in Chapter I, this had never been 
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the case, the Asilomar Conference helped bolster the power of the NIH in directing 
biological research. Scientists at that time saw the NIH as their best option, an ally 
among federal agencies, once it was clear that they could not simply continue rDNA 
research free from public interference. With the Human Genome Project, however, 
many bioscientists resisted NIH Director James Wyngaarden’s attempts to house the 
project within the NIH. They wanted to leave it to the Department of Energy, which had 
already funded some of the research into the human genome. Second, large-scale 
science threatened scientific autonomy by forcing scientists to become too highly 
enrolled by funding agencies. So not only might those agencies actively direct their 
research, but scientists might increasingly pursue research projects in line with 
whatever those agencies were likely to fund. A good deal of basic scientific research 
(i.e. research without immediate potential for application in technologies or commercial 
products) or research with applications not valuable to the military or private industry 
might go unfunded (Frickel et al. 2010, Hess 2010). The internal conflict around the 
nascent Human Genome Project was likely one reason for its early support of the ELSI 
program. With such significant internal opposition to the project, outside opposition from 
concerned publics, civil society groups, or politicians would have almost certainly killed 
the project before it got started.  
James Wyngaarden was very aware of this fragility when he asked James 
Watson to lead the project. James Watson was, of course, half of the Nobel Prize 
winning duo behind the discovery of DNA and the enfant terrible from the Asilomar 
Conference (Wade 1997:43). He wrote The Double Helix, one of the most famous and 
widely-read books on the history of science and one which many regarded as gossipy 
and overly acerbic, just like Watson himself. Watson had a strong personality that 
alienated a great many people from him. Yet the genius of his work, his ability to 
discover talented young scientists, his skill at organizing others, and his political savvy 
with those in funding agencies and Congress made him an indispensable player for the 
fledgling Human Genome Project. He was an early supporter of the project but had 
never intended to lead it. Indeed, he had been readying himself for retirement. Two 
things changed his mind. First, NIH Director James Wyngaarden and David Botstein, 
Watson’s friend and colleague, entreated Watson at a conference to lead the project. 
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Wyngaarden needed Watson’s personal charisma and his credibility among 
bioscientists to quell the internal opposition to the project. He needed Watson’s star-
power, recognized by well-informed publics and policymakers, to give the nascent 
project a face they associated with groundbreaking scientific discoveries. That alone 
might not have convinced Watson. In addition to Wyngaarden’s efforts, Watson’s son 
began showing signs of schizophrenia. Watson, who had no doubts that schizophrenia 
was largely, if not entirely, a genetic condition, wanted the genetic treatments that the 
Human Genome Project promised, and he wanted them immediately (McElheny 2003, 
2010). Thus, he postponed retirement to become the first director of the Human 
Genome Project. 
Watson took charge with the authority that everyone expected of him. He started 
by quelling the fears of Big Science. “We are all small scientists,” he said. “Big Science 
is no good. We have to give the money to bright people. The program has to be run by 
scientists, not by NIH administrators” (McElheny 2010:76). Then, in a move that 
seemed to surprise everyone involved, Watson single-handedly decided to create the 
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications program as a key add-on to the main initiative. 
Watson had been extremely ambivalent when it came to ethical concerns and societal 
implications in science. At times, he was a vocal champion of the ethical concerns and 
societal implications of bioscience. This is why he had signed on to the Berg 
committee’s original moratorium letter, for instance. At other times, however, he 
combated those people who wanted to pay attention to these concerns, seeing such 
attention as a hindrance to the progress of science. If the people he fought were 
scientists, then he attacked their credibility. In the context of rDNA research, Jonathan 
Beckwith said that Watson labeled scientists with whom he disagreed as “kooks” or 
“second-rate scientists” (Beckwith 2002:158). Thus, in October 1988, it came as a 
surprise to many when Watson announced the creation of the Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications of Human Genetics Research Program (herein ELSI program). He 
dedicated 3% of the total project budget to the ELSI program, later rising to 5%. 
Furthermore, he seemingly made this decision without consulting his colleagues or 
anyone else at the NIH, even Director Wyngaarden (Cook-Deegan 1994, McElheny 
2010, Wexler 1994). He seemed to learn the lesson from the aftermath of the rDNA 
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controversy: that people’s concerns mattered irrespective of how scientifically credible 
they were. Explaining why he announced the ELSI program, Watson explained that: 
Deep down, I think that the only thing that could stop our program is fear; 
if people are afraid of the information we will find, they will keep us from 
finding it. We have to convince our fellow citizens somehow that there will 
be more advantages to knowing the human genome than not knowing it 
(Kevles and Hood 1992: 173). 
Watson imagined a public with the power to destroy the initiative and a mode of 
self-governance, the ELSI program, capable of avoiding this potential. In his imaginary, 
Watson did not give up on the most essential component of the Asilomar conference, 
that scientists could effectively self-regulate and thereby avoid public scrutiny and 
backlash. He did seem to expand his idea of governance to include expert non-
scientists. These were experts in ethics, law, and societal implications. Still, their 
discourse would be disciplined, in part, by the fact that they were to conduct their work 
within the confines of the Human Genome Project’s supporting agencies, the DOE and 
the NIH. Furthermore, the ELSI program was to serve the interest of the larger Human 
Genome Project. Eric Juengst, the first director of the overall ELSI program, said that its 
purpose was to “aid the virtuous genome scientist’s professional ethical question: ‘What 
should I know in order to conduct my (otherwise valuable) work in a socially responsible 
way?’” (Juengst 1996:68). Unlike for rDNA research, that the science should move 
forward or that scientists were virtuous was not a question. 
Policy Expansion: New Experts 
Since the rDNA debates, it seems that bioscientists in the U.S. began to realize 
that something like ELSI as necessary, at least politically if not for ethical and moral 
reasons. Beckwith writes in his memoir, “It had become accepted wisdom that scientists 
should at least pay lip service to the concept of social responsibility” (Beckwith 
2002:159). They had learned from the rDNA debates and the debacle that had ensued 
that early attention to ELSI issues was the key to avoiding a repeat of negative public 
attention. One thing, however, did not change. Those appointed to the ELSI working 
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group were an elite group of experts. While many scientists viewed ELSI as heretical to 
the ideology of objective, value-free science, it was a heresy firmly embedded within the 
scientific culture of the NIH and DOE. One of the benefits of embedded heresy for the 
Human Genome Project was that Watson could strategically choose his heretics. 
Watson clearly felt that he had to allow non-scientists to cross over into the scientific 
domain. He used the power of his position to choose the people he thought would be 
supportive of the nascent Human Genome Project. 
The ELSI program had four components: the NIH/DOE Joint Working Group on 
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI working group), the Extramural ELSI 
Branch, the Office of Policy Coordination, and the Intramural Genome Ethics Office 
(NHGRI ELSI Program Review 1996:1). This dissertation focuses mainly on the ELSI 
working group for two reasons. First, as described by the Human Genome Project itself, 
the ELSI working group “provided the overall guidance to the NHGRI [National Human 
Genome Research Initiative] and the other ELSI programs” (7). The ELSI working group 
was supposed to determine the issues of concern that would help set the agendas of 
the other ELSI endeavors. The second reason is practical and methodological. More 
critical accounts have been written by people who served in the ELSI working group 
than by people in the other branches of ELSI for the Human Genome Project. 
Watson started by appointing clinical psychologist and disease research 
advocate Nancy Wexler to chair the ELSI working group. Wexler had many qualities 
that made her an attractive choice. Primarily, she had expertise and credibility that 
biologists recognized. Although her PhD was in clinical psychology, Wexler had 
experience with Huntington’s chorea and the ethics of genetic testing, having had her 
mother die of Huntington’s. When a genetic test for Huntington’s was later developed, 
she grappled with whether or not to be tested. She used her own struggle as the 
impetus for a psychological study of people facing the same decision (Wexler 1979). 
Her goal for the research was to inform genetic counseling services around 
Huntington’s and other tragic genetic disorders like it. Huntington’s disease and genetic 
testing became the focus of her career. She became an advocate for families with 
Huntington’s. Later she helped lead a multi-year study on the gene for Huntington’s 
disease in Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela. Her participation was an enormous help to the 
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geneticists on the project, since her personal experience with the disease gave her a 
degree of credibility and legitimacy with the people of Lake Maracaibo that the 
geneticists could not replicate. As a social scientist by training, a genetics researcher by 
experience, and a member of the stake-holding public by virtue of her personal 
experience with Huntington’s and her advocacy work, Wexler was the proverbial total 
package to lead the ELSI working group. Particularly the fact that she was a social 
scientist, and not a geneticist, would help alleviate some of the concerns of insider bias 
that plagued the Asilomar Conference. 
Wexler and Watson’s selections for the rest of the ELSI working group skewed 
heavily in favor of scientific expertise. In addition to Wexler, the original group included 
Victor McKusick, a geneticist from Johns Hopkins University, Robert Murray, a clinical 
geneticist at Howard University, Patricia King, a lawyer from Georgetown University, 
Robert Cook-Deegan,15 a medical doctor by training who later focused on health policy, 
Thomas Murray, a social psychologist and bioethicist who would come to head the 
Hastings Center, and Jonathan Beckwith, a molecular biologist and member of Science 
for the People. The ELSI working group would later include more social scientists, but 
the inaugural group were almost all insiders to the biological sciences adopting the role 
of ethical overseers to the project. Only Beckwith had been in any way an outsider by 
virtue of his participation with Science for the People. By working primarily on ethical 
issues, however, they were supposed to represent a different kind of expertise. 
Although the group was comprised mostly of bioscientists, they nonetheless put 
their scientific credibility on the line, even risking being labeled heretics to their 
colleagues in the Human Genome Project. They were often seen as “second-rate 
scientists” and the working group as a “welfare program for ethicists” (Beckwith, 2002: 
199-200).16 This was not peculiar to the Human Genome Project. This is a common risk 
for scientists who vocalize ethical, moral, or other value-laden concerns about science 
or technology (Gregory and Miller 1998). 
Watson’s choice of people to serve on the ELSI working group helped discipline 
                                            
15 Robert Cook-Deegan also wrote the most comprehensive history of the Human Genome Project. Yet despite being 
a member of the inaugural ELSI working group, he did not write much about it other than its origins. 
16 Beckwith observes, pointedly, that scientists never see initiatives like the Human Genome Project as “welfare for 
scientists.”  
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the ethical and societal implications discourse around the Human Genome Project. 
They focused on concerns that did not threaten the future of the scientific work. 
Although the ELSI group was clearly concerned with certain types of ethical concerns, 
particularly how newly discovered genetic information might be used by individuals and 
by medical industries, they did not entertain any potential moratorium or relinquishment 
of genomic science. In fact, Wexler and Watson were quick to preempt the introduction 
of these into the ELSI working group. In 1990, David Baltimore hosted an informal 
meeting at his home for the new Human Genome Project leadership. The meeting was 
a forum to discuss the emerging initiative for a book that would begin the historical 
account of the Human Genome Project (Cooper, 1994). The meeting, and the proto-
historical account that came out of it, was quite obviously a clever piece of marketing for 
the then-fledgling Human Genome Project. It nonetheless offers a useful glimpse into 
the values espoused at the beginning. They closed their meeting with a discussion of 
ELSI. Nancy Wexler, by way of introducing the new ELSI working group to those 
present preempted the legitimacy of relinquishment. 
It would be foolish to try to slow down the advancing science—the 
advances promise better treatments for disease, better quality of life and 
health for society. Rather than slow the science, we need to accelerate the 
creation of a social system that will be more hospitable to new information 
about our genes, our heritage, and our future (Cooper 1994:167).  
She returned to this idea – that we should not focus on issues surrounding the 
science but rather on fixing society and preparing it for the science – several times 
throughout their meeting. There are two important things to notice here. First, and most 
importantly, the science came first. The scientific progress of the genome project would 
take priority over any potential ethical or social implications of that project. Second, the 
scientific knowledge was sacrosanct. It could not be blamed for any problems that 
emerged out of the Human Genome Project. Rather, they were indications of an 
already-flawed society. Any problems that might arise in the future would require the 
tweaking of society to match and accommodate the science rather than changing how 
these technoscientific developments were developed or deployed into society. As David 
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Galas, the Director of the Office of Biological and Environmental Research in the 
Department of Energy’s Office of Science, said at that same sit-down meeting: 
There are two important things to remember when we think about ethical 
and social issues in terms of the Genome Project. First, there are no new 
problems. Issues concerning privacy, confidentially, and discrimination will 
become much more pressing. The basic problems, however, are not 
new—they will simply be exacerbated. The second thing to keep in mind is 
that many ethicists, lawyers, and social scientists who speak out about the 
implications of the Genome Project are often somewhat ignorant of the 
fundamental science of genetics. We need everyone to learn and 
understand [genetic testing and genetic probability] (179) 
Galas here deflected blame for any ill after-effects of the Human Genome Project 
and sets the conditions for participation: acquiring scientific expertise. The potential for 
the Human Genome Project to raise old problems in new ways or to more extreme 
degrees did not count for Galas since these issues were not new.17 One might 
reasonably have argued that, from a certain perspective, no problem is ever new. There 
was another reason why the Human Genome Project could not harm, according to 
Galas.  
I’ve heard people say—including people in Congress and even some 
scientists—that the public can be hurt by genetic information. It’s true that 
in the past that information has been used against people. But genetic 
information itself is not going to hurt the public; what could hurt the public 
is existing social structures, policies, and prejudices against which the 
information can ricochet (Cooper 1994: 304). 
The Human Genome Project could not cause harm because it was simply 
information and, by itself, information cannot harm. It may harm but only if it “ricochets” 
                                            
17 He also seemed to contradict himself. At the same meeting, he criticized a study on biological reductionism 
because, he argued, genetics is no more reductionist than biology more generally. He stressed, instead, the issues 
emerging around genetic testing for cystic fibrosis. It seems, then, that he does not support reductionism as a topic 
because, unlike cystic fibrosis testing, it is an old topic. 
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off flawed social structures, which should themselves be blamed. Galas’ sentiment 
treats the entire Human Genome Project as pure science, a simple a quest for 
knowledge, and not the unavoidably social and political technoscientific project that it 
was. Paradoxical in this view of ELSI is the fact that, if ELSI was driven at all by 
substantive purpose and was not simply a cynical political maneuver, then at its core lay 
an acknowledgment of the socio-political nature of the Human Genome Project.  
These comments are especially curious given that Wexler did understand the 
dangerous power of simple information. Her mother had made a “serious suicide 
attempt” after being diagnosed with Huntington’s (CBS 1986). In recounting her work in 
Lake Maracaibo, she wrote about how she and her team often had to council people 
about their life with a genetic condition. Many times, they had to try to talk people out of 
committing suicide after those people discovered that they carried a fatal disease. 
Wexler and her team made the ethical decision not to test children. They saw no 
positive use for that information but several negative ones, like parents withdrawing 
resources such as food or even attention from children almost certain to die (Wexler 
1979). Much of Wexler’s work explored the psychological impacts of genetic testing for 
Huntington’s (Wexler 1979, 1980, 1985). Clearly, she knew about the negative potential 
impact of what Galas frames as mere information but was an enrolled outsider, willing to 
accept and promote the science-first vision of the larger Human Genome Project. 
Furthermore, the very actions of the fledgling ELSI group evidence an 
understanding about the power of information. By 1989, a genetic test for cystic fibrosis 
had become available. The test, however, was very complicated and its results difficult 
to interpret. Although there was a single cystic fibrosis gene, different mutations 
elsewhere in the genome altered how it was expressed and resulted in degrees of 
severity difficult to predict. Genetic counselors and clinical geneticists began to raise the 
alarm about making such a test widely available. They were outnumbered by laboratory 
geneticists who thought that simple information could do no harm. Wexler, however, 
“courageously steered the ELSI working group straight into the [cystic fibrosis] storm 
(Cook-Deegan 1994: 245).” The efforts of the working group resulted in seven grants 
funding research at six centers to study the effects and approaches to clinical cystic 
fibrosis testing.  Oddly, though, cystic fibrosis testing quickly became one of the few 
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uncontroversial areas of ELSI research among the scientists on the project. This is 
probably because it focused on what people did with information rather than the process 
of scientific discovery. Cystic fibrosis testing did not threaten the progress of the 
scientific research or scientific autonomy. Either way, Wexler and her ELSI group were 
clearly aware, on some level, that simple information was incredibly powerful and 
potentially dangerous. 
Ethical scrutiny may have been embedded in the Human Genome Project, but 
those engaging in it were not exactly radical in either the actions they pursued or the 
values they espoused. Wexler and probably even Galas were aware of the potential 
impacts but discursively minimized them to ensure that the larger project moved 
forward. Even before the ELSI program or Working Group got started, Wexler joined the 
vocal opposition to a moratorium. Even Jonathan Beckwith, once a self-styled radical 
scientist who had made many enemies among his colleagues for his advocacy of 
scientific ethics, had had a conversion by the time Wexler invited him to the ELSI 
working group. When some of his activist friends criticized his participation in the new 
ELSI working group, saying that there was no consideration for slowing the project to 
consider ethical issues or those of social impact – essentially no consideration of a 
moratorium – Beckwith responded that he “had long since rejected the idea that the 
best way to prevent the harmful results of scientific developments was to stop the 
progress of science (2002: 194).” While the very existence of ELSI may have looked like 
some measure of heresy to scientists in the Human Genome Project, it was not the 
embedded heresy of Asilomar. There were no troublemakers in the group, no one like 
Harold Greene to argue, “society can more easily tolerate a postponed, or even a lost 
benefit than it can an actual injury (Krimsky 1982: 139).” If there had been, their 
credibility and legitimacy would likely have been challenged.  
After Watson: Disciplining ELSI 
The way Watson and Wexler designed that inaugural group set the stage for all 
of the work to follow, at least in the sense of who was included and what kinds of topics 
the group would address. Certain topics took precedence at different times, as we saw 
with the transition from cystic fibrosis testing to BRCA testing, but the core range of 
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issues remained relatively stable. As already discussed, they attended to concerns like 
privacy and discrimination while ignoring issues like genetic engineering or those that 
might have come from the public.   
Perhaps more importantly, though, I have focused on the beginning because it 
was while Watson was director that the ELSI working group had any real autonomy, 
according to Jonathan Beckwith and Lori Andrews, the chair of the working group after 
Nancy Wexler. This is not to say that Watson necessarily had any special love for ELSI. 
Even his intentions in forming the group are difficult to discern. Lori Andrews, chair of 
the ELSI working group from 1994-1996, was extremely critical of Watson. In her 
memoir of that time she wrote that:  
Watson implied that the ELSI working group had been created not to set 
ethical standards but to let the science proceed unimpeded. “I wanted a 
group that would talk and talk and never get anything done,” Watson said, 
“and if they did do something, I wanted them to get it wrong. I wanted as 
its head Shirley Temple Black’” (Andrews 1999: 206).  
Presumably, Watson was referencing Shirley Temple Black’s role as an 
American ambassador, by which he seemed to mean a nominal role only. Jonathan 
Beckwith, the only other insider to publish criticism about the early ELSI group, said that 
Watson was not an obstructionist. Indeed, Beckwith said that Watson took little interest 
in what the group did and never hindered their projects or their funding. Watson may not 
have been a champion for ELSI, he may have considered it a waste of resources 
despite establishing it, but neither was he an active obstacle to the working group. For 
her part, Nancy Wexler may have also sided with science as an ultimate good, but she 
was more than just a nominal leader without purpose or the capacity to realize that 
purpose. 
All of this changed once Francis Collins became the director of the Human 
Genome Project in 1993. Depending on the account, Watson either was fired or quit the 
Human Genome Project on April 10, 1992. The official reason given by the NIH was that 
Watson had a conflict of interest, due to his stock holdings in biomedical corporations 
(Brown and Gladwell 1992). Watson, however, said that he was willing to sell the stock. 
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The reason he gave, and which histories of the project usually recount, was an 
increasingly bitter and public dispute between Watson and then NIH Director Bernadine 
Healy about the patenting of DNA sequences, a proposition he called “sheer lunacy” 
(Scott 1992). 
For whatever reason, Watson was out, and it was difficult to imagine who might 
replace a celebrity-scientist like Watson. Francis Collins, a University of Michigan 
researcher, was an obvious choice. Lori Andrews describes him as “an immediate hit in 
Congress” (1995:188). He attended prayer breakfasts with conservative lawmakers and 
had ready biblical justifications for the work of the Human Genome Project. He bridged 
a divide not only between science and politics generally but specifically between a 
science project that raised a lot of moral and ethical anxiety and those whose religious 
convictions often made those anxieties consequential in the form of funding. 
Unlike Watson’s approach of benign neglect, Collins actively tried to take control 
of the ELSI working group and to direct the overall program. Lori Andrews, who took 
over in 1995 after Wexler’s term ended, realized too late that she made a mistake by 
allowing Collins to participate in the working group’s meetings. Collins made sure that 
the group studied only what he wanted, which meant a strong focus on studies about 
testing for the cystic fibrosis gene and a breast cancer gene (see Graph II.1). He 
regarded psychology, Nancy Wexler’s background, as “too mushy” for consideration 
(Andrews 1995:200, Beckwith 2002:204). He also changed their budget structure so 
that they had no budget of their own. The working group had to appeal to Collins and 
his staff for any funding. Eventually, he would not even fund regular meetings. 
Several ethical crises emerged within the NIH and the DOE that further 
demoralized the Working Group. The now infamous book The Bell Curve was published 
in 1994. It sold 400,000 copies and was a convincing argument, to many, about race 
and the genetic basis for intelligence. People used it to argue for defunding education in 
predominantly minority communities since, if the book’s argument was correct, 
educating minorities was a waste of resources. The ELSI working group drafted a 
memo arguing that “since the lessons of genetics are not deterministic,” decisions about 
education should be seen as “moral, social and political ones” not biological ones 
(Nature 378:529, 1995). Their own staff in the NIH stonewalled them, however. It is still 
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not entirely clear how or why. It took eight months and eventually strong-arming the staff 
to send out their memo for publication (Andrews 1995:196-197, Lehrman 1995: 96). 
Collins himself caused a crisis when he held “a massive press conference” in 
September of 1995 to announce the discovery of a mutation that caused breast cancer 
in Ashkenazi Jewish people (the 185delAG mutation). Women began calling to be 
tested for the gene. Some women even wanted prenatal testing so that they could abort 
fetuses possessing the gene. According to Andrews, doctors were telling patients that it 
had an 86% chance of expression leading many women to elect for prophylactic double-
mastectomies. It was later found to have only a 50% chance of expression. Some still 
did not get the importance. Dr. Harvey Stern from the Genetics and IVF Institute said, in 
1996, that "the actual number" did not matter. "If the number is 50, 60, 70, 80, [percent] 
it doesn't matter. It's still much higher [than for women without the gene]” (Andrews 
1999:97). In another scandal, the Department of Energy (DOE) was sued by its own 
African-American employees for testing them for sickle-cell anemia and cystic fibrosis 
without their knowledge. In its defense, the DOE argued that since they there was no 
evidence of discriminatory action following its obtaining the results, that there was no 
harm (Andrews 1999:97). Still, it demoralized those in the ELSI working group to see 
that even one of their parent agencies could not act entirely ethically when it came to 
genetic information.  
Lori Andrews and Jonathan Beckwith have both said that they were continually 
marginalized and hamstrung by the larger project. When they were told by the NHGRI 
that there was not enough money to fund their three annual meetings, a total cost of 
$20,000, working group members became irate. The working group was funded 
separately from the 5% of the total Human Genome Project budget that went to ELSI 
work. Lori Andrews set a meeting with Francis Collins in December of 1995 to discuss 
the ELSI group’s lack of autonomy and funding. She says that he stood her up to attend 
a prayer breakfast with a member of Congress. She quit two months later. Troy Duster 
took over for her but said that he did not intend to be the new chair (Lehrman 1995). He 
and Dorothy Nelkin, both sociologists, later repeated Andrews’ complaints that Collins 
was purposefully obstructing the activities of the group. Nelkin told a journalist from 
Nature “members feel that they are sometimes being used to legitimate the genome 
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project, rather than to explore critically issues related to its impact” (Lehrman 1996).  
The other members of the ELSI group eventually followed Andrews in quitting. 
Collins represented more than just himself in how he approached the ELSI group 
did. He may have had an undue personal influence, especially in his commitment to 
genes for cystic fibrosis and breast cancer, but his general orientation towards the ELSI 
working group and ethical concerns in general represents a larger contingent of 
scientists. Indeed, Jonathan Beckwith, Troy Duster, and Lori Andrews all suggest that 
Collins represented the majority opinion. Beckwith said that Collins’s approach 
“appeared to reflect the dissatisfaction of genome scientists with the ELSI program” that 
there should be “no more ‘soft science,’ ‘prurient speculation,’ or ‘vacuous 
pronunciamentos of self-styled ethicists’” (2000:204). 
To scientists like Collins and seemingly Watson as well, ELSI research did not 
count as worthwhile knowledge to pursue. Since ELSI research had no direct visible 
impact on genomic research, it was difficult to measure its value. Unsurprisingly, 
genome scientists and agency administrators began to complain that ELSI research 
was taking too long. Many could not appreciate the relatively glacial speed of the 
policymaking process. Duster (2002) recounts an experience in 1996 in which a 
member of the NIH ELSI Review Panel told him that all of the other advisory panels had 
completed their work “in a year or two” and asked him why ELSI was “’still in business’ 
after seven years.” Duster’s response to the NIH ELSI Review Panel brought up three 
arguments, only two of which concern us here. First, he said that “while molecular 
biologists might produce an across-the-board solution to a technical problem and 
complete their work in a year; ethical, legal, and social issues frequently emerge out of 
the very solutions other disciplines propose” (2002:69). Secondly, he brought up the 
vexing problem of race in America. While scientists agreed that “race is not a concept of 
any scientific value,” race is nonetheless consequential for people’s everyday lives. 
We may be 99.9 percent alike at the level of DNA, but if that were the end 
of the story, we could all pack up and go home after a year of technical 
advice. The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues advisory committee is still “in 
business” for a good reason (Duster 2002:69). 
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Duster’s point seems to have been that ELSI research would never be done. We 
can read this as a flipped version of David Galas’ assertion, at the very beginning of the 
ELSI working group, that the genome project would introduce no novel problems but 
rather would only be mapped onto existing ones. Duster seemed to argue that as long 
as problems like racial discrimination in the U.S. persist, then there was always going to 
be reason to understand how research like the genome project was being either 
mapped onto those problems or adding to them. 
Imagining Issues 
In this section, I transition from using secondary data collection to analyzing 
project data for the National Human Genome Research Initiative’s (NHGRI) Joint ELSI 
program between the NIH and the DOE. I do so to understand what kinds of work the 
larger ELSI program funded and to what degree ELSI research reflected a critical gaze 
back at the larger project. It is also to get a measure of the ELSI program’s commitment 
to public engagement and compare this to the technocratic approach that I argue was 
the modal approach for the ELSI program. Public engagement was still a relatively new 
concept for American bioscientists, but it was listed in the goals and mechanisms of the 
ELSI program’s five-year plan. Including public engagement would have been another 
expansion in the ideas about acceptable science policy for the Human Genome Project. 
 This ELSI research still took a technocratic approach to ethical issues and 
societal implications. In this model, experts in ethics and in the social sciences tried to 
discover ethical issues and societal implications like they might discover universal laws. 
As Richard Kuisel observed, the program operated as if “human problems, like technical 
ones, have a solution that experts, given sufficient data and authority, can discover and 
execute” (Kuisel 1981 in Porter 1995:146). The difference here was that the experts 
included social scientists rather than the Asilomar model, which gave the ethics work to 
scientists. Additionally, with some few exceptions, there was little recognition that ethical 
and moral issues might arise from people and institutions who make technology both 
meaningful and thereby actionable. In Brian Wynne’s terms, researchers did not fully 
appreciate that science has a meaning problem when it comes to its interactions with 
publics. For the most part, when people did factor into their analyses, it was nearly 
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always as objects of research. In other words, how people thought and what people did 
were not seen as constituent elements of an overall universe of ethical concerns, but as 
additional problems to be understood and solved on the way to scientific and medical 
advances. There were some noteworthy exceptions. In 1995, for example, Morris Foster 
at the University of Oklahoma was awarded a grant to study ELSI concerns of two 
Native American tribes. For the most part, however, ethical issues were seen as “out 
there” in the proverbial ether where technical experts could anticipate them. 
This section uses reports for the NHGRI and project data from all of the funded 
ELSI proposals from 1985-2000 (n=203) — including grants, fellowships, and activities. 
I use these to show what was promised, what was done or not done, and how 
successfully funded researchers imagined the issues for the Human Genome Project 
and how to investigate them. I had to combine two separate sources of NIH data. The 
NIH RePORTER database only has grant information going back to 1993. Additionally, 
in most cases the results did not provide grant abstracts. The NHGRI website has its 
own database of ELSI grants, which provided abstracts but not funding data.18 I 
combined these two data sets using NIH project numbers to ensure no projects were 
double-counted. I chose the 1989-2000 time frame because it covers the period from 
the inception of the ELSI working group to the completion of the genome. Only in this 
time frame, therefore, could anyone have raised issues that might have influenced the 
course of discovery. 
According to the Human Genome Project’s first 5-year strategic plan, the ELSI 
program began with four goals and five mechanisms for accomplishing these goals. 
Below is a list of these goals where n refers to the number of funded grants associated 
with each category. Of course, I have added the counts to these categories from the 
strategic plan. At the time of the report, there would have been no count. 
1. Address and anticipate the implications for individuals and society of 
mapping the sequencing the human genome (n=103). 
2. Examine the ethical, legal, and social sequelae of mapping and 
sequencing the human genome (n=71). 
                                            
18 https://www.genome.gov/17515632/elsi-research-program-abstracts-and-activities-database/ 
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3. Stimulate public discussion of the issues (n=16). 
4. Develop policy options that would assure that the information is used for 
the benefit of the individual and society (n=28). 
The five mechanisms for accomplishing these goals were the following. 
1. Stimulate research on these issues through grants (n=136). 
2. Refine the research agenda through workshops, commissioned papers 
and invited lectures on specific topics selected by the working group 
(n=48). 
3. Solicit public testimony from the community at large through town 
meetings (n=12). 
4. Support the development of educational materials for all levels (n=34). 
5. Encourage international collaboration in this area (n=5). 
Like the scientists in the rDNA debate, those leading the ELSI apparently did not 
see the relevance of the public for its work. Although they solicited public testimony in 
other ways, usually through academic conferences with a public component, not a 
single town meeting, as listed in mechanism three, was funded from 1989-2000. 
Because I found nothing in the grant data, I searched the archive of NIH bulletins and 
the annual ELSI program reports to see if any mentioned a “town hall” or “town meeting” 
as described in the five-year goals. The first activity with a significant town hall type 
meeting came almost a year and a half after the genome was complete. It was held on 
November 9-11, 2001, titled "The Human Genome Project Conference: The Challenges 
and Impact of Human Genome Research for Minority Communities" at the Renaissance 
Hotel and at Shiloh Baptist Church in Washington, D.C. The stated purpose was to 
reach out to minority community members about the implications of the newly 
completed genome. Francis Collins also used the opportunity to discuss the 
“unfortunate walls” that had developed between science and the Christian faith. 
According to the NIH bulletin, the town meeting aspect involved 50 community members 
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who were free to discuss their concerns about the completed genome. Waiting until the 
genome was complete to conduct anything like a town hall limited the impact that public 
opinion might have had on the research and, obviously, made any discussion of a 
moratorium or relinquishment irrelevant. Not only was this meeting the first town hall but 
seemingly the only one for many years as well. The next town hall seems to be a 2006 
program, which was also described as a pilot program on public engagement. Jean 
McEwen, a director of the NHGRI’s ELSI research program in 2006, introduced it by 
saying:  
It is important that researchers begin working with the U.S. public now so 
that, in the event these projects are launched, public input and concerns 
about issues like patient privacy and informed consent can be 
incorporated into the design and implementation of such studies (NIH 
News 9/28/2006). 
 Apparently, public input on the design and implementation of a study was not a 
key concern for the Human Genome Project itself. This town hall, and McEwen’s 
sentiment here, came at a time when other branches of science and technology were 
re-discovering the importance of public engagement in science. This process was 
driven, in part, by the politics and market consequences for public resistance to 
genetically modified organisms in Europe, and the response by European science policy 
agencies. The next chapter discusses this in detail. For now, it is only important to note 
that there were few efforts to bring the lay public into the work of the ELSI program and 
the development of the Human Genome Project. 
Since I found no town hall meetings from 1989-2000 I decided to broaden the 
criteria for “solicit[ing] public testimony” by counting conferences and other meetings 
which claimed to give non-expert publics an opportunity to have their voices heard by 
counting research using open-ended focus group discussions. The ELSI program’s 
major innovation over the rDNA debates was the inclusion of certain ethics 
professionals. With these data, however, I wanted to see the degree to which the ELSI 
program included the lay public. I only counted events which were open to anyone who 
wanted to participate regardless of knowledge or professional affiliation and where there 
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seemed like an opportunity for feedback from the lay public. Essentially, I hoped to see 
to what degree they satisfied Goal #3, to stimulate public discussion of the issues. 
Graph II.1 shows the frequency of these events by year. Work involving some sort of 
public access peaked in 1991, the first full year of the ELSI program. It declined in 1992-
1994. This may have to do with the battle between Human Genome Project director Jim 
Watson and NIH director Bernadine Healy at that time around patenting genetic 
information with Watson leaving the project in 1994. 
 
Graph II.1 Funded ELSI Projects Involving Publics 
 
 
 
Only a handful of projects had any public involvement. Again, these were mostly 
academic conferences in which publics could participate if they knew about them. If 
there was little public engagement, then what did happen? Using the NIH project 
numbers, and the classification system to which they correspond, it seems that roughly 
62% of ELSI grants supported research (n=134), 11% supported educational initiatives 
(n=24), another 11% supported conferences (n=24), and 8% were NIH Inter-Agency 
Agreements (n=18). The rest of the categories were represented by only a few cases. 
The Inter-Agency Agreement classification is odd in that it does not capture the nature 
of the activity but rather a mode of funding. It describes any activity for which funds are 
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transferred from the NIH to another agency within the DHHS (n=5) or funds transferred 
outside of the DHHS altogether, to “acquire products, services, or studies” (n=13). 
These were mostly conferences (n=7) and research (n=9) but also included a PBS 
television series and a single individual’s book project. The NIH used this funding 
mechanism mostly from 1989-1991 (n=14). According to NIH classifications, then, the 
ELSI working group mostly funded standard academic activities: research, education, 
and conferences. These are consistent with practices of scientific knowledge-production 
and clearly borrow from those modes of producing credibility and legitimacy. While this 
is not surprising in itself, it further indicates that public engagement did not then fit within 
the institutional logics of federal science funding agencies. Not only do they literally lack 
the funding category for public engagement, but it also seems difficult to fit public 
engagement into existing funding categories.  
In addition to not showing public engagement, the NIH categories also do not 
capture the degree to which these projects addressed ethical concerns. To determine 
this, I coded the project descriptions according to the five goals laid out in the NHGRI’s 
Five-Year strategic plan for the join ELSI program. There is overlap among categories 
since, unlike NIH project numbers, these categories were not mutually exclusive. For 
each of the NIH goals listed above there is a corresponding n showing the number of 
total projects in that category.  
The number of projects might not matter as much, however, if each of the 
projects were sufficiently well funded and engaging. It is difficult now to know the degree 
to which each project engaged the public. Funding data is the best approximation. 
Unfortunately, though, the NIH RePORTER tool, which provided funding data, only goes 
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Graph II.2 Number of ELSI Projects by NIH Category 
 
 
 
back to 1993. This is unfortunate given the internal battles that began taking place in 
that year. It would be valuable to see how the Human Genome Project’s funding 
commitments changed with the changing of the Human Genome Project director from 
James Watson to Francis Collins. It is precisely this period for which we do not have 
funding data. 
Since research is the largest category, I coded those abstracts again in order to 
identify trends in the focus of those research projects. I began open-coding but quickly 
discerned four common types. The first was research on people. Typically, this research 
asked how people understood, or misunderstood, genetic information and what factors 
motivated them to seek or avoid genetic screening for a possible condition. For 
example, Susan Spear received a $200,435 grant in 1999 to field a survey to patients 
with increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease to see how well they understand the genetic 
factors in Alzheimer’s and to identity their attitudes towards pre-symptomatic genetic 
testing. This category of research falls within the definition of public understanding of 
science discussed in Chapter I. Although PUS has historically focused on 
communicating with the public, it also includes research to identify how publics think 
and what they know, in order to facilitate science communication. Brice Laurent calls 
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this the move from public understanding of science to a scientific understanding of 
publics (2017:49). 
The research category of people overlapped strong with the second area of 
research, which concerned medical practices. The most common examples of this 
research focused on informed consent, genetic counseling, and communication with 
patients. Research projects that combined these two categories were often testing a 
treatment condition. For instance, in 1991 Dorothy Wertz at the Eunice Kennedy Shriver 
Center for Mental Retardation received $135,420 for a project that fielded a 20-question 
post-treatment survey to test the impacts of genetic counseling on people in the U.S. 
and Canada.  
The third category was research on issues. This research track was more often 
directed towards identifying the potential impact of issues already defined by ELSI 
working group members or prominent scientists like Francis Collins. In 1993, for 
example, Albert Jonsen was awarded $129,966 for his study Paradigm Approach to 
Ethical Problems in Genetics. Jonsen’s study proposed to develop a “comprehensive 
and systematic framework for ethical issues” by pairing diseases with known a genetic 
component to a known list of ethical issues and testing these categories against patient 
records in genetics clinics at the University of Washington. This category best reflects 
the technocratic vision of the Human Genome Project’s ELSI research, which treats 
ethical issues as objective, technical objects that scientists can discover in the 
technology itself. 
The final category of research focused on institutions. These projects, which 
were the fewest in number, investigated the history of scientific disciplines, the cultures 
of science, and the broad impacts of genetic knowledge on institutions of law, 
insurance, medicine, and healthcare. For example, in 1992 David Blumenthal was 
awarded $100,000 to study changes in academic-industry relations brought about by 
the Human Genome Project. The study was supposed to help academic-industry 
relations, in part, by testing whether the Human Genome Project would “enhance the 
commercial and academic productivity of university investigators (including current or 
potential HGP grantees), or…reduce communication in ways that may compromise 
scientific progress and the university environment.” This category came the closest to 
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recognizing the power of civic epistemology, meaning here that technoscientific 
discoveries are changed, applied, and otherwise made meaningful by the institutions 
with which they interact (Jasanoff 2005). 
Given the logic of the ELSI program, we might have expected the largest 
category to be research on issues. Even if Galas was right, and the Human Genome 
Project raised no new social issues, research into the issues against which the Human 
Genome Project might “ricochet” was still a major component of its mandate. Issues 
research does grow steadily from 1990-1992 before it bottoms out in 1994. Issues 
research resurfaced briefly in 1996-1997. In an inverse relationship, we see research on 
people and practices. These issues see a spike in 1994, decline briefly, and then come 
back in 1998. Although I cannot be sure, the 1994 spike may have been a product of 
the 1993 cancellation by Congress of the Superconducting Super-Collider planned in 
Texas. The cancellation of that $4.4 billion project sent shockwaves through science 
agencies. The lesson was that they had to communicate better with people and with 
Congress in order to show the value of scientific research (Guston and Keniston 1994). 
The overall funding picture tells a similar story about the rise and decline of people and 
practices research, though it shows that such research actually came back in 1996 and 
remained strong. The funding picture also reveals that the 1994 spike is stronger than 
the number of projects alone shows. In terms of funding, the majority of projects dealt 
with practices and about half investigated people. Research on issues nearly 
disappears. This was likely an artefact of the Watson, with his hands-off approach to 
ELSI, being replaced by Francis Collins, who began directing the study of the ELSI 
group more towards the four major issues identified early by the ELSI working group. 
These were the cystic fibrosis gene, the BRCA gene mutations for breast cancer, issues 
of informed consent, and issues related to genetic testing.  
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Graph II.3 Number of Annual New ELSI Projects by Research Type 
 
 
 
 
Graph II.4 Funding of New ELSI Projects by Research Type 
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Graph II.5 Funding for Core ELSI Issues Defined by NHGRI 
 
 
Conclusion 
These two cases, the rDNA controversy with a focus here on the Asilomar 
conference and the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications program of the Human 
Genome Project, two different ways in which ideas about acceptable science policy 
were constructed. Each represents a different technocratic orientation to science and 
policy and technoscientific development in a democracy. Each one also protected 
scientific autonomy in a different way. 
In the case of the rDNA debate, scientists focused almost solely on making their 
research safe, first in the laboratory, and secondly for society as a whole. The issues 
were technical ones, having to do with the infectiousness of the SV40 virus inserted into 
E.Coli bacteria. The solution were similarly technical, centering mostly on containment. 
They introduced what was, for them, a new idea into the science policy domain: a 
moratorium and possible relinquishment. Whether or not the ideas of a moratorium and 
relinquishment were really new, it was revolutionary to them. Furthermore, it was a 
move that even many supporters of it later came to regret, as it did not seem to quell 
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public concerns with rDNA research. If anything, it looked to many like biased self-
dealing by scientists to avoid substantive regulatory policies around rDNA research. 
And really, that was fairly accurate. They hoped that their efforts would obviate the need 
for a more substantive role by regulators. When that seemed impossible, they tried to 
make sure that the NIH, which they considered an ally, would oversee rDNA research 
and its safety. 
The scientists at Asilomar, for the most part, kept to an authoriative idea of 
scientific expertise. Non-scientists were not invited to participate in the discussions. 
Furthermore, rDNA researchers’ collective imaginary about proper science and science 
policy did not include publics or ethics experts as even a possibility. Journalists were 
allowed in, but only because they served the role of public witness to give the 
proceedings democratic legitimacy. Even their presence was cause for a vote by rDNA 
researchers at the conference. Attorneys were also brought in and here we see the only 
kind of non-scientific expertise allowed. They were to report on the possible legal-
scientific intersection that might happen with rDNA research. They were not there to 
speak to the issues, but only to possible outcomes. The attorneys spoke outside of their 
role, however, by introducing the idea that publics had a role and should have a voice in 
science. If scientists accepted these ideas, they did not immediately put them into 
practice.  
The Asilomar conference, and to some degree the larger rDNA controversy, was 
an object lesson in drawing the boundaries of science policy in such a way as to 
exclude those without scientific expertise. Consistent with theories of risk and 
uncertainty, the efforts of rDNA scientists to address all of the potential issues with their 
research was bound to fail. In their defense, they tried to draw a line around what was 
relevant by directing their efforts at health and safety concerns. In the first place, 
though, there was no way that they could have foreseen all of these concerns. 
Secondly, their focus on scientific expertise as the ultimate arbiter in rDNA policy did not 
take into account the fact that lay publics might have ethical concerns falling outside the 
bounds of health and safety. Something like rDNA raised difficult questions about the 
nature and sanctity of life and fear of science run amok. However irrational and 
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irrelevant those concerns might seem to scientists, they can have serious 
consequences nonetheless. 
The ELSI program of the Human Genome Project marks another moment of 
expansion and disciplione in ideas about acceptable science policy. The ELSI program 
expanded ideas about acceptable science policy by including a new set of experts. 
These were people with expertise in social sciences, law, and medical ethics. At the 
same time, there was work to narrow those newly expanded boundaries and thereby to 
discipline the ethics discourse in the Human Genome Project. The first effort was to get 
rid of the idea that had been the science policy expansion in the rDNA debates, the 
possibility of a moratorium on human genome research. The second effort was to enroll 
a new set of experts who would not problematically deconstruct, in Jasanoff’s terms 
(1990), the work and goals of the Human Genome Project. Although some of them were 
outsiders, in the sense that they were not experts in science, they were enrolled into the 
larger project. Finally, the ELSI working group took a technocratic approach, treating 
ethical and social issues like technical ones and increasingly using the new set of non-
scientific-experts to make those discoveries. 
 Additionally, both the rDNA debates and the ELSI program of the Human 
Genome Project were responses to an imaginary of social pressure and possible 
backlash. It was fear for the project that motivated the attention to ethical, social, health, 
and safety issues for these research projects. Those imaginaries proved insightful for 
accurately identifying the fact that public perceptions mattered. Neither, however, fully 
embraced the idea that public engagement was important for addressing ethical and 
societal issues. Even the Human Genome Project, which espoused the value of public 
engagment, did very little in this regard. For that, we turn now to the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, in which the funding agencies involved expanded what was 
deemed acceptable science policy to include public engagement. Of course, this came 
with its own modes of disciplining discourse. 
 
100 
 
CHAPTER III 
The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Societal and Ethical Implications of 
Nanotechnology 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the two comparative cases of this research, 
showing two different approaches to ethical, health, and safety issues as well as 
societal implications. This chapter turns to the main empirical case of this research, 
nanotechnology and the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). The data for this 
chapter comes from an analysis of 17 Congressional hearings related to 
nanotechnology, 38 NSF workshop reports, the NSF budget documents from FY2000 to 
FY 2015, six pieces of legislation dealing with the National Nanotechnology Initiative, 
and occasionally quotes from the 33 people I interviewed where such quotes are 
relevant. When the NNI began in 2001, it was supposed to include its own version of the 
ELSI program, the Societal and Ethical Implictions of Nanotechnology (SEIN) research 
program.19 This chapter explores the conditions of emergence for the SEIN program 
and its efforts at engaging lay publics. It is this upstream public engagement that, for our 
purposes, most differentiates the National Nanotechnology Initiative’s SEIN program 
from the Human Genome Project’s ELSI program. Upstream public engagement was 
the major expansion in acceptable science policy under the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative. 
The condition of upstream public engagement’s emergence gives an insight into 
the political imaginaries and public reasoning that underlay those efforts. Although 
                                            
19 SEIN was also often called ELSI. In the interest of avoiding confusion, however, I am choosing to refer to the NNI’s 
program as SEIN and use ELSI only to refer to the Human Genome Project’s program. Where interviewees or official 
documents use ELSI to refer to the NNI program, I will put “SEIN” in brackets to clarify. 
101 
 
upstream public engagement was a significant expansion in what was considered 
acceptable science policy, the way it was imagined also served to discipline the 
discourse in terms of who was invited and what they could talk about. The emergence 
of the SEIN program and the boundary work that defined nanotechnology, discussed in 
this chapter, shows how some of the early discourse around nanotechnology was 
disciplined. 
In ways similar to rDNA research and the human genome project, the SEIN 
program was intended to protect the funding of the program as well as the autonomy 
and authority of scientists. Unlike the other two cases, however, the stakes seemed 
much higher for nanotechnology. If not, then the hyperbole was stronger. The 
development of nanotechnology came to symbolize the standing of American scientific 
development and its economic future.  Looking at the conditions of emergence for the 
SEIN program will also help us understand, in the next chapter, how the discourse of 
the lay public was later disciplined. In the lead-up to the passage of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative and the development of its SEIN program, several battles took 
place to define nanotechnology and narrow the scope of acceptable concerns about it. 
In this story, we see exercises in public reasoning (Hurlbut 2017, Jasanoff 2012) that 
discarded certain concerns as science fiction while embracing others as acceptable. 
The results of these struggles informed the public engagement work that followed. 
Nanotechnology and The NNI 
What, exactly, is nanotechnology? This question is surprisingly difficult to 
answer, but not for scientific or technical reasons. One reason is that “nanotechnology” 
may be thought of as more of an umbrella term for several areas of technoscientific 
research than a field unto itself. For instance, micro-electronics and materials science 
both fall under the “nanotechnology” despite the fact that both technosciences pre-date 
the American use of the term. The other reason is that scientists have a preferred myth 
about the origins of nanotechnology that exclude its founder, Eric Drexler. 
Nanoscientists came to see Drexler’s concerns about the social implications of 
nanotechnology as a threat to the field, and so they labeled him a heretic to science. He 
engaged in a protracted battle with Nobel laureate physicist Richard Smalley to define 
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nanotechnology. Their debate set the stage for the determination of what were seen as 
the legitimate social concerns about nanotechnology and, thereby, influenced what 
were deemed legitimate matters for science policy. For now, though, it is enough to 
know that the signified to the signifier of “nanotechnology” has never been entirely 
clear.20 Nonetheless, it will be more useful to have even a flawed working definition of 
nanotechnology than none at all. 
Most definitions of nanotechnology are based on its unimaginably small size. The 
prefix “nano” refers to one-billionth of a meter. The common referrent for this is the 
human hair, which is 10,000 times thicker than the smallest nano-particle. 
Nanotechnology, using size as its defining factor, is any science having to do with 
materials or machines at that scale. Carbon nanotubes, for instance, are cylinders with 
walls one carbon atom thick. They are many times stronger and lighter than steel. A 
nanowire, another nanotechnology structure, is a nano-sized crystalline structure that 
conducts signals in micro-transistors. Nanotechnology, then, usually refers to materials 
or shapes between 1nm-100nm that are used in technological or commercial products.  
There are two things to know about nanotechnology for this discussion other than 
its size. First, is that nanotechnology is in a lot of consumer products from the 
microprocessor chip in a cell phone, to the coating on stain-resistant clothing, to nano-
sized zinc oxide particles in clear sunscreen. Second, is that nano-materials often 
behave differently than their larger-sized counterparts with the result that they can be 
more toxic. For instance, the element gold, which is famed for being chemically non-
reactive, becomes reactive and, thus, toxic at the nano-scale. This is due to the 
increased ratio of surface area to volume for the nano-particle. There are two reasons to 
be aware of this. First, these surprising qualities, in which usually non-toxic elements 
become toxic, increases the uncertainty of nanotechnology, potentially exacerbating risk 
society style concerns about the proliferation of technological risks and the inability of 
scientists to deal with them (Fitzgerald and Rubin 2010). The other is reason this is 
important is that much of the disciplinary work around nanotechnology seemed to avoid 
                                            
20 Even scientific definitions of nanotechnology have proven elusive, which has made nanotechnology difficult to 
regulate. It is not clear to regulators if nanotechnology refers to a certain size of particles in commercial products or to 
various kinds of uses. Toxicologist Andrew Maynard argues that regulators should not try to define nanotechnology at 
all, since such a definition would be a “’term of art’, rather than science” (Maynard 2011). 
103 
 
acknowledging this fundamental and concerning uncertainty. Basing a definition on 
nanotechnoloy on size, then, elides much of the complexity surrounding 
nanotechnology. It is simply too far beyond the scope of this project to arrive at a more 
sensible definition of nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology has always had something of an identity crisis that, at various 
times, threatened its stability as a field and thereby its funding. This identity crisis starts 
at the very beginning of nanotechnology. The story that scientists now tell about the 
birth of nanotechnology credits the idea to Richard Feynman’s 1958 lecture There’s 
Plenty of Room at the Bottom. Feynman’s lecture, the story goes, lay the conceptual 
groundwork for what would later be called nanotechnology. However, as many scholars 
have since shown, this is actually a re-imagining of nanotechnology to exorcise its 
founding father cum heretic, Eric Drexler from its history (Benett and Sarewitz 2006, 
McCray 2013, Selin 2011). As an undergraduate at the Massachussetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), Drexler created a new major for himself which he called “molecular 
engineering,” a term borrowed from MIT physicist Arthur von Hippel (Charriere and 
Dunning, 2014). Drexler would go on to advocate for the promise of molecular 
engineering, eventually borrowing the term “nanotechnology” from Japanese physicist 
Norio Tanguchi. Drexler taught undergraduate courses in nanotechnology mostly 
focused on what might one day be possible, given established principles of science and 
engineering. This is one of the many ways in which nanotechnology was unique as a 
modern science. It emerged as a discipline before it could do anything in the laboratory. 
It “arrived” in 1989, when scientists at IBM’s Almaden Research Center used a 
converted electron scanning tunneling microscope (STM) to arrange individual argon 
atoms to spell out “IBM.”21 
The mantle of nanotechnology, which was often seen as something closer to 
alchemy than science while led by Drexler, was slowly taken over by physicists such as 
Richard Smalley. It achieved full legitimacy with the creation of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in 2001. President William J. Clinton announced the 
                                            
21 In a bit of random coincidence, I was present just after this moment of discovery. I wound up taking a personal tour 
of that Almaden facility in 1989 at the age of 13 with a physicist named Hanz Coufal. I was briefly introduced to 
Donald Eigler, one of the scientists who arranged these atoms. Showing me the electron microscope image of “IBM” 
spelled in argon atoms that they had taped to a wall, Dr. Coufal told me that they had probably just embarked on the 
most exciting discovery in modern physics. 
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creation of the NNI in a January, 2000 speech to an audience of scientists at Caltech. In 
his Caltech speech, Clinton referenced three of the most common innovations promised 
by nanotechnology: materials lighter and stronger than steel, high-capacity storage 
media, and tools for detecting early cancers. The excitement and hope around 
nantoechnology was unmatched at that time. As a 2003 editorial in Nature magazine 
described it: 
Not since John F. Kennedy’s announcement of the US government’s 
intentions to put a man on the moon has scientific discipline so captured 
the imaginations of politicians, venture capitalists and pulp-fiction writers 
alike (Nature Materials 2003:127). 
The NNI became a federal initiative which grew to include twenty-five agencies, 
all collectively developing nanotechnology research. Its initial budget of $464 million in 
2001 grew to $1.6 billion by 2013 (Carim 2013). Of these federal agencies, the most 
prominent were the NSF, the DOE, the DOD, and NASA. While all of these agencies 
were responsible for a certain degree of SEIN research, the NSF became the central 
agency for SEIN and upstream public engagement. 
In a matter of decades, nanotechnology went from a matter of speculation by an 
intrepid undergraduate at MIT to one of the most highly-funded and highly-hyped areas 
of technoscience in U.S. history up to that point (Berube 2006). There is little wonder, 
then that it was difficult to set policy for nanotechnology and that doing so involved 
significant re-imagining of science policy and its relation to the civic epistemology. 
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Figure III.1 Agencies in the National Nanotechnology Initiative (Ota Wang 2009) 
 
 
 
Societal and Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology (SEIN) and Public 
Engagement 
Similar to the Human Genome Project and its ELSI program, the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative was supposed to attend what was called, in the NNI, the 
Social and Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology research. The concept of SEIN is not 
so different from ELSI and they are often used interchangeably by people in the field of 
nanotechnology. I will use SEIN here mainly to differentiate it from the Human Genome 
Project’s ELSI program, but the reader will not be far off if they think of SEIN as 
nanotechnology’s ELSI program. Again, SEIN was a part of the NNI before it even got 
started. In his aforementioned speech, President Clinton stressed the importance of 
ethical scientific innovation under the NNI. 
It's up to all of us to figure out how to use the new powers that science and 
technology give us in a responsible way. Just because we can do 
something doesn't mean we should. It is incumbent, therefore, upon both 
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scientists and public servants to involve the public in a great debate to 
ensure that science serves humanity -- always -- and never the other way 
around. 
On this campus nearly 70 years ago, Albert Einstein said, "Never forget 
this, in the midst of your diagrams and equations: concern for man himself 
and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical 
endeavors." Today, at the dawn of this new millennium, we see for all of 
you, particularly the young people in this audience, an era of unparalleled 
promise and possibility. Our relentless quest to understand what we do 
not yet know, which has defined Americans from our beginnings, will have 
more advances in the 21st century than at any other time in history. We 
must be wise as we advance (Clinton 2000). 
One could say a great deal about this quote. Clinton’s political imaginary here 
embraces a mode of science policy governance that includes a possible moratorium. He 
also frames scientists not only as inherently social actors, even in simply conducting 
their research, but as fiduciaries of public trust and wellbeing. These particular political 
imaginaries did not ultimately frame the SEIN program. The essential point that 
nanotechnology should be pursued responsibly, however, did seem to frame the effort. 
Early Congressional hearings and NSF workshops also stressed a commitment to SEIN 
research. For instance, in the 2000 NSF Societal Implications workshop, intended to 
address the importance of societal and ethical concerns, it states that “Advances in 
nanoscience and nanotechnology promise to have major implications for health, wealth, 
and peace in the upcoming decades” and that, “The study of the societal implications of 
nanotechnology must be an integral part of the NNI” (Roco and Bainbridge 2001:iii). 
In part, this commitment followed directly from the example set by the ELSI 
program of the Human Genome Project. It was the only real model of a federally-funded 
initiative for attending to the ethical and societal issues of a larger scientific initiative in 
an upstream manner. Its value lay in the fact that it seemed to address the necessary 
issues without resorting to the blunt mechanism of a moratorium, used unsuccessfully 
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during the rDNA controversy. It was, however, only a model for the feldgling NNI. As 
Edward Hall, one interviewee for this project involved in the development of the NNI, 
explained that “as we were beginning to formulate what this should look like, we actually 
made repeated references to the [ELSI] program…but it was the idea rather than the 
mechanics” (Hall Interview 5/19/2018). 
The NNI borrowed from the Human Genome Project the idea that something like 
ELSI was necessary and that it should begin early in the life of the initiative. As we will 
explore in more detail below, the NNI was also influenced by public backlash against 
genetically modified foods in Europe and the efforts to deal with that backlash. In terms 
of ELSI, though, the ethical work for nanotechnology borrowed from the concept of ELSI 
but did not take the form of ELSI. For instance, nothing quite like the ELSI working 
group was ever implemented for the NNI.22 Perhaps more saliently, unlike the Human 
Genome Project, the NNI did not immediately begin attending to societal and ethical 
issues despite a lot of rhetoric to that end. 
The NNI could not make such a boast. Three years into the initiative and little to 
nothing had yet been done in terms of SEIN research or upstream public engagement. 
As Mnyusiwalla et al. (2003:R10) point out, although the NNI had supposedly set aside 
$16-28 million for SEIN research, less than half of that had been spent and none of it 
funded even a single social science project. Much of this funding supported other ways 
that laboratories could meet the requirement regarding ethical issues, including 
research into laboratory safety. This is research that they might well have done anyway 
using their primary research funding. The first report to Congress by the National 
Academies of Science (NAS) on the NNI confirmed this problem (Small Wonders, 
Endless Frontiers 2002). It put the blame partially on the Nanoscale Science, 
Engineering, and Technology (NSET) subcommittee of the National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC)23 for several problems in its funding structure and partly on 
                                            
22 In 2006 the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office (NNCO), tasked with coordinating the NNI’s twenty-five 
agencies, did create the Nanotechnology Public Engagement and Communication (NPEC) working group. However, 
it did not function like the ELSI working group for the Human Genome Project. The NPEC did not deal with societal 
issues itself but rather organized the efforts of the various agencies and tried to turn their SEIN and engagement work 
into a standardized approach to publics and public engagement. Chapter IV covers this in greater detail. 
23 See Figure III.1 for the organization of the NNI from 2000 until 2004. To avoid confusion, I will not often refer to 
these subcommittees unless necessary. 
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the social science proposals themselves which were not funded because they “were not 
at centers judged meritorious enough to warrant funding” (2003:34). Since there is no 
record kept of unfunded proposals, it is impossible to know where these applications 
came from or what was considered “meritorious” for these purposes. According to the 
report, the three structural problems were (1) a funding structure that pitted social 
science proposals against science and engineering proposals, (2) that social science 
work was only one of six ways in which the NNI could qualify as societal implications 
research (others including “international collaboration, shared experimental facilities, 
systems-level focus, proof-of-concept test beds, and connection to design and 
development activities”), and (3) there were no social scientists on the review panels for 
these grant proposals (Societal Implications Hearing 2003:5). 
That report was not the first time these issues had been raised. The Chair of the 
review committee that produced the National Academy of Sciences report, Dr. Samuel 
Stupp, had voiced these concerns previously in his testimony at the September 2002 
Congressional hearing. 
Even though there was the intention of the NNI to look into issues of 
societal implications, the reality is, it really has not happened to a great 
extent, and so we are recommending that the NNI implements a new 
strategy to make sure that those programs do take place (Nanotechnology 
2002:53). 
The rhetoric around early attention to societal and ethical implications of 
nanotechnology had not been met with funding to realize that rhetoric. The new strategy 
he recommended was a funding mechanism that set aside funding solely for SEIN 
research and public engagement. This funding structure did not immediately change. In 
part, this was because it seemed to meet some partisan resistance in Congress. Of all 
the amendments proposed in May of 2003 to finalize the 2003 Nanotechnology 
Research and Development Act of 2003 (Nano R&D Act), intended to fund a multi-
agency research effort in nanotechnology, the only two not passed were one by 
Representatives Brad Sherman (D-CA) and Chris Bell (D-TX) “to require that not less 
than five percent of the total appropriations be set aside for research on societal and 
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ethical implications of nanotechnology” and one by Representative Eddie Bernice 
Johnson (D-TX) “to require that the Advisory Committee convene citizen panels of 
nonscientific and nontechnical experts to consider and make recommendations on the 
societal and ethical concerns arising from the development of nanotechnology” (Nano 
R&D 2003:11-12). The only SEIN related amendment to pass was one proposed by 
Representative Chris Bell that ensure that “interdisciplinary research centers include 
activities that address societal and ethical concerns” (Nano R&D 2003:11-12). In some 
ways this resembles the Asilomar approach in that these centers were housed in 
research in scientific research facilities. Alone, this amendment would have placed 
ethical and social implications work within centers of technoscience discovery. 
Three other factors had been bubbling in the background while all this had been 
taking place. First, tthroughout the 1990s, while the ELSI program struggled to influence 
the larger Human Genome Project, scholars mostly in STS published a great body of 
research critiquing what we already discussed as the “deficit model” for risk research 
and public engagement (Alaszewski and Brown, 2007, Davis 2011, Irwin 2001, 2014, 
Jasanoff 1998, Leach et al. 2005, Lewenstein and Brossard 2006, Rogers-Hayden and 
Pidgeon 2007, Sarewitz 1997, Stilgoe 2014, Toumey 2006, Wynne 2006, Ziman 1991). 
The response by scholars in the 1990s, particularly in science and technology studies, 
was what has now been dubbed the “participatory turn” or sometimes the “analytic 
deliberative turn” (Fiorino, 1990; Fischhoff, 1995; Irwin and Wynne, 1995, 1996; 
Pidgeon, 1998; Stern and Fineberg, 1996; Renn, 1992).24 I will stick here with the 
former term. Those working in the participatory turn advocated for more upstream public 
engagement and participation instead of top-down informal science education and 
communication. A key figure in one of the Science and Society Centers saw this as one 
reason for the risk of SEIN research and public engagement under the NNI. 
I think I also see it as part of the analytic deliberative turn which was, in 
part, really a global deliberative turn and then, a little further on, the 
                                            
24 I have combined literatures from the psychometric paradigm in decision-making research with STS scholarship. 
While both advocated for public participation as an antidote to ineffective public communication strategies, the two 
had very different motivations. Those in the psychometric paradigm saw public participation as a better way to inform 
and correct public misperceptions, essentially an extension of the deficit model, while STS scholars wanted to 
eradicate the notion of the misperception deficit altogether (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden, 2007). 
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responsible innovation turn in the EU.  In the risk world, or at least the risk 
perception/risk communication world, the analytic deliberative turn 
happened, you know, in the four or five years before the onset of this [the 
NNI].  So, I say that it was partly the moment in time (Jackson Interview 
4/13/16). 
Second, several Western European countries had been dealing with issues of 
public trust in science brought about by certain public health crises, like the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalitis (BSE), or “Mad Cow” disease, in the U.K. and public response 
to genetically modified foods (GM foods) all over Europe. The BSE crisis has become a 
cautionary tale about how not to foster public trust. Aware that BSE might be able to 
jump species, Minister of Agriculture John Gummer went on television to assure the 
public that British beef was safe to eat. In an odd exercise in public witnessing, he tried 
to get his daughter Cordelia to eat a beef burger. The burger was too hot for Cordelia, 
so he wound up eating it himself. When a public health problem did emerge, British 
citizens’ faith in British regulatory science had been shaken (Bennett 2010, Jasanoff 
2004). Opposition to GM foods, likely linked in the U.K. case to the BSE scare, gave 
rise to discourse like “Frankenfoods” and “Mutant Crops.” These discourses proved 
resistant to either the technocratic assurances about the safety of GM foods or the 
charge that GM opponents simply did not understand the science (Frewer et al. 2002, 
McDavisen 2008, Shaw 2002). Those discourses only served to alienate further a public 
who already did not trust the products of technoscience (Wynne 2001). The public 
opposition to GM foods resulted in commercial losses that neither Americans nor 
Europeans science agencies wanted to repeat with nanotechnology (Gaskell et al. 
1999, Laurent 2017). 
Finally, upstream public engagement was beginning to emerge for other sciences 
contemporaneously with the National Nanotechnology Initiative. The National Research 
Council published a report in 2001 that called for “broad national dialogue on the 
societal, religious, and ethical issues” in which scientific experts would lead public 
deliberation about the issue of human reproductive cloning (Hurlbut 2017:191). This 
effort was qualitatively different from nanotechnology, however, in that it centered public 
engagement on scientific experts rather than enrolling social scientists to do upstream 
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public engagement. It was also not an ongoing program, but a single set of events to 
deal with a politically contested issue around the use of the term “embryo” in 
conjunction with cloning research. Nonetheless, it is evidence that a broader process of 
learning both from the Human Genome Project’s ELSI program and from experiences in 
Western Europe was at work in the early construction of the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative’s SEIN program. 
While scholarship like this may have had an influence on the development of the 
SEIN program, it would only have served as an example for scientists and science 
agencies in the U.S. to borrow from rather than a direct influence. Bennett and Sarewitz 
(2006) have shown that social scientists were almost entirely absent from the early 
development of the SEIN program for the National Nanotechnology Initiative. They 
came to nanotechnology when invited, with the lure of funding to conduct their research. 
With the single exception of a toxicologist working in nanotechnology, who turned later 
to risk research and public engagement, those interviewed for this project all confirmed 
this when asked how they got involved in nanotechnology. As Raquel Jackson, a 
prominent scholar who came to lead one of the centers for social science of 
nanotechnology remarked. 
In 2000, … I was already interested in deliberative mechanisms for 
engaging people about science and technology, when these opportunities 
[from the NNI] just simply came up. … The level of attention to 
nanotechnology [by social scientists] was off the charts and really 
continues to be, you know, well beyond what would happen on its own 
[without NNI funding]. But, you know, I think a lot of the same types of 
questions would have been asked by social scientists around emerging 
technologies. But the focus on nano, in particular, was definitely driven by 
the funding mechanisms (Jackson Interview 4/13/16). 
Academics working in the participatory were already working on projects other 
than nanotechnology. Indeed, most had never even heard of nanotechnology before the 
NNI began enrolling them. Jackson acknowledged this as well. 
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So, for me personally this really was in response to the funding call.  I had 
no background in nanotech and so this was really initiated by one of the 
leading nano scientists on our campus calling me in and asking me to help 
put together a group of people who could respond to this [call for research 
from the NNI].  In fact, our initial reaction was “sounds interesting but we 
don’t know anything about that.” (Jackson Interview 4/13/16). 
The scholars who eventually came to do upstream public engagement for the 
SEIN program came after the funding had been secured for SEIN research and 
upstream public engagement and after having been invited to conduct the work they 
had already been doing elsewhere. As mentioned earlier, many of them had an indirect 
influence on the NNI through the upstream public engagement work they had done in 
Europe. In 2009, for instance, one interviewee, Hugh Davis, had been a part of the first 
pan-European World Wide Views conference on global warming. That conference 
helped legitimize large-scale public engagement in science in the U.S. Davis would later 
come to lead upstream public engagement projects under the NNI. People at the NSF, 
particularly the first Director of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, Mihail Roco, were 
aware of this body of research, especially the European work on public engagement. 
These scholars, however, had no direct influence on the initial discussions about SEIN 
research and public engagement in the NNI. 
Ultimately, funding was set aside for SEIN research and public engagement. The 
2003 Nano R&D Act, with its partisan battle over amendments about SEIN research 
funding and the convening of citizens’ panels, wound up not making it to the Senate for 
a vote. The 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act opf 2003 
(21st Century Act), which borrowed language from the 2003 Nano R&D Act, did pass 
and was signed into law in December of 2003. It created the National Nanotechnology 
Coordination Office (NNCO) to organize the several science funding agencies 
supporting the National Nanotechnology Initiative. It also codified SEIN research and 
upstream public engagement, in part, “by the convening of regular and ongoing public 
discussions through mechanisms such as citizens’ panels, consensus conferences, and 
educational events, as appropriate” (21st Century Act §2(a)(4)(D)(10)). This did not 
happen immediately, however, or simply because SEIN research and upstream public 
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engagement were seen as the right thing to do.  To understand how and why SEIN 
research and public engagement were taken seriously, we must understand the value of 
the NNI to scientists and funding agencies and the threats they saw facing the initiative. 
The Value of the NNI 
The Societal and Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology program and upstream 
public engagement were ultimately funded in order to protect the enormous potential for 
scientific knowledge-creation, wealth-production, and American scientific identity that 
nanotechnology promised. To understand SEIN research and public engagement, then, 
we have to understand the basis for these claims about its potential.  
The value of SEIN research was a direct product of the perceived value of the 
nanotechnology program itself and the perception that SEIN would protect the NNI. 
Nanotechnology’s advocates framed it as imperative for three reasons. First, it promised 
a funding windfall for a struggling National Science Foundation (NSF). Second, they 
framed it as the single most transformational emerging technoscience that science-
funding agencies could support. It offered nothing less than a second Industrial 
Revolution. Finally, nanotechnology’s advocates argued that it promised to secure 
America’s position as the global leader in scientific development. Together, these made 
funding the NNI an imperative for American science. 
As its first source of value, Nanotechnology promised a massive expansion in the 
funding of non-biological sciences, such as materials science and physics. In the years 
leading up to the NNI, funding for these disciplines had been stagnant or had even 
decreased. It was in this context that Mihail Roco brought the idea of nanotechnology to 
President Clinton. Mihail Roco is the most important single figure for nanotechnology in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. He was the founding chair of the National Science and 
Technology Council’s subcommittee on Nanoscale Science and Engineering. He was 
nanotechnology’s biggest advocate and later became the first Director of the NNI. He 
was more commonly known then as the “Czar of Nanotechnology.” He brought 
nanotechnology to President Clinton’s attention at a time when the NSF was trying to 
figure out ways to expand its budget. Years of stagnant funding for the NSF budget in 
absolute numbers meant a real decline when considering the impact of inflation. 
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Especially annoying to some was the relative disparity in funding between the NSF and 
the NIH. The NIH had been working with a budget more than double the size of the 
NSF. An article in the March 2001 issue of Scientific American described the situation 
aptly: 
Biologists sometimes stand accused of physics envy: a yearning for 
irreducible, quantifiable laws sufficient to explain the complex workings of 
life. But the jealousy goes both ways. Physicists, chemists and other non-
biologists have long suffered from what can only be called NIH envy: the 
longing for the hefty increases in research funding that seem to go every 
year to the National Institutes of Health (Megabucks for Nanotech 2001:8-
10). 
This disparity made little sense to those at the NSF and its supporters in 
Congress. The NIH had a narrow focus on biology and public health whereas the NSF 
had to fund every other scientific discipline as well as science education. As 
Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) reminded House Committee on 
Science25, “[the] NSF funds 36% of the total academic research in physical sciences, 
50% in engineering, and 72% in mathematics” (The NSF Budget: How Should We 
Determine Future Levels 2002:10-13). Graph III.1 shows this relative funding disparity 
over a thirty-year period.26 The NSF’s supporters in the House Committee on Science 
called attention to the disparities in the amounts of the average grants awarded within 
the two agencies and the average length of those grants, where the NIH was able to 
award larger grants for longer periods. Representative Nick Smith (R-MI), Chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Research, said what scientists at the NSF apparently could not 
say. 
One critique I do have of course is the continued funding disparity  …  
between NIH and NSF. In this budget, for instance, just a slight reduction 
                                            
25 This committee has undergone several name-changes. As of the time of this writing, it is currently the Committee 
on Science, Space and Technology. 
26 The research budget for the department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was combined with the NIH for 
several years making it impossible to disaggregate their budgets for those years. For this reason, these data, from 
the AAAS, combine NIH and HHS budgets for all years. 
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in NIH funding because of the size of that funding would make a huge 
difference in terms of increased funds being available in the National 
Science Foundation (The NSF Budget: How Should We Determine Future 
Levels 2002:10-13). 
In all of the funding documents for the prior 10 years, there were no calls for a 
reduction of the NIH budget to fund an expansion of the NSF budget. Administrators at 
the NSF clearly did not want to call for a decrease in funding for their fellow-agency 
despite suffering budget-wise themselves. 
 
Graph III.1 NIH and NSF Budgets from 1985-2015 in 2015 Constant Dollars 
 
 
 
This funding disparity was not simply between the NIH and the NSF, however, 
but represented a wider trend in the growth of the “biomedical industrial complex” 
relative to other scientific disciplines (House 2016). Graph III.1 shows the relative 
budgets of scientific disciplines over a 36-year period. Engineering and physical science 
enjoyed slight funding advantage relative to the life sciences throughout the 1970s to 
early 1980s. Starting in the mid-1980s, though, life science funding began to grow. By 
1996 the life sciences became the most well-funded scientific discipline. One 
justification for expanding the NSF budget, then, was based on issues of fairness and 
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value. It was unfair to have such a funding disparity between the NSF and NIH since the 
NIH created no more value in terms of commercial technologies and the social value of 
science than the NSF created. 
 
Graph III.2 Science Funding by Discipline 1970-2016 in 2016 Constant Dollars 
 
 
 
Although seemingly everyone acknowledged the disparity as a problem, no one 
had a long-term solution. In 1999, the Clinton Administration promised a 10% increase 
in the NSF budget that was supposed to come from a settlement between the federal 
government and the big tobacco companies. Tying the NSF budget increase to what 
was essentially a gamble, however, made many policymakers uncomfortable. In his 
opening statements for a 1998 hearing of the House Committee on Science, Chairman 
Pickering expressed this anxiety. 
Although the Science Committee is generally supportive of the increases 
in R&D proposed by the Clinton Administration, there are real concerns 
that the proposed budget increases for scientific research relies too 
heavily on tobacco smoke and mirrors (Budget Authorization Request: 
National Science Foundation 1999:2-47). 
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Then-NSF Director Neal Lane was diplomatically circumpsect in his opinion 
about the tobacco settlement. When asked his opinion by Representative Gil Gutknecht 
(R-IA) about having his agency’s funding “tied to an anchor which may or may not float,” 
Dr. Lane gave a long and general answer about the importance of research and the 
difficulties of setting budgetary priorities. “Gosh, we’d love to invest more” Lane said, 
identifying with the Congressional subcommittee and their struggles to make tough 
budgetary decisions, “but we have to make a decision on our own priorities.” At the end 
of Lane’s statement Mr. Gutknecht, seeming confused, asked “So I take it…you’d prefer 
not to be tied to the tobacco settlement?” Lane merely replied “I look forward to working 
with Congress,” drawing laughter from the committee (NSF Budget Request 1999:2-47). 
Director Lane acted diplomatically. Although Lane had compared the NSF to the 
NIH in terms of number of grants funded, average funding per grant, and the average 
length of grants to show the disparity between the two agencies, he never called for a 
reduction in NIH funding to help the NSF. He also did not disparage a potential funding 
windfall, even if it presented a stop-gap measure to a long-term problem. In the end, the 
gamble paid off . The settlement did eventually give the NSF a short-term funding 
windfall, but the deeper problems remained. Another windfall like the Big Tobacco 
Settlement might never come along again. The NSF needed a longer-term solution.  
The usual mechanisms the NSF used to justify its funding clearly were not 
allowing it to keep pace with inflation much less the NIH. The NSF budget request to 
Congress asks for funding based on regular expenditures, like administration and 
facilities, and “research and related activities” (NSF Budget Request 2002). Facilities 
might justify modest budgetary increases but usually administration costs do not, as 
high administration costs are viewed negatively. Budget documents usually contain 
language to assure that budgetary increases will not go to administration costs. By 
themselves, research and related activites, proved insufficient to justify major budget 
increases. Research and related activities refers to work in core disciplines like 
chemistry and mathematics (NSF Budget Request 2002). It seems that the most 
effective way for justifying budgetary increases were to have research initiatives that 
combined the activities of several disciplinary fields. The NNI started as one of these 
smaller initiatives. In the years prior to the NNI, there were several of these initiatives. 
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The Knowledge and Distributed Intelligence (KDI) initiative was an initiative to fund 
computer scientists and facilitate computational knowledge infrastructures. The Life and 
Earth’s Environment (LEE) initiative helped fund biologists, geologists, and other 
scientists workin in areas related to environmental science. The Education for the 
Future (EFF) initiative funded informal science education in schools and museums. 
None of these, however, could justify funding all of the varius work that the NSF did. 
Nanotechnology, on the other hand, by virtue of its fuzzy definition and hype, could do 
just that. As Neal Lane’s successor, NSF Director Rita Colwell, told Congress in 
February of 2000: 
[Nanotechnology] involves biology, math, physics, chemistry, materials, 
engineering, information technology, and all the different ways they 
connect to each other at the nanoscale. I cannot emphasize enough the 
strong connections between these initiatives.27 For example, we often say 
you need nanotech to go further in infotech (Fiscal Year 2001 Budget 
Authorization Request: National Science Foundation 2000:7). 
Not only did nanotechnology cover all of the core research areas but, as Dr. 
Colwell frames it here, nanotechnology was also the lynchpin for the success of every 
other initiative that they had proposed. In the budget proposal for the previous year 
(FY2000), nanotechnology had been framed as an aspect of the Biocomplexity in the 
Environment (BCE) initiative and helped justify a $25 million increase for the NSF 
(Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Authorization Request: National Science Foundation 
1999:194). The total increase requested by the NSF for all of these projects for FY2000 
combined amounted to $117 million. By comparison, the FY2001 budget that Dr. 
Colwell discusses above requested $200 million just for the new nanotechnology 
initiative.  
Nanotechnology promised a budgetary windfall that would right the wrongs of the 
funding disparity between the NSF and the NIH. The NNI, as an inter-agency initiative, 
promised even greater funding for the NSF and looked to narrow the gap between it and 
                                            
27 She refers here to the other initiatives she discussed at this hearing, including Information Technology Research – 
which had morphed out of KDI, Biocomplexity and the Environment, the 21st Century Workforce, and the Nanoscale 
Science and Engineering Initiative. 
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the NIH. An NSF report to Congress in 2000 promoting the NNI promised that 
nanotechnology would justify a budget increase of 124% to the NSF and 300% to 
NASA, while only promising the NIH a 13% budget increase (Nanotechnology: The Next 
Industrial Revolution 2000). Additionally, the report promised that 70% of the additional 
funding will go towards funding university grants. This had been the main complaint 
about the funding disparity between the NIH and NSF, that the NSF could not fund 
university grants at the same level and duration as the NIH. The NIH could offer more 
grants to university researchers with higher levels of funding that lasted on average two 
to three years longer. The NNI looked like the budgetary solution scientists and 
administrators at the NSF had been hoping for. 
That was the immediate value of the NNI to the NSF, but nanotechnology’s 
advocates said that nanotechnology held promises for Americ as a whole. 
Nanotechnology, they said, promised unrivaled economic benefits and came to define 
America’s dominance in science and technology.  
In terms of the economy, nanotechnology’s advocates promised that it would 
both create new markets and reshape existing ones. Nanotechnology, to a greater 
degree than the other initiatives at the time, was framed as nothing short of the the next 
industrial revolution. Indeed, in a report to Congress titled Nanotechnology for the 21st 
Century: Leading to a New Industrial Revolution (2000) Mihail Roco promises that: 
The initiative [NNI] will support long-term nanotechnology research and 
development, which will lead to breakthroughs in information technology, 
advanced manufacturing, medicine and health, environment and energy, 
and national security. The impact of nanotechnology on the health, wealth, 
and lives of people will be at least the equivalent of the combined 
influences of microelectronics, medical imaging, computer-aided 
engineering, and man-made polymers developed in this century. 
 
This is an impressive exercise in public imagination. In simple terms, Roco 
promised Congress that nanotechnology would be, at a minimum, as socially 
transformational as the total combined influence of all of the most important 
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technological breakthroughs of the 20th century. In effect, Roco engaged not only in 
science-making, but future-making for the entire country. Budget requests to Congress 
often contain promises about revolutionary new technologies, but Roco’s claim was 
grandiose even by those often hyperbolic standards.  
These breakthroughs were supposed to transate into unprecedented economic 
and social benefit. The industrial revolution would, according to Roco, lead to a trillion 
dollar nanotechnology industry sometime by 2015 (Nanotechnology: Societal 
Implications 2001:25).28 This would come from revolutionary changes to manufacturing, 
electronics, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, chemical plants, transportation, and 
sustainability. Thomas Kalil, deputy director for the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), enlisted an even grander vision. In the cCngressional report 
on nanotechnology’s societal implications he observed the following: 
Discoveries involving nanoscience will be as dramatic and, I believe, even 
more important than the creation of the Internet. Let’s consider the 
economic impact nanoscience may have our society [sic]. Bill Joy, co-
founder and Chief Scientist of Sun Microsystems, has estimated that the 
combination of the information and physical world will create in this 
century a thousand trillion dollars worth of wealth. As a former lawmaker, I 
thought I was used to dealing in big sums. This is really big! In fact, it 
would be adding 100 U.S. economies in the world market 
(Nanotechnology: Societal Implications 2001:25). 
Kalil took Roco’s imaginative future-making work and not only made it bigger but 
made it global. His choice to use Bill Joy, however, for this economic promises is odd 
for a coupl of reasons. First, Bill Joy is no economist. He was an engineer, a 
businessman, and a popular futurist. Kalil strategically ignored Bill Joy’s lack of 
                                            
28 It is unclear whether nanotechnology ever met this goal or even came close. The issue is complicated by the fact 
that nothing like a discrete nanotechnology industry ever emerged. Nanotechnology is more of an “enabling” 
technology, meaning that it simply changes the production of existing products while not necessarily leading to new 
ones. According to interviewees, industry actors also learned not to advertise the use of nanotechnology in their 
products, fearing negative public response. Since nanotechnology is still largely unregulated, there is no way to tell 
whether a product contains nanoparticles. The Project on Emerging Technologies at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation 
ran an open database where users could enter products that claimed to contain nanotechnology, but later found that 
two-thirds of the entries made claims that were either false or unverifiable. 
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expertise and credibility regarding global economics when he deployed Joy’s estimate. 
Second, Bill Joy was no supporter of nanotechnology. He wrote a popular article about 
the potential for nanotechnology to cause major social disruptions to the very fabric of 
society, essentially a nanotechnology-enabled post-human dystopia. Joy called for total 
relinquishment of nanotechnology, making him an odd choice for Kalil here. 
Nonetheless, nanotechnology’s advocates saw in it an almost unimaginable 
degree of promise. So much so, in fact, that the nano-future came to be seen as a 
foregone conclusion and any hindrance to that future as essentially robbing people of a 
future that was already in-hand. Several scientists criticized this hype as promising 
more than nanotechnology could reasonably deliver, especially in the usual decades’-
long time frame from technological discovery to marketable consumer products (Berube 
2006). In the period from 1999 to 2005, however, these voices were drowned out by 
those who saw nanotechnology as the key to prosperity.  
If the nanotechnology revolution was a foregone conclusion, then the only real 
question left was who would benefit. American scientists and administrators of funding 
agencies argued that it had to be the U.S. Funding nanotechnology was framed as a 
way to stabilize American dominance in science and commercial technologies. Failing 
to fund nanotechnology amounted to dooming U.S. science and commercial 
technological industries. They discussed nanotechnology as a race against other 
countries who might win for themselves the spoils of the nano-revolution. The rhetoric 
around this race strongly paralleled that of the Cold War, treating the nano-revolution as 
the spoils in a zero-sum game (McCray 2013).  
In this discourse, among scientists and adminsitrators at the NSF and Congress, 
the U.S. was framed in a perpetually fragile position. The U.S. was imagined as always 
leading the race to nanotechnology at that given moment, but also always about to lose 
its position. Scientists and industry leaders presented a picture in which Europe, China, 
and Japan were always just about to catch the U.S. From a 2005 hearing devoted to the 
standing of the U.S. in nanotechnology research, committee chairman Bob Inglis (R-SC) 
The U.S. is currently ahead of the nanotechnology curve, but other nations 
continue to invest more and more time, energy, and money in their 
nanotechnology efforts. If we pause even to glance over our shoulders, we 
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will see them on the horizon, several of whom are already on our heels 
and pushing to take the lead. (Nanotechnology Where Do We Stand 
2005:14). 
Inglis’ mixed metaphor gets a bit complicated if you analyze it too closley, but it 
clearly takes on the qualities of a horror movie. America, the hero, is running from a 
horde of monsters that are so close on the hero’s heels that there is barely time to even 
take stock of the chase. Matthew Nordan, Vice President of Lux Research, Inc. a private 
organization that assessed the value of emergning technology markets, expressed the 
nanotechnology revolution as a race with no clear end. 
It is just like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland. It is not an issue of 
being in one place before someone else. It is always being one step 
ahead, being able to run faster. There is an evolutionary arms race to 
think about (29). 
The race for nanotechnology supremacy became enmeshed with American 
anxieties about the state of it superiority in science, its scientific education, brain drain, 
and training America’s foreign competition. Some were afraid that the American 
nanotechnology workforce was increasingly from China, India, Japan, and South Korea. 
Worse than training a foreign workforce that stayed in America to work was training one 
that went back home. As Matthew Nordan observed, the U.S. risked becoming a “drive-
through educational institution for other countries’ students” (29-30). The race was not 
only a concern for the stated goal of realizing nanotechnology’s benefits. It was also a 
concern about the relative state of the U.S. standing in science, science education, and 
the native workforce. Nanotechnology came to signify what concerned scientists most 
about American science. For all of these reasons, it was imperative to scientists, 
funding agency administrators, and many policymakers in Congress to fund the NNI. It 
is also worth noting that this discourse was not peculiarly American. Brice Laruent 
describes how the organization Nano2Life in France was supposed to come up with a 
solution to the problem that “European nanotechnology research was lagging behind 
that of other developed countries, most notably the United States” in a “global 
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nanorace” (Laurent 2017:5, Hullmann 2006). 
Edward Hall, a scientist involved with nanotechnology prior to the formation of 
the NNI, summed up this story well. 
You have a situation in the 1990s where the NSF were looking for a big 
idea to sell to Congess to boost their budget. And it may be because the 
NIH was getting a lot of money under Clinton and they [the NSF] was 
pretty much static. And so there was a little brain storming going on, and it 
was Mike [Roco] that came up with this idea of nanotechnology and sold 
the idea. And he did it very well. He sold it in a way where the emphasis 
was on job creation, economic growth, and along with this the idea that 
this is so new and cutting edge that if the U.S. isn’t there, it would be left in 
the cold. So that was a very clear narrative that Mike was largely 
responsible for. And he was also smart enough not to just focus on the 
science, but he brought in some of those, sort of, broader ethical 
considerations as well into that dialogue (Hall Interview 5/19/16). 
To summarize this section, funding for the NNI was seen as an imperative for 
three reasons. First, it was a funding windfall for an ailing NSF. In part, because it had 
such a loose definition, nearly any scientific discipline could count as “nanotechnology.” 
Therefore, nanotechnology could provide funding for the broadest array of work under 
the NSF. Second, nanotechnology promised to be the most transformational technology 
of the 21st century. The imagination around its promise reached truly hyperbolic levels. It 
was, according to its advocates, more revolutionary than the combined influences of 
some of the 20th century’s most transformational technologies. As a form of political 
imaginary, it framed governance around nanotechnology by making it too valuable not 
to pursue. In other words, it discursively precluded anything like a moratorium to give 
time to discover answers to questions like why gold nano-particles are surprisingly toxic. 
Finally, nanotechnology got rhetorically and symbolically wrapped into discourse about 
the state of American science. Nanotechnology was framed as a race in a zero-sum 
game that borrowed heavily from the rhetoric and values of the Cold War. The 
tolerances, then, for obstacles to nanotechnology were almost non-existent. Anything 
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could lose America the race and with it, all of the transformational benefits 
nanotechnology had to offer. For the NSF, it also risked losing its best hope for an 
expanded budget after years of struggling for even modest funding increases.  
The Public Threat to the Nanotechnology Revolution 
The enormous promise of the NNI brought with it the concomitant fear among 
scientists who might benefit from nanotechnology funding and administrators at science 
funding agencies, particularly the NSF, that all of nanotechnology’s immense promise 
might not be realized. Nanotechnology’s proponents had two major concerns in this 
regard. The first, was that the government simply would not fund the NNI. As we just 
saw, scientists and supporters from industries were able to frame nanotechnology in 
such a way so as to win big funding for nanotechnology, thereby defusing this threat in 
the short term. Second, they feared that a significant public backlash might severely 
impact, if not outright destroy, the fledgling initiative before it brought about the 
revolution it promised.  This concern came from several directions at once. 
As discussed earlier, the controversy over genetically modified foods, particularly 
in Europe, gave nanotechnology’s advocates reason to worry. Workshops at the NSF 
and witnesses before Congress repeatedly mention the need to avoid the European 
backlash to GMOs, which dwarfed the GMO backlash in the U.S. Anti-GMO protesters 
had concerns about the environmental, health and safety issues with GMO foods. They 
and their concerns were disregarded as unscientific and irrational. What no one wanted 
to admit, however, was that in terms of a pure risk-benefit calculus, their concerns were 
completely rational, at least in terms of the risk society. The risks to consumers were at 
least somewhat unknown, which made them non-zero. The benefits, however, went not 
to consumers but to producers (Bennett, 2010). With a couple of exceptions such as 
“golden rice,” a nutrient-rich rice strain made with food-insecure nations in mind, GMO 
foods were no cheaper, did not taste better, nor were they more nutritious than their 
non-GMO counterparts. The benefit of GMO foods were that they were easier and 
cheaper to produce. Scientists and representatives from the agricultural industries in 
Europe responded by trying to convince people that their concerns were irrational and 
anti-science. That strategy was a spectacular failure of which those in the fledgling NNI 
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were well aware. Alysha Carter, a social scientist involved in public engagement for the 
NNI, recalled the signficiance of the GMO controversy for nanotechnology.  
There was the whole GMO excitement that would’ve been a blip on the 
screen before nanotechnology became a national priority.  And what you 
saw around GMOs was enormous public backlash that wound up being 
pretty expensive for corporate interests, and kind of blindsided apparently, 
in my mind, a lot of the technology developers and technology  
entrepreneurs and this kind of thing. So I think that you know there was 
just this kind of interest in preserving profitability and sort of that tiered 
flow of technology development. So there was this interest in looking at  
nanotechnology in this broader light, paying attention to public opinion 
around nanotechnology (Carter Interview 7/19/16). 
Nanotechnology’s advocates cited other examples of failed commercial 
technologies in the vein of GMOs, particularly nuclear energy and stem cell research. 
Many considered nuclear energy a lost opportunity for clean energy as nuclear 
programs in Europe flourished while it largely disappeared in the U.S. (Jasanoff and 
Kim, 2009). Stem cell research experienced enormous public backlash and was 
ultimately defunded at the federal level in 2001. Nanotechnology’s advocates feared 
that it would join the list of these scientific lost opportunities, what has been dubbed 
“undone science” (Frickel et al. 2010). Representative Ralph Hall (D-TX) put the three 
together in his statement before Congress.  
We know too well that negative public perceptions about the safety of a 
technology can have serious consequences for its acceptance and for its 
use. This has been the case in such technologies as nuclear power, 
genetically modified foods, and stem cell therapies (The Societal 
Implications of Nanotechnology 2003:12). 
Representative Hall reflects a common framing for these problems: their public 
acceptance. Once the scientific process produces a technique or a product, the 
question is how to get publics to accept it. As we will see, while much of SEIN research 
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and public engagement took seriously the implications of nanotechnology, many took 
fostering public acceptance of nanotechnology as their main mission. Yet, not all fears 
came from the history of other technoscientific fields.  
Besides the cautionary tale of GM foods in Europe, three other imagined 
technoscientific crises for nanotechnology emerged that made its advocates worry 
about a possible public backlash. The first and most significant source of these visions 
came not from anyone opposed to nanotechnology but from Eric Drexler, 
nanotechnology’s founder and its most vocal and prominent advocate. Drexler gave the 
world the first imagination of a nanotechnology apocalypse. In his 1986 book, The 
Engines of Creation, he described a scenario he called the gray goo. As an engineer, 
Drexler has always imagined nanotechnology to mean nano-sized machines, or 
nanobots as they came to be called. He argued that it would be inefficient to construct 
nanobots individually with macro-scale machines, like cars in a factory. Thus, Drexler 
imagined that building nanobots would require nano-sized assemblers to construct 
them. These nano-assemblers would work by breaking down surrounding material at 
the atomic scale to produce not only nanbots generally but more nano-assemblers. 
Nano-assemblers would have to be run by artificial intelligence since it would be 
impossible to manually control something that small.  
In the gray goo scenario, a nano-assembler breaks with its programming controls 
and begins to turn all matter around it into more nano-assemblers. The faulty coding is 
reproduced and the problem grows exponentially, very much like an engineering version 
of cancer. In Drexler’s vision, the world would be slowly digested into more and more 
nano-assemblers until the planet was turned into a “gray goo” of tiny nano-assemblers. 
The gray goo was a thought-experiment that Drexler intended to flag that 
nanotechnology had societal implications worth considering. Engines of Creation had 
positive impacts for nanotechnology. It put nanotechnoloy on the proverbial map, 
leading to university programs, helping win important public support for research, and 
inspiring a generation of scientists to study nanotechnology, including the man who 
would become Drexler’s staunchest critic and arch-nemesis in the battle to define 
nanotechnology, the physicist Richard Smalley. For all this, though, it also saddled 
nanotechnology with a powerfully frightening scenario ripe for science fiction and the 
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public imagination. It presented to nanotechnology’s advocates a problem that had to be 
solved. 
In 2000, as Mihail Roco, the future Director of the NNI, successfully petitioned 
President Clinton and Congress to develop the NNI, Richard Smalley threw down the 
proverbial gauntlet, openly challenging Drexler about the feasibility of nano-assemblers. 
We will cover only the basic details of the debate here as there is already a great deal of 
quality scholarship on that debate (Bennett and Sarewitz 2006, Kaplan and Radin 2011, 
McCray 2013, Selin 2007). The debate was essentially a contest to define 
nanotechnology as either a science of nano-scale machinery, Drexler’s view, in which 
nano-scale materials played a crucial part or, in Smalley’s view, as a nano-scale 
materials science in which nano-scale machines had no part. The explicit subject for 
this definitional contest was feasibility of nano-assemblers but it was implicitly about the 
possibility of the gray goo. If nano-assemblers were impossible, then so was the gray 
goo.  
Their argument boiled down to whether or not it was possible for a nano-
assembler to manipulate objects at the atomc scale, which is necessary if you want to 
assemble those atoms into materials and machines. Drexler thought that it was 
theoretically possible while Smalley mantained it was not. Smalley had two reasons. 
First, the nano-assemblers would necessarily have “hands” larger than atoms, making 
them too big to grab things. He called this the “fat fingers” problem. Second, the 
electrical charge of the nano-machine’s hands would make it impossible for them to 
both pick up and drop an atom. It would do one or the other but not both. Smalley called 
this the “sticky fingers” problem. Drexler admitted that fat and sticky fingers were 
limitations, but ones worth exploring through scientific research, not reasons to give up 
on nano-assemblers at the outset. Smalley was performing crucial boundary work here. 
Whereas Drexler saw his vision as consistent with the power of science to do previously 
unimaginable things, Smalley framed Drexler’s vision as mere science fiction. 
Furthermore, the motivation for this boundary work was primarily social rather than 
scientific. If not for the apocalyptic gray goo and its potential to capture the public 
imagination, it is likely that no nanoscientist would have much cared about the feasibility 
of nano-assemblers, at least before any real research on them had been proposed. 
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Sticky and fat fingers would have been questions to answer in the laboratory, not 
discursively in battles of the imagination. That a debate raged at all is a testament to 
nanoscientists’ fear of the gray goo to capture the public imagination and the power of 
that imagination to negatively impact their nascent field.  
Smalley won the debate that determined the future of nanotechnology. There 
was no scientific closure on the problem of nano-assemblers or fat and sticky fingers. 
Indeed, there could be no such closure in the absence of research. Rather, Smalley’s 
arguments, based in physics, looked more scientific than Drexler’s engineering-based 
arguments.29 Towards the end of the debate, Smalley was still publishing his opinions 
on the impossibility of nano-assemblers in journals like Nature while Drexler was having 
to publish his opinions in his own organization’s newsletter or his personal blog. In a 
protracted exercise of socially-motivated boundary work, the most important scientific 
threat to the emerging field of nanotechnology was defined away as science fiction. The 
debate also got rid of nanotechnology’s most significant heretic. By the end, Drexler 
was no longer taken seriously as a scientist. He was no longer invited to speak at 
conferences or to witness before Congress.30 He was effectively ousted from the field 
he had almost single-handedly founded and the origin-story of nanotechnology was re-
imagined to give the founding role to the widely-loved and already deceased physcist 
Richard Feynmann (McCray 2013, Selin 2007). 
As the Drexler-Smalley debate was wrapping up, nanotechnology was hit by 
another apocalyptic vision. This time it came from physicist and Sun Microsystems CEO 
William (Bill) Joy. Unlike the Drexler-Smalley debate, Joy’s vision was published in the 
popular Wired Magazine with followup pieces in the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, among others. In his article, Why The Future Doesn’t Need Us 
(2000), Joy argued that advancements in robotics, artificial intelligence, and 
nanotechnology would render humans obsolete. Humans would either be melded with 
these technologies, making them effectively no longer human, or would replaced by 
them. Ultimately, Joy advocated for the total relinquishment of nanotechnology. Recall 
                                            
29 David Noble (1977) gives a history of engineering in the U.S. in which he shows how it came to be seen as less 
scientific than fields like chemistry and physics. 
30 His wife, Christine Peterson, continued to engage in these activities on behalf of the Foresight Institute, which she 
co-founded with Drexler. Importantly, she never mentioned either the gray goo or the issue of sticky and fat fingers. 
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earlier that Thomas Kalil cited Bill Joy when discussing the thousand-trillion dollar global 
nanotechnology market and the positive social disruptions this would portend. Kalil’s 
use of Bill Joy’s ideas were odd, given that Bill Joy feared rather than endorsed 
nanotechnology. Unlike Drexler’s gray goo, Bill Joy’s concerns began in popular rather 
than scientific discourse, and so could not be exorcised with a bit of determined 
scientific boundary work. 
Roco feared Bill Joy’s vision and the media response it had received. In a 2000 
email exchange, Roco enlisted Richard Smalley, still engaged in his debate with 
Drexler, to help set boundaries on the legitimate concerns of nanotechnology. Roco 
asked Smalley speak about “The Technological and Cultural (educational) 
Consequences of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology” at an NSF workshop on 
nanotechnology’s societal imlications. As Kaplan and Radin have written (2011:467): 
Roco concluded his invitation with a hint of urgency, saying to Smalley, “I 
hope you could come because this issue [concern with the implications of 
nanotechnology] is becoming a determining one.” Smalley’s reply 
expressed sympathy with Roco’s concerns, “Dear Mike, I hope all is well 
with you, and that Bill Joy has already hit his high water mark! Cheers, 
Rick.” 
Bill Joy had not hit his high water mark. Three years later, in 2003, nanoscientists 
and administrators at the NSF were still fighting Bill Joy’s relinquishment. And in some 
sense, the spectre of relinquishment would remain always in the background of 
nanotechnology whenever scientists became fearful of the public and the consequences 
of a public backlash. 
The nanotechnology apocalypse had one more source, which seemed to frighten 
nanoscientists and NSF administrators even more than Drexler’s gray goo and Joy’s 
call for relinquishment. In 1997 Twentieth Century Fox had purchased the film rights to 
a then-unwritten book by Michael Crichton he called Prey. The book was a dramatic, 
science fiction treatment of the nanobot apocalypse. In it, nanobots break from their 
programmed safe-guards, much like Drexler’s gray goo. Instead of digesting the planet, 
however, the nanobots attack humans in massive swarms. Twentieth Century Fox film 
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executive Hutch Parker said, upon buying he rights, that “we are really fired up over this 
acquistition. Our instinct is to do this quickly” (Boehm, 1997). When the book was finally 
published in 2002, scientists panicked. As Vicki Colvin, a biochemist from Rice 
University and Director of its Center for Biological and Environemental Nanotechnology, 
testified to Congress at the 2003 Societal Implications hearing, “the public relations 
nightmare it [Prey] could spawn is just as frightening to me, a nanotechnology 
researcher, as nanobots might be to some lay people.” Crichton’s novel changed the 
issue of public backlash from a vague possibility into an impending certainty. Edward 
Hall, a scientist involved with the NNI from its beginning, recalled the impact of Prey. 
When I joined, in early 2001, there was already a lot of internal discussion 
amongst the twenty or so agencies that formed the NNI about “how do we 
make sure this thing doesn’t go wrong?” And very much the feeling was: 
this was a massive commitment by the government, a massive 
investment. It would be an absolute disaster if there was an anti-nano 
movement amongst the public and amongst the NGOs. So the question 
was: “how do we prevent this from happening?” And a smaller question 
was: “Well if there are any health and environmental [implications] then 
actually we should do something about them anyway.”  
But the turning point was, I don’t know if you remember Michael Crichton’s 
book Prey. You have never seen people so panicked in the government. It 
so astounds me to think back to that. People were sitting around the table 
and saying “Oh my gosh, what are we going to do about this? Everybody 
is going to read this book, everybody is going to become scared of 
nanotechnology. We’re not going to be able to realize the benefits of this!” 
And that’s when people began thinking seriously about what they needed 
to do to shore up public trust, how they need to engage with publics (Hall 
Interview 5/19/18). 
To sum up, in the face of growing threats to nanotechnology research, 
nanoscientists and funding agency administrators, particularly at the NSF, were looking 
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for a solution that would protect the National Nanotechnology Initiative. Although these 
actors had always expressed a commitment to SEIN research and public engagement, 
none was immediately funded. Only once scientists and administrators with the NSF, in 
particular, began to perceive the public as a threat to the NNI were the rhetorical 
commitments to a SEIN program involving social scientists and to upstream public 
engagement realized. The consequences of public perception on the initiative were not 
something that they could address through technocratic means – by researching 
appropriate possible risks, for instance, and giving the public the numbers (Fischhoff 
1995, Porter 1996). Indeed, nanotechnology posed a level of uncertainty that meant that 
no such numbers existed. In the time it would take to get them, something like 
Crichton’s Prey might capture the public imagination. Furthermore, the disciplinary work 
that excised the gray goo from nanotechnology discourse would not work with the 
public. That disciplinary work had been a credibility contest, in Gieryn’s terms, between 
two of the most prominent scientists in nanotechnology. Such boundary work does not 
apply to the public imagination. 
Acceptable Concerns and New Experts 
The 21st Century Act secured funding for SEIN research and public engagement. 
Initially, the questions about what kinds of issues they would pursue and who would do 
the pursuing were open ones. The NNI underwent an explicit period of reorientation that 
went along with these debates in the early 2000s. Specifically, two types of boundaries 
were eventually remade: (1) between legitimate (scientifically credible) and illegitimate 
(scientifically non-credible) concerns and (2) between legitimate and illegitimate actors, 
particularly social scientists and publics. We will discuss each of these in turn.   
The battle around ideas of a moratorium on nanotechnology, a battle of political 
imaginaries of the technology, illustrates the effort to discipline discourse around 
nanotechnology by defining acceptable concerns for science policy. Unlike the Human 
Genome Project and rDNA research, proposed moratoria on nanotechnology came 
from several directions. Recall that Bill Joy had called for the total relinquishment on 
nanotechnology – essentially a full moratorium and did so several years before the NNI 
got started. Additionally, President Clinton’s speech hinted at a moratorium when he 
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said, “some science should not be done.” The moratorium gathered steam from another 
source as well. In 2002, the ETC Group, a science NGO based out of Canada, had 
publicly called for a global moratorium on nanotechnology in their publication The Big 
Down. They were dismissed by many nanoscientists, Congresspersons, and by many of 
the social scientists whom I interviewed. Allen Lewis, one of those social scientists, 
described them as nothing more than “a few people and a pretty good fax machine” 
(Lewis Interview 2/26/2016), they received a great deal of attention in popular media, at 
least for a complex scientific issue. Prince Charles, after reading The Big Down, met 
with ETC Group and eventually joined them in the call for a moratorium (Feder 2003). 
These moratoria differed from each other in important ways. Unlike Bill Joy, for 
instance, the ETC Group had not called for total relinquishment. In my interview, Patrick 
Mooney of ETC Group explained their position. 
We weren’t proposing a long moratorium. We were willing to discuss sort 
of a time-lined moratorium of, we thought it could literally be a matter of 
months, so that governments or industry could establish even a voluntary 
set of guidelines that would guarantee that they would be monitoring 
workers, lab workers especially, and establish standards for safety. What 
got us concerned was…we had folks from the South African 
Nanotechnology Initiative come to us and tell us that they were alarmed by 
nanoparticle safety. They showed us a video of how their students 
handled gold nanoparticles in the lab. They wear these, you know, space 
suits, and then told us that in France they wore those masks that you use 
in subways, like the Japanese [wear in] subways, which were useless, and 
that in Texas [Texas A&M], they were bare handed (Mooney Interview 
1/28/16)! 
It is remarkable how much the ETC Group’s response mirrors the Asilomar 
strategy. Like the scientists at Asilomar, the ETC Group proposed a temporary 
moratorium of nanotechnology in order to determine best practices around laboratory 
safety. Similarly, the ETC Group did not want to enlist publics or even social scientists. 
They were not concerned about the larger social implications. Theirs were technocratic 
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concerns about health and safety. That this was, by this time, so unthinkable to 
scientists, shows how much ideas about acceptable science policy had changed since 
the rDNA research debates. Although the lack of existing safety protocols worried 
scientists and funding agencies as well, they were never going to support such a 
moratorium. Yet the numerous calls for a moratorium, already injected into popular 
discourse by Bill Joy’s articles, made it impossible for those at the NNI to repeat what 
James Watson and the first ELSI working group did for the Human Genome Project, 
simply taking the possibility of a moratorium off the proverbial table before the initiative 
started. Instead, nanotechnology advocates had to argue against it actively. In so doing, 
they were setting boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate concerns. 
Since they could not discard the idea of moratorium, they had to define concerns 
in a way that made a moratorium unnecessary or even ineffective for protecting public 
health and safety. The first effort to define away dangerous concerns was Smalley’s 
arguments in the Drexler-Smalley debate. Scientists were not overly frightened by 
concerns like that of the ETC Group. Most seemed confident that health and safety 
concerns, including laboratory safety, would be addressed once the initiative and its 
funding had been secured. Rather, they feared the public’s fear of runaway nano-
assemblers and the moratorium to which that might lead.31 Thus, the Drexler-Smalley 
debate may have hinged on a narrow technical issue, but it represented the most 
important issue in the question of a moratorium. To be clear, despite his concerns, 
Drexler never wanted any kind of moratorium and his argument against one was 
brought to Congress in the 2003 Societal Implications of Nanotechnology hearing even 
in his notable absence. Christine Peterson, his wife at the time and the co-founder of 
their technology NGO, the Foresight Institute, argued from his book, Engines of 
Creation, that: 
Individuals and organizations with legitimate concerns regarding advanced 
nanotechnology have suggested delays in development, even moratoria 
                                            
31 In his interview, Patrick Mooney distanced their moratorium from of the nanobot scare. He said “Our concern 
is…the social and economic implications of a new technology that can be disruptive and damaging to marginalized 
peoples. And secondarily...it’s sort of the health and environmental considerations.” He then described Prey as a “silly 
thing” and a “terrible book” that was “all scare about nanorobots coming together to make shapes [that] do weird 
things.” 
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or bans. While these reactions are understandable, this approach was 
examined over a decade ago [in Engines of Creation] and rejected as 
infeasible (The Societal Implications of Nanotechnology 2003:66). 
Peterson appealed to diplomatic pragmatism, arguing that a moratorium did not 
address the key questions and anyway, was unenforceable. Philip J. Bond, the 
Undersecretary for Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, stated the point more 
bluntly in a 2003 workshop about nanotechnology’s societal implications.32 Under the 
sub-heading “First Message: Nanotechnology Is Coming and It Won’t Be Stopped” 
(Roco and Bainridge 2005:17-21) he stated: 
Some around the world are calling for a slowdown or even an outright 
moratorium on nanotechnology research and development. To those 
calling for a slowdown or a halt on nanotechnology… I say instead: 
Prepare for the inevitability of a world blessed with nanotechnology and 
nano-enabled products and services. … These are forces that cannot be 
held back. 
One of the elements of this technocratic approach was that the development of 
technology was inevitable. Again, this contrasts with the technocratic approach for rDNA 
in which the questions answers were technical ones, but where the technology itself 
was not considered inevitable. Bond here frames nanotechnology development as a 
“force of nature,” and therefore outside the control of human agency. Interestingly, in 
Beck’s view of the risk society, forces of nature are also without blame for the risks they 
pose (1992). This frame also contrasts with the concerns about a public backlash 
around nanotechnology. But if nanotechnology development is a force of nature that 
cannot be stopped then why was public opinion so frightening? It should have been 
unable to impact it if it was a force of nature. This goes to show the disciplining work 
Bond was engaging in and which was reflected elsewhere. Nanotechnology was fragile 
when it came to securing both funding and public support. It was invulnerable, however, 
when it came to the question of moratoria and relinquishment. 
                                            
32 Nanotechnology: Societal Implications – Maximizing Benefits for Humanity. December 2-3, 2003 
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Further, into his statement, however, Bond employed a softer tactic, one more 
often used by scientists and those from funding agencies fighting against a moratorium. 
Under the sub-heading “We must identify legitimate ethical and societal issues and 
address them as soon as possible” he proposes a division between legitimate and 
illegitimate concerns. 
The first thing we need to do is to sort legitimate concerns from imaginary 
ones, those that are based on science from those based in science fiction. 
Then we must debunk the latter and devote time, attention, and resources 
to seriously address the former (Roco and Bainridge 2005:17-21). 
Concerns such as Bill Joy’s post-human dystopia, Drexler’s ambivalent mix of 
techno-optimism and apocalyptic gray goo, and of course Crichton’s story in Prey were 
discarded by agency administrators like Roco as mere science fictions. Science fiction 
had an odd double-existence in the discourse around the NNI. Scientists and 
administrators, like Roco above, often employed science fiction to help set the 
boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate technical concerns for nanotechnology. 
They used it as a discursive resource to set the boundaries on acceptable science 
policy. Yet they also employed science fiction as a resource of imagination, to instill 
wonder at the possibilities of nanotechnology and thereby justify its ongoing funding. 
When asked, “What are the principle justifications for such an initiative,” for instance, Dr. 
Eugene Wong, the Assistant Director of the Engineering Directorate for the NSF, 
answered of nanotechnology that “Science fiction has become science reality. The 
potential to transform nearly every aspect of human existence is almost without parallel” 
(Nanotechnology: State of the Science, 1999). Science fiction is a particularly valuable 
resource for scientists because they alone claim the authority to determine what is 
science fiction, with a reasonable chance of one day becoming science fact, against 
what is and will always remain purely science fiction. The discourse of science fiction 
gave scientists and funding administrators a tool both for future-making and for 
discarding obstacles to that future-making. Drexler found himself on the wrong side of 
this definitional battle. Smalley effectively framed him as one who could not discern 
science fiction from science fact. The boundary work distinguishing science from 
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science fiction created an internal sense of coherence for the emerging field of 
nanotechnology. The discourse of science fiction was not always applied consistently. 
Bill Joy’s prediction of a trillion-dollar global nanotechnology economy, repeated by 
deputy director for the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Thomas 
Kalil, would be considered science fiction by any serious-minded economist, if only for 
the uncertainty involved in a nascent scientific field. In another example, more directly 
related to the question of scientific facts, NSF Director Rita Colwell told a Congressional 
budget committee that: 
Nanoscale science and engineering will allow the development of a 
machine smaller than the head of a pin that could be placed in a person’s 
bloodstream to monitor the health of the heart and blood vessels, thereby 
obviating strokes and heart attacks (Proposed R&D Budget for Fiscal Year 
2002 2001:128). 
Director Colwell trumpeted the wonder of medical nanobots in 2001, at the same 
time that Smalley was trouncing Drexler over the impossibility of such nanobots. To be 
fair, a machine smaller than the head of a pin does not necessarily qualify as a nano-
sized machine. Still, Smalley and his supporters were waging a war against nano-
machines as a whole. When Drexler had tried to use viruses to argue about the 
possibility of nano-machines, which would not run into Smalley’s fat and sticky fingers 
problem and which were essentially the same thing that Director Colwell promised 
above, he had been shot down. As an emerging field, nanotechnology was able to 
benefit from the positive imagination of nanobots for funding purposes. Nanoscientists 
then discarded the idea as epistemically bereft to avoid its implications for regulatory 
purposes. When it came to nanobots, nanoscientists and NSF administrators got to eat 
their cake and have it too. 
Bond seemed to recognize the limits of a purely technocratic approach and the 
fact that something like a civic epistemology had consequences for nanotechnology that 
necessitated a more concerted effort in public reasoning than simply discounting 
science fictional concerns. Sorting the real from the imaginary risks, as Bond described 
above, was insufficient to get rid of the public threat to the emerging field of 
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nanotechnology. If Drexler’s gray goo, Crichton’s Prey, and Joy’s post-human dystopia 
were mere science fiction, then why would scientists have had to do so much work to 
discount them in the first place? As Mihail Roco and William Bainbridge seemed to 
understand, those scenarios had power quite apart from their feasibility. They had the 
power to capture the public imagination. This was something that the lawyer Alex 
Capron had told the bioscientists assembled at the Asilomar conference, seemingly to 
their surprise. Awareness about the risk of public perception had increase since that 
time but was nothing close to universal among nanoscientists. As Matthew Nordan, VP 
of Lux Research, warned policymakers in a 2005 Congressional hearing about 
America’s standing in nanotechnology: 
The first cut that you have to make is between real risks and perceptual  
risks, which are equally important. So, on one hand, there are real risks  of  
manufactured nanoparticles, nanotubes, metal oxide nanoparticles, 
fullerenes, dendrimers. 
On the other hand, there are perceptual threats, which  are  often  written 
off by participants in the field of nanotechnology as not terribly important. 
But if you look at the genetically modified food experience in Western  
Europe, you can see that the belief that there might be a threat, even  
when none actually exists, can choke commercialization just as real risks  
do. In fact, in many cases, those threats can appear earlier, and have a 
broader magnitude of impact, than real risks (Nanotechnology: Where 
Does the U.S. Stand? 2005). 
The experience with GMOs in Western Europe set the stage for nanoscientists, 
funding agency administrators, and those with commercial interest in nanotechnology to 
heed the power of public perception. Crichton’s Prey, Drexler’s gray goo, and Joy’s call 
for a permanent moratorium gave teeth to the fear of public perception. For purposes of 
this dissertation, this marks the first big difference between the NNI and its programs in 
SEIN research and public engagement on the one hand and the Asilomar conference 
and the Human Genome Project’s ELSI research on the other. The latter two focused 
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on what Nordham calls the real risks. Even the ELSI program, which took into account 
ethical concerns instead of focusing solely on issues of health and safety, focused on 
what they thought were real risks. The NNI, responding to lessons learned in Western 
Europe about perceptual risks, came to focus on this new category of risks. 
Although administrators like Roco and Bainbridge were aware of perceptual 
risks, nanoscientists still often discounted them. Nordham above makes that point when 
issuing his warning about perception. Chadwick Hall, a social scientist involved in public 
engagement in nanotechnology whom I interviewed for this dissertation, said that 
nanoscientists never seemed to appreciate the perception problem, especially once 
their fears of Prey, the gray goo, and Bill Joy’s moratorium had subsided.  
The perception problem is a ticking time bomb. There’s a lot at stake. If 
something [like a scandal] gets exposed about nano, and let’s say it has to 
do with nano-silver particles in your plastic baggies for lunch, and 
environmental groups or advocates take off with this, then it’s going to 
slow down all the stuff that can save peoples’ lives, nano-sized medicine 
for cancer and all of that. That’s a serious reason to care about the 
vulnerability [of perception] to the whole program. And I just wish that the 
recognition of that was, well, a little bit deeper than it seemed to be (Hall 
Interview 2/29/16). 
They could not deal with the risks from public perception in the same way as 
risks associated with health and safety, or real risks as they called them. Just as the 
Human Genome Project’s ELSI program had expanded the scope of relevant expertise 
in the initiative to include social scientists and hybrid-scientists with expertise in ethical 
issues and social implications, nanotechnology had to expand relevant expertise to 
include that on the public and its collective mind. Some, like Philip J. Bond, again the 
Undersecretary for Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, argued that scientists 
possessed the relevant expertise to connect with the public and create trust.  
Scientists and engineers are in the best position to contribute to sound 
policy development, addressing legitimate concerns and allaying irrational 
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public fear. Scientists and engineers alone have the scientific and 
technical knowledge necessary to sort the wheat from the chaff. In 
addition, while not historically great communicators, scientists and 
engineers have unique credibility with the public in speaking to these 
issues (Nanotechnology: Societal Implications – Maximizing Benefits for 
Humanity 2005:21) 
Bond was not alone in this, but the idea that scientists would do this work never 
went far among funding agency administrators. Even Bond admitted above that 
scientists were “not historically great communicators.” One wonders why he thought it 
would be different with nanotechnology. Instead, Mihail Roco began arguing for an 
expanded role for social scientists to serve this function. Social scientists were not a 
natural fit. Although they had an official, if carefully managed role in the Human 
Genome Project’s ELSI program, some scientists were still bitter that funding was spent 
on social science that could have gone to biological science (Andrews 1999, Cook-
Deegan 1994). Others were upset that the ELSI program had not led to any permanent 
solutions to bioethical issues (Beckwith 2002). Thus, Roco had to make the case for 
enrolling social scientists into the nanotechnology program. In the opening statement in 
a report for a workshop on the societal implications of nanotechnology he presented his 
reasoning. 
Sober, technically competent [social science] research on the interactions 
between nanotechnology and society will help mute speculative hype and 
dispel some of the unfounded fears that sometimes accompany dramatic 
advances in scientific understanding… 
The inclusion of social scientists and humanistic scholars … is an 
important step for the NNI. As scientists in their own right … they are 
professionally trained representatives of the public interest and capable of 
functioning as communicators between nanotechnologists and the public 
or government officials.  Their input may help maximize the societal 
benefits of the technology while reducing the possibility of debilitating 
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public controversies (Societal Implications of Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology 2001:iii). 
Roco extends the concept of acceptable science policy to make room for social 
scientists for a few reasons. First, he establishes social scientists as another kind of 
expert. Social scientists are experts on the public. Second, they are boundary-spanning 
actors. They can represent the public back to scientists and scientists to the public. 
Finally, social scientists are actually scientists, though of a different type. Social 
scientists have their own credibility mechanisms that give them legitimacy just as 
natural scientists do. Roco also makes it clear why they need social scientists: to protect 
the NNI against the threat of public perceptions of nanotechnology so that the immense 
promise of nanotechnology could be realized. Roco frames social scientists as crucial 
allies in the development of nanotechnology. 
The fact that there was not a larger discussion or contentious credibility contest 
needed to open a space for social scientists is a testament to Roco’s power at that time.  
Roco exercised an unchallenged influence on the early development of the NNI, 
consistent with his commonly used moniker as the “Czar of Nanotechnology.” Edward 
Hall, an interviewee cited earlier, described it this way. 
There was a transition point, which must have been around 2004, where 
Mike was internally ousted from his leadership role. Before this, though, 
Mike was the head of the NNI. Everything that was done was basically 
down to his personal visions.  If he thought something was important, it 
was supported. If it wasn’t important to him, it wasn’t supported (Hall 
Interview 5/19/16). 
Mihail Roco wanted a SEIN program led by social scientists and so he made it 
happen. This did not get rid of the animosity towards the social scientists or the bitter 
feelings towards the Human Genome Project’s ELSI program. Dana Rohrbacher (R-CA) 
said of giving a role to social scientists, “It sounds like to me, you are putting all of the 
sociology and literature majors in charge of defining the goals of the engineering and 
science majors” (The Societal Implications of Nanotechnology 2003:56). Even Langdon 
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Winner, a political scientist from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and the only social 
scientist invited to testify before Congress about the development of the NNI, warned 
against letting the SEIN program become the “Nanoethicist Full Employment Act” (76). 
This was a criticism of the ELSI program and its focus on bioethics research which 
produced a lot of research papers but, as Winner went on to explain, managed to 
“exclude the participation of those who are the ultimate stakeholders, the general public” 
(76-81).33 Social scientists would have to continue to prove both their own relevance to 
the NNI and the publics whom they studied and engaged. 
Conclusion 
To understand why the National Nanotechnology Initiative funded a program in 
the Societal and Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology and eventually upstream public 
engagement, we must see nanotechnology as the topic of contested political 
imaginaries and public reasoning. The imaginary around nanotechnology that its 
advocates promoted was one of enormous promise for American science, the economy, 
and society as a whole. These imaginaries set out a zero-sum game of future-making in 
which, to prosper as a society, it was imperative to fund and develop nanotechnology. 
Failing to develop nanotechnology, in this imaginary, was tantamount to giving up not 
only a particular technoscientific field, but economic development, America’s global 
standing in science, and the the only future worth having. These imaginaries were 
backed up with some facts and figures, like Joy’s estimate of a trillion dollar 
nanotechnology economy, that were dubious at best. If technocratic governance 
involves, as Theodore Porter (996) has said, the performance of numbers to foster trust 
in particular modes of governance then many of the technocratic displays in the early 
years of nanotechnology resemble something closer to pure theater (Ezrahi 2012). 
Ezrahi discusses this as technocratic displays of public witnessing that have lost any 
basis in technical fact, retaining only the performative elements. Other aspects of the 
discourse for this imaginary of nanotechnology employed shifting referents. Science 
fiction was used to both encourage policymakers to wonder at the marvels that 
                                            
33 Winner never explicitly criticized bioethics in his published works as far as I could find, but Susan Kelly used 
Winner’s perspective to criticize the faith that bioethics, given its enrollment in the biomedical enterprise, could ever 
seriously challenge biomedicine (2006). 
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nanotechnology promised and later used to discipline the discourse around 
nanotechnology by ridding it of concerns that nanotechnology’s supporters found 
threatening. Neither Drexler’s gray goo nor Crichton’s swarms of nanobots were more 
or less scientifically accurate at that time than NSF Director Rita Colwell’s promises 
about nanobots swimming around in people’s bodies fighting cancer. The only 
difference came in how these different scenarios might affect the nascent National 
Nanotechnology Initiative. 
Nanotechnology’s advocates seemed to realize that something like a civic 
epistemology would emerge and come to affect this emerging technoscience. This 
marks an important way in which the National Nanotechnology Initiative and its SEIN 
program differs from the ELSI program of the Human Genome Project and the Asilomar 
Conference for rDNA research. Administrators like the NSF’s Mihail Roco and industry 
representatives like Phillip J. Bond were aware that the biggest threat to 
nanotechnology came not from foreign competitors but from fearful citizens. Their 
response was to engage in practices of public reasoning to discipline the discourse 
around nanotechnology to exclude competing imaginaries of nanotechnology that 
framed it in apocalpytic terms. Drexler’s and Crichton’s visions were framed as science 
fiction while a protracted discussion centered on how to diminish Joy’s calls for the 
relinquishment of nanotechnology. Scientists, policymakers, and science agency 
administrators admitted that nanotechnology posed important societal concerns. They 
engaged in important rhetorical work to define the scope of those concerns and 
determine their relevance. This is at odds with the realization that public perceptions, 
what I have been calling civic epistemology from Jasanoff, might impact the initiative. If 
a large enough public is concerned about gray goo, then the feasibility of that scenario 
hardly matters. Still, they felt that they had to not only engage potential societal 
concerns but define them as well. 
In the end, what was considered acceptable science policy had expanded to 
include SEIN research and public engagement, but only once it became clear that 
public perceptions posed a threat to the National Nanotechnology Initiative. These 
efforts were not funded when it simply seemed like the right thing to do, despite a lot of 
discourse among policymakers in Congress and administrators and scientists at the 
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relevant science agencies to that effect. Like the other cases for this research, this 
expansion was met with a simultaneous effort to discipline the new discourse around 
societal implications, and to thereby contain the degree of expansion that was taking 
place. In the next chapter we will see, in greater detail, how this discipline continued 
with the actualization of upstream public engagement for the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Upstream Public Engagement in the NNI 
 
Introduction 
This final substantive chapter builds upon the prior two chapters by showing what 
happened once public engagement became a core component of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative. I focus particularly on public engagement because it was the 
biggest departure from technocratic modes of science policy and therefore the most 
significant expansion in what was considered acceptable science policy for the NNI. 
This chapter follows five public engagement events for nanotechnology.34 Full 
descriptions of the events can be found in Appendix A. Although this chapter will turn to 
public documents at times, the bulk of the data for this chapter come from documents 
related to the five deliberative public engagement events and 33 interviews with 
individuals connected to these events. Those interviews were mostly with the social 
scientists who organized and conducted these engagement events, but also include one 
toxicologist, whom we have already seen in Chapter III, two former NSF program 
directors, and three representatives from civil society organizations involved in the 
discourse about nanotechnology’s societal implications. 
This chapter explores, in practice, how public engagement was both an 
expansion and disciplining of what was considered acceptable science policy. The last 
chapter covered the public reasoning of science agencies, particularly the NSF, and in 
Congress around nanotechnology and its governance. This chapter follows the social 
scientists who did this work, to understand what it was possible or encouraged for them 
                                            
34 In the interest of giving my subject’s the anonymity I promised them, the names of these events, the universities, 
and the names of all of the scholars whom I interviewed are pseudonyms. I only use real names for people I did not 
interview or in cases where the interviewee explicitly said they did not want a pseudonym and where using their name 
would not identify anyone else in this dissertation. 
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to have publics deliberate and what seemed to remain off the proverbial table. We will 
also look at the outcomes of public engagement as this presents a final opportunity to 
discipline discourse around societal implications. The question of what agency 
administrators and policymakers did with the outputs of public engagement, particularly 
reports by or about the citizens who took the time to discuss something as unfamiliar as 
nanotechnology, reveals much about the degree to which public engagement was a 
substantive expansion of acceptable science policy or the performance of such. The 
answer is that it depends on how you define success for public engagement. In some 
ways, it was a vast substantive expansion in what was considered acceptable science 
policy but, in some ways, it was conditioned to limit the scope and impact of that 
expansion. 
To begin, this chapter will recount the formation of the Science and Society 
Centers for nanotechnology to understand how the discourse around nanotechnology 
was bureaucratically disciplined at the outset to be primarily academically driven. We 
will then turn to the engagement events themselves to understand what the NSF 
wanted them to accomplish and what the social scientists themselves wanted them to 
accomplish. Although not quite in tension, the goals of the NSF and social scientists did 
not fully overlap either. Finally, I will turn to the outcomes of public engagement for the 
reasons just described. As a kind of epilogue, I give a brief account of how the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative seemed to drop its focus on upstream public engagement. 
Enrolling Scholars 
The way that upstream public engagement and SEIN research was implemented 
for the NNI helped determine the shape of the discourse to follow. Like the Human 
Genome Project’s ELSI working group, this work for the NNI went to a select group of 
scholars. Most of the NSF funding was split between two Society and Science Centers. 
These were at universities that I am referring to here as Institution A and Institution B.35 
In some ways, this marked an innovation in the NSF’s approach to SEIN research and 
upstream public engagement, since the NSF did not retain any direct control over what 
scholars did at these two universities. Additionally, what these universities proposed 
                                            
35 To protect the anonymity of the scholars whom I interviewed, I am referring to these institutions by these letters. 
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constituted a major expansion in acceptable science policy. In another sense, though, 
by enrolling well-established scholars who were, recalling the earlier reluctance to fund 
SEIN research from Chapter III, “meritorious enough to warrant funding,” administrators 
at the NSF could be reasonably sure that the work of these two universities would fall 
within the parameters of acceptable discourse. 
Almost immediately after funding for SEIN research was secured, the NSF sent 
out a request for proposals to fund two Society and Science Centers. The effect was to 
narrow the set of actors who would conduct SEIN research and public engagement. 
Though Margaret White, one of the former NSF program directors whom I interviewed, 
said that their reasoning was that they wanted to “start with a smaller effort” and get 
larger later on (White Interview 9/13/17). The Science and Society Center model had 
come from an existing administrative structure in the NNI for the Nanoscale Science 
and Engineering Centers (NSEC). For the most part, he NSECs were tasked with doing 
laboratory research on nanoscale innovations, but this did involve a measure of 
attention to societal issues and implications. Societal implications were, at best 
however, an adjunct activity to the core mission of laboratory research at the NSECs. 
Furthermore, as the National Academy of Science Committee Chair Samuel Stupp had 
expressed to the NSF and in his first triennial review of the NNI, the societal implications 
work at the NSECs tended to focus only on laboratory safety instead of larger societal 
issues with implications outside of the lab. Lowell Evans, the other former NSF program 
director whom I interviewed for this research, said that there were many reasons why 
the NSF opted for a centralized model, but that “the idea of creating a center was 
probably just an easy way of addressing societal and ethical and legal dimensions…it 
was essentially the easiest way to go” (Evans Interview 8/17/2017). He added that the 
SSC model allowed for greater bureaucratic access and oversight than the de-
centralized grant programs that normally went to fund research and which briefly 
preceded the SSC model for the National Nanotechnology Initiative. The Science and 
Society Center model allowed the NSF greater oversight and to see what it had 
purchased by funding upstream public engagement. 
Although the NSF funding announcement referred to a single Science and 
Society Center, it wound up funding two such centers. However, the NSF did not double 
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the money it had set aside for this work, so it could not fully fund both proposals. 
Instead, it split the pot of money between them. This forced both centers to scale back 
their efforts significantly. The difference between $15 million and $7 million over five 
years meant that they had to scrap what had been core areas of each of their 
proposals. The program directors I interviewed said that the NSF was aware of the 
burden this created for the two centers. Why, then, did the NSF fund two half-centers 
instead of one fully? As former NSF program director Lowell Evans explains, Institution 
B was more academically-oriented and thus safer while Institution A was more 
innovative but riskier. 
At [Institution B] there was an effort focused primarily on studying public 
engagement, studying the public, the public’s perspective on 
nanotechnology, studying issues of risk, studying media and these sorts of 
things. It’s very much a scientific orientation. 
But at [Institution A], you know, the culture of the place was different, in 
part because … they saw it as a more holistic approach to science and 
society where, you know, you are engaging [the public]. You’re not just 
doing research, but you’re also getting the public engaged. There are 
expectations at [Institution A] that if you’re working on something that is 
publicly relevant, well then you should be, you know, holding meetings in 
the public, where the public is engaged in your work. And yes, it was 
research-focused, but also it was focused on kind of developing more on, 
you know reflexive governance. They were experimenting with different 
ways of doing that and conducting research on that, but part of their 
agenda was actually just doing it (Evans Interview 8/17/17). 
In his reading, Institution A as a whole had a culture of public engagement 
that seemed to transcend the instrumental needs of its constituent scholars. In 
his view, both were studying public engagement while also doing it, but Institution 
B was focused slightly more on the former while Institution A was focused slightly 
more on the latter. Margaret White, another former NSF program director, 
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described each center as proposing innovative research, but did frame Institution 
B as more focused on studying risk and public perception with Institution A 
focused more on public engagement.   
Evans later added that funding two centers allowed the NSF to hedge its 
bets in case one of the centers should have a “major crisis” and fail. It seemed 
that the concerns about failure pertained to Institution A’s center. 
To some extent early on, [Institution A’s experiments] looked weird to 
people at NSF. Some questioned ‘what the hell are they doing,’ you know, 
‘[with] these sorts of things?’ And [there was] a potential embarrassment 
there, so to speak, ‘oh gosh,’ you know, ‘NSF is funding this kind of weird 
stuff.’ And then over-time, it made sense and a lot of their work was highly 
successful, you know, it just took [time]. Some of that stuff looked weird 
and raised some questions, but you know they just went about it in a 
different way.  And so, that might’ve been one of the reasons why a 
decision was made to fund two centers as opposed to one (Evans 
Interview 8/7/17). 
Institution A had lots of interesting “weird stuff.” One activity was a strategy card 
game. Players would receive a set of cards representing technological innovations 
based in nanotechnology. Players were also given a country card with particular needs 
that could be met by different technological innovations. Participants in the game would 
try to trade technological innovations in order to come up with the set of technologies 
that best served their society’s needs. They also had speculative scenario development, 
in which participants would explore fictional but scientifically credible scenarios related 
to nanotechnology. These are particular activities, but the entire orientation of Institution 
A’s center might have looked weird to decision-makers at the NSF. Institution A 
proposed nothing less than the potential to evaluate emerging technologies in real-time 
and thereby avoid the problem that science policy always seems to come too late to 
make a difference in emerging technologies (Institution A NSF Proposal 2005:15). 
Ultimately, though, the NSF proved willing to embrace the “weird stuff” going on 
at Institution A. Part of the reason is that Institution A’s proposal framed the center’s role 
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and its work explicitly in terms of boundary work. The Broader Impacts section of the 
Institution A proposal began by stating that “Institution A’s Science and Society Center 
is designed self-consciously as a boundary organization…with a structure that will 
enable it to manage the oftentimes demanding tensions between inquiry and outreach, 
public and private, NSE [Nanoscale Science and Engineering] and society” (Institution A 
NSF Proposal 2005:15). The Institution A proposal framed itself in terms that reflect 
Mihail Roco’s earlier justification for including social scientists in the NNI in the first 
place. Recall, from the last chapter, that NNI Director Mihail Roco framed the value of 
social scientists in terms of their being “professionally trained representatives of the 
public interest and capable of functioning as communicators between nanotechnologists 
and the public or government officials” (Societal Implications of Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology 2001:iii). Institution A’s proposal promised to realize exactly this vision 
of the social sciences and the promise to science agencies to serve this boundary 
spanning role. Margaret White agreed. 
What [Elijah Anderson, Director of Institution A’s SSC] was doing was 
saying ‘okay, we see our role here as being able to talk to these different 
groups, maybe using a kind of boundary object,’ that is something that has 
a vague enough meaning or an inclusive enough meaning that different 
groups are willing to take it on as something in which they have an 
interest. Then he was saying that what they’re doing is to operate with all 
of those languages and help translate the language from one group to 
another’s group so some of these terms can be better understood. I think 
people, particularly people who were evaluating these proposals, 
understood this a way in which to approach the need for better 
communication (White Interview 9/13/17). 
It was no idle promise for Institution A to serve this boundary-spanning role. 
Institution A was, and remains, home to some of the most prominent scholars in science 
policy and boundary work, especially the primary investigator of the Science and 
Society Center proposal. The organization of Institution A’s Center itself evidenced its 
potential to span boundaries. The Institution A Center would not be the product of a 
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single university but rather a network of scholars at eight universities across the country. 
The SSC proposal from Institution A drew on a wide range of experts in the social and 
physical sciences at these universities. It appealed to the growing value of 
interdisciplinary collaborations at the NSF. This focus on interdisciplinarity was already 
evident in another organizational model in the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the 
various Nanoscale Interdisciplinary Research Teams (NIRT). The NIRT groups were 
“small collaborative groups of three or more investigators…to address education and 
research goals where a synergistic blend of expertise is needed” (Nanoscale Science 
and Engineering Research Proposal Solicitation 2002:9). Perhaps because Institution A 
framed itself as just what the NSF had wanted or because of the caliber of scholars 
involved in the initiative, the NSF was willing to gamble on the “weird stuff” that 
Institution A had proposed.  
The effort that wound up centralizing public engagement, then, had several 
effects for the future of this work. Most obviously, it meant that the NSF would no longer 
have to worry about reviewing proposals. This had at least two benefits to the NSF. 
First, as long as the two SSCs were doing their job, the NSF only had to check in with 
them annually, which it did. Second, it also meant that they no longer had to worry 
about funding projects at centers “meritorious enough to warrant funding.” Institution B 
and Institution A had established their credibility with the NSF. 
Another effect of this mode of organization was that non-scholars, even 
professionals who engaged publics for a living, were not enrolled to conduct any of the 
public engagement. In 2006, the NSF had invited several professional public 
engagement practitioners to a workshop on the societal implications of nanotechnology. 
Kristyn Lee was one such professional whom I interviewed. She said that, having been 
invited to participate in the workshop, that she thought there was at least a possibility 
that her public engagement non-profit might be hired to do some of the public 
engagement work (Lee Interview 2/2/2016). She was disappointed to discover that that 
was never the NSF’s intention. She also saw two potential problems with a university-
based program. First, she thought that a university-based program would prove less 
experimental. While she had high praise for the academics at the two SSCs for their 
commitment to public engagement, she thought that, as scholars, they would ultimately 
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be beholden to the norms of their discipline and the need to forward their academic 
careers. It is not that the work of the SSC would not experiment – indeed that was its 
whole motivation – but that the experiments would be social experiments first – in 
sociology or anthropology for example – and experiments in better engagement 
practices second. Recall that Evans also identified this as an issue with Institution B 
although oddly not with Institution A. Second, she predicted that a program based out of 
universities and led by scholars would run into trouble once they tried to use the 
outcomes of public engagement to influence science agencies or policymakers. 
I served as chief of staff to the Governor of Ohio for the last four years of 
the ‘80s. And then I spent some time working in the Clinton/Gore White 
House in Washington, so I actually have a pretty deep understanding of 
the real politick world that you are connecting the citizen engagement to.  
In my experience, people who are dominantly or completely university-
based, and have not had some life experience that puts them in the rough 
and tumble of public policy development, are pretty naïve about politics. 
(Krysten Interview 2/2/216). 
When the 21st Century Nano R&D Act had earmarked SEIN funding, however, 
the funding umbrella for public engagement was described as a “university-based” set 
of activities (§(6)(a)(2)(B)). This shaped upstream public engagement and its outcomes 
in key ways. Most importantly, upstream public engagement, like SEIN research as a 
whole, became primarily a research endeavor. It was led by primary investigators who 
had to report their findings back to a funding agency that assessed the value of their 
work in terms of its value as research. This also meant that they could not violate the 
key values of funders by engaging people or ideas that the latter found particularly 
threatening. This is one of the consequences of being enrolled into research (Callon 
1986, Callon et al. 1986, Cozzens 1990). Others have called this process “ELSI-
ification,” referring to the ways that scholars lose their critical edge once enrolled into a 
major federally funded initiative (Lopez and Lunau 2002, Rabinow and Bennett 2009). 
Engagement practitioners were beholden to their own discipline as well. Public 
engagement was to be a vehicle for producing publications and forwarding academic 
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careers. This should not be read as a criticism. Rather, the point is merely that the 
particular arrangement of goals and commitments by the network of actors enrolled to 
do this work shaped what it was possible to discuss for purposes of upstream public 
engagement.  
The Events 
This research follows five deliberative public engagement events either funded 
directly by the NNI in the form of an NSF grant, or indirectly through a university-based 
nanotechnology research center funded by the NSF. The five events are: the 
Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation, the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference, the Eastern Environmental Risk Forum, the Western Citizen Risk Forum, 
the Southern Technology Conference, and the Southwest Nano-Dialogue. Two of these 
did not have a direct affiliation with the SSCs. The Southwest Nano-Dialogue pre-dated 
SEIN funding for public engagement. It was funded through the host university but, as 
the organizer explained, was important to the scientists at the university, in part, 
because they wanted to satisfy their “broader implications” requirements of their NSF 
grant funding. The Eastern Environmental Risk Forum was funded through one of the 
NSF’s Nanoscale Interdisciplinary Research Team (NIRT) grants, the model on which 
the Science and Society Center model was based. The Midwestern Nanotechnology 
Deliberation was done at a university that was part of Institution A’s Science and 
Society Center network and the National Emerging Technologies Conference was a 
large-scale deliberative exercise that involved six of the eight universities comprising 
Institution A’s network. Finally, the Western Citizen Risk Forum was the major 
deliberative component of Institution B’s Science and Society Center. 
Although there are fine-grain differences in the deliberative formats of these 
events, all share some essential elements. In this model, deliberations begin with some 
informational session to provide a framework for the discussion and to ensure that all 
deliberators operate with a similar foundation of knowledge. Sometimes this is sent out 
to participants ahead of the event, in the form of reading materials, videos, and surveys, 
and sometimes the event begins with lectures that provide this foundation. Deliberations 
usually follow afterward. Some are highly structured, with set questions that participants 
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Table IV.1 Nanotechnology Deliberative Public Engagement Events 
 
Event Title Years 
Types of 
Engagement Stated Goals 
Southwest Nano-
Dialogue 2002 
One deliberative 
dialogue with over 
200 people. 
Creating “excitement and wonder” about 
nanotechnology. 
Midwestern 
Nanotechnology 
Deliberation 
2005 
Thirteen people met 
three consecutive 
Sundays. 
“Allow area citizens to consider the promises and 
perils of the many possible future nanotechnologies 
before they reach the market.” 
Eastern Environmental 
Risk Forum 
2007-
2011 
(mostly 
2009) 
Delphi method 
discussions with local 
civil society groups. 
“(1) Identify factors in public risk perception of 
nanotechnology. (2) Test effects of deliberative 
method on public risk perception.” 
National Emerging 
Technologies 
Conference 
2008 
Danish Consensus 
Conference, both 
online and in-person 
with six universities. 
“To cultivate our collective ability to govern the 
implications of our technological ingenuity” (Hamlett, 
Cobb and Guston, 2008: p. 15) 
Western Citizen Risk 
Forum 2009 
Six four-hour 
deliberations. No 
repeat participants 
“To examine the ways that gender operates as a 
factor to enable or inhibit full participation in such 
public forums, and how specific workshop design 
features such as group size, gender and 
race/ethnicity composition interact.” 
 
 
discuss and set issues to vote on. Others are more open-ended, allowing participants to 
come up with their own concerns and issues to vote on. Finally, participants are often 
asked to vote on a set of prescribed issues or to produce a final statement or report of 
the group’s deliberations. Usually the participants discuss and vote until they achieve a 
consensus. Each of these stages – information-provision, deliberation, voting or 
reporting – may be repeated several times for any given event.  
Competing, Coexisting and Complimentary Goals 
The goals of the NNI and the social scientists who engaged the public also help 
us understand how the science policy domain was simultaneously expanded and 
discourse disciplined. Advocates of deliberative public engagement have argued that it 
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can produce substantively better decisions, obtain a broader set of viewpoints, give 
democratic legitimacy to decision-making, improve public trust, and is normatively 
appropriate for decision-making in a liberal democracy (Blok 2007, Bohman and Rehg 
1997, Guston 2004, John Rawls 2002, Sclove 1995). Goals are a symbolic expression 
of an actor’s values and, in the case of the stated goals of a bureaucratic organization, 
the ordering logic for the practical actions it supports. In this section, two key points 
stand out. First, the main goal for both funding agencies and social scientists was that 
public engagement should happen but did not always accompany a statement about 
what it should accomplish or how it would be assessed. Second, funding agencies and 
social scientists each had a goal that was not always shared by the other. Funding 
agencies wanted to foster trust in nanotechnology. Many social scientists, but not all, 
wanted engagement to affect policy- and decision-making around nanotechnology. 
The science agencies that comprised the NNI and policymakers in Congress had 
largely overlapping goals for public engagement. The NNI’s first Strategic Plan in 2004 
mirrored concerns from previous Congressional hearings about the “responsible 
development of nanotechnology,” the title for the fourth goal of the NNI. The importance 
of this work was that it “builds trust among all stakeholders” because “perceptions and 
acceptance of new technology are critical in the realization of economic and other social 
benefits” (NNI Strategic Plan 2004:10-12). Part of the effort to realize that goal was to 
“Support efforts to create … broadly inclusive interdisciplinary dialogue. Assess and 
analyze public understanding of, and attitudes towards, nanotechnology, [Identify] 
effective means to raise awareness...and obtain input from the general public” (NNI 
Strategic Plan 2004:10-12). The President’s Council of Advisers on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) report on nanotechnology of the following year supports this in its 
section describing the importance of public engagement, adding that “The public is 
generally very supportive of the Federal Government’s investment in scientific research” 
(PCAST Report 2005:38).36 “To sustain this support,” it began, “the scientific community 
and the Federal agencies that fund scientific research must communicate more directly 
with the public, not through surrogates such as the entertainment industry” (43). It goes 
on to warn, “the NNI…should vigorously communicate with various stakeholders and 
                                            
36 Report to the President and Congress on the First Assessment of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (2005) 
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the public about the Government’s efforts to address societal concerns. Without such 
communication, public trust may dissipate, and concerns based on information from 
other sources…may become dominant” (43).  
From the perspective of those at the NNI and the President’s Council, then, we 
can discern three goals: (1) to understand what the public is thinking with respect to 
nanotechnology, (2) to protect or foster public trust in- and acceptance of 
nanotechnology, and (3) to exert some measure of control over the narrative about 
nanotechnology in the public. The first goal evidences an expansion of the ELSI 
program of the Human Genome Project. Whereas the ELSI program treated ethical 
issues as objective and scientifically discoverable problem, the SEIN program does the 
same for public perception. It is, as Brice Laurent says, the scientific understanding of 
the public (2017). The second goal explains why they were willing to engage in this 
expansion: they expected it to result in tangible benefits in the public perception not only 
of nanotechnology but, potentially, for science as a whole. The third goal evidences the 
disciplining of discourse that went along with this expansion in science policy. Part of 
the purpose in communicating with the public was to manage the information the public 
received and ensure its scientific credibility. 
The social scientists who were enrolled to conduct this ethical work and public 
engagement were not necessarily opposed to these goals but had their own as well. 
One of the most common goals for the social scientists doing this work was to help 
democratize technoscience and science policy (Brown and Guston 2009, Guston 2004, 
Irwin 2001, Sclove 1995, Stilgoe 2007). Democratization was, as one social scientists 
put it, “the name of the game” (Thompson Interview 1/12/16). Louis Campbell, a social 
scientist and one of the organizers for the Eastern Environmental Risk Forum, explained 
this more fully. 
Well the way I put it is this: you know, we live in a democracy and we 
make decisions through democratic processes you know legislation, 
sometimes litigation, sometimes civic involvement, you know, protests or 
whatever. You know, we’re a democracy and we don’t set aside science 
and science policy to be something that’s going to be made only by 
scientists (Campbell Interview 11/10/2015). 
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Most of the social scientists enrolled to do SEIN research and upstream public 
engagement wanted their work to lead to some measurable impact on policy or 
decision-making about nanotechnology. This had been a key point from the inception of 
public engagement in nanotechnology. Two key social scientists affiliated with Institution 
A had criticized the ELSI program of the Human Genome Project for having “no policy 
relevance,” saying that it failed “to link ELSI research to policy decision processes” 
(Laurent 2017:129). This goal was consistent with the rhetoric funding agencies 
espoused as well, about the value of public engagement. Many of the social scientists I 
interviewed seemed to understand that policy impacts might be difficult. David Guston, 
an STS scholar with expertise in science policy, has written about this problem. He has 
written that people often expect the results of ELSI research or public engagement in 
science to have policy impacts that “occur directly on decisions…affecting some 
regulatory, legislative, budgetary, or other decision” the “magic bullet approach” 
(1999:459). He has generally advocated for a broader view of the impacts of ethical 
research and public engagement that resonated with many of the scholars who did this 
work. Nonetheless, many still wanted policy impacts in the “magic bullet” model. 
Institution A’s Science and Society Center elaborated a clear set of goals which it 
divided among four sub-programs. These were: (1) to define the scope of nanoscale 
science and engineering and identify possible linkages with public values, (2) to identify 
and track changing public perceptions and values of nanoscale science and 
engineering, (3) to develop “plausible visions of nanotechnology-enabled futures” and 
use them in deliberative public engagement events to “help refine future visions and 
enhance contextual awareness,” and (4) to reflexively investigate how the knowledge 
produced by Institution A impacts nanoscale scientists and engineers and assess the 
value of the center more generally (Institution A Project Proposal 2005:3-12). The 
Center at Institution A also endeavored to use its public engagement work as a way to 
train citizens to participate effectively in civic life and to train a “cadre of interdisciplinary 
researchers to engage the complex societal implications of NSE [nanoscale science 
and engineering]” (Institution A Project Proposal 2005:3-12). Theirs was a kind of 
double boot-strapping effort. The work at the center would train a new group of scholars 
with the skills to engage the societal implications of nanotechnology into the future. 
157 
 
Similarly, upstream public engagement around nanotechnology would produce a public 
more informed and more effectively involved around the policy issues of science and 
technology.  
Most of these goals were consistent with NSF/NNI goals or at least did not 
conflict with them. For instance, both administrators for the various agencies of the NNI 
and relevant policymakers in Congress had a strong interest in discovering public 
opinions. In these goals we see overlap among social scientists, policymakers, and 
funding agencies. Training citizens in civic life, however, was never a stated goal among 
policymakers or funding agencies. Still, such training did not seem to threaten the NNI 
or the goals of educating citizens and discerning public opinions and concerns.  
There were goals that social scientists and funding agency administrators did not 
share. Some social scientists resisted the idea that their public engagement exercises 
should be oriented towards fostering public trust. Most were aware, however, that 
fostering trust was an expected outcome of their work by funders.  
The challenge [of public engagement] is to try to present that information 
in as balanced a way as possible. You know, so as not to predispose them 
to thinking in certain ways. That’s my goal. I have that goal. There are 
others that do quote, unquote "public engagement," and they do not have 
that goal and they want to bias the public in certain directions. You’ll have 
scientists go out and they say, “you know we got to talk to the public 
because we need to convince them that this is safe.”  And then so they go 
in and they engage with the public with that in mind.  For me, that’s not my 
personal goal.  My personal goal is to try to present the information in as 
balanced ways as possible. (Thompson Interview 1/12/16). 
None of the people whom I interviewed wanted to foster public distrust; they 
simply did not want to serve as public relations representatives of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative. Still, this did not seem to lead to any overt conflict. Social 
scientists saw an opportunity to do the work to which they were committed and the 
opinion at the NSF seemed to be that as long as public engagement involved some 
measure of public education in nanotechnology, then public trust would undoubtedly 
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follow. The assumption by those at funding agencies, that education leads to trust, was 
a holdover from deficit models of science communication (Wynne 2006, Thorpe and 
Gregory 2010). The public engagement work for nanotechnology and research on 
public opinion would upend this assumption. 
The myriad and sometimes contradictory goals of those involved in this public 
engagement work show that it could simultaneously mean different things to different 
actors while getting broad support from all of them. Through public engagement, social 
scientists were able to create venues for publics to be critical of an emerging 
technoscience. Yet public engagement also helped to enroll a set of social scientists 
into the issues and goals of science funding agencies, like fostering public trust, who 
might not otherwise have been enrolled, or enrolled to serve those goals in particular. 
One respondent described his own somewhat grudging enrollment. 
I probably shouldn’t admit this but, ironically, I told a colleague that I was 
really hating [how] all these STS scholars were jumping on the Nano 
bandwagon just because there was money there (laughter). And then I 
ended up being one of the largest recipients! I shouldn’t say recipient. I 
never actually got a huge amount of funding for it, but it did sort of, uh…it 
was the reason why [I received], not just my postdoc, but my ultimate 
faculty position. 
Public engagement and its umbrella, Societal and Ethical Implications of 
Nanotechnology research, could do the work of bringing together a disparate set of 
actors and containing, simultaneously, many different goals. The absence of a clear and 
concrete definition for public engagement or the modes of evaluating it probably helped 
these actors to see in it what they wanted. Everyone involved thought that they might 
get something positive from upstream public engagement and SEIN research. The 
values underlying these goals, however, are not entirely complimentary. The goal of 
scientists and agency administrators, to foster public support for nanotechnology and 
trust in science, does not necessarily sit well with the goal of democratizing science and 
training a critical citizenry. Ultimately, though, the social scientists enrolled for this 
project had to avoid violating the goals of the NNI even if they did not actively try to 
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realize them. Social scientists could engage in practices to democratize science, but 
they could not be seen to foment public distrust in nanotechnology. This might be 
especially true for Institution A, which wanted to train a new cadre of scholars savvy in 
the societal implications of science and science policy. To do so effectively would 
require long-term relationships with science funding agencies. In practice, this meant 
that the social scientists enrolled to do public engagement had to show that deliberative 
public engagement did not foster public distrust. They did so in part by trying to 
construct the rational public for engagement. This mirrors the Rawlsian perfect 
deliberator who engages in “reasonable pluralism,” meaning that they can discuss 
differences civilly according to shared norms of discourse (Rawls 2002). As Hurlbut 
argues, a focus on Rawlsian public reasoning delimits the types of concerns that can 
emerge in discourse (2017:22). 
Constructing Publics, Constructing Issues 
With public engagement events, the imaginaries around science, science policy, 
democracy, an engaged citizenry were put into practice. If we view imaginaries, as 
Ezrahi does, as a kind of world-making, then the construction of the deliberative public 
for nanotechnology, from imaginaries about the potential of nanotechnology and ideal 
deliberative discourse, brought the nanotechnology public into existence. If public 
engagement in nanotechnology was a process of expansion in terms of science policy, 
then the construction of specific publics for deliberation was an exercise in disciplining 
discourse. By itself, that is neither surprising nor problematic. The nature of 
representation, whether in politics or research, means that parts must stand in for 
wholes. Any subset of the public will constitute a narrowing of discourse. The question 
here is how the construction process wound up disciplining discourse around 
nanotechnology.  
The first way in which construction of the public disciplined discourse was 
unintentional. Most of the events studied here could not get the publics that they had 
first imagined. The problem was that people simply were not interested in 
nanotechnology. As Hugh Davis, a participant in the Midwestern Nanotechnology 
Deliberation, explained: 
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We were idealistic, or at least I was, and I believed people would jump at 
the opportunity to engage in a democratic process. And it turned out that, 
you know, people are busy and have lots of commitments and most of 
them didn’t know anything about nanotechnology. So, I mean, if we had 
held a consensus conference over the possible citing of a toxic dump five 
miles from peoples’ homes, we would have gotten probably a ton of 
people to participate. But we were dealing with this issue that was pretty 
removed from peoples’ lives, and so it was hard to find people (Davis 
Interview 9/24/2015). 
The transcripts for the National Emerging Technologies Conference show 
another way in which people’s uninterest wound up narrowing discourse. The NETC 
involved an online component across the six participating universities. People logged in 
to ask questions of experts and write comments to one another in real-time. Transcripts 
show event organizers admonishing people, however, for logging on but not 
participating. People got paid whether they typed anything or not. Organizers suspected 
that people were logging on and then minimizing the chat window to watch television. 
The organization of the event likely exacerbated this in another way. Not everyone 
could speak at once, so participants were given windows of time in which they could 
participate. A few people had to be reminded that it was not their time to deliberate. 
Some people later admitted that since they were not allowed to deliberate, that they did 
not feel like they needed to pay attention. They said they would read the transcript the 
next day (NETC Transcript Day 6 2008). 
Publications for these events indicated that the publics they were able to recruit 
wound up sharing certain characteristics. For three of the four events, all but the 
Eastern Environmental Risk Forum, this resulted in the selection of publics that were 
more highly educated than the general populace.37 In two of the three events, the 
National Emerging Technologies Conference and the Midwestern Nanotechnology 
Deliberation, participants were also skewed towards the political left. In the National 
Emerging Technologies Conference, for instance, 29% of the participants had some 
                                            
37 The EERF engaged what one interviewee involved with it described as “vernacular communities.” These were pre-
existing civil society groups with which they helped to plan a nanotechnology engagement event for themselves.  
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college, 31% had a college degree, and 33% had graduate degrees. Additionally, 44% 
were Democrats, 9% were Republicans, and 36% were Independents. These 
percentages tracked almost perfectly with the categories Political Liberal, Conservative, 
and Moderate, respectively (Wickson et al. 2013). The Western Citizen Risk Forum 
selected for a more or less even split among self-identifying liberals and conservatives. 
Having a higher education and being more politically liberal both correlate with more 
positive attitudes towards science (Brossard and Nisbet 2006, Fischer et al. 2013, 
Gauchat 2012). The selection bias did not always emerge, however, from accidentally 
attracting more science-positive publics from an otherwise open pool of people willing to 
deliberate about nanotechnology. For instance, when organizers of the Midwestern 
Nanotechnology Deliberation discovered that they could not attract their intended fifteen 
people, they were forced to recruit from the university itself. They even recruited several 
graduate students. This might explain, in their particular case, why participants were 
more politically liberal and more highly educated. Even still, they only wound up with 
thirteen of the fifteen people they hoped to recruit. 
Organizers for the Western Citizen Risk Forum events were able to avoid these 
problems by using a third-party organization that specialized in recruitment for survey 
research and focus groups. Their motivation, however, was to avoid another problem. 
As Raquel Jackson, the chief organizer of the event, explained: 
We did not want to use “nano” in recruitment because nano is a pretty big 
turnoff. Meaning that, for this, many people would self-exclude if they 
thought it was about nanotechnology. They would assume that they 
don’t…that that’s not their thing, and they don’t know anything about it. 
And since our institutional location has it [“nanotechnology” in their name], 
if you’re trying to do it without priming the nanotechnology pump, [then] we 
needed to have a third party do it, so that it wasn’t coming from us. 
Organizers of the Western Citizen Risk Forum event consciously worked to avoid 
the self-selection of people out of engagement for nanotechnology and thereby were 
able to recruit a more diverse group, in terms of education and political ideology. Their 
event was a notable exception, however. 
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The self-selection problem manifested not only in terms of publics opting out of 
such engagement events but also opting into them as well. Johnathan Parker, an 
organizer for both the Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation engagement event and 
the National Emerging Technologies Conference, illustrated the problem with some of 
the later public engagement work he had done for NASA. 
So, there are a group of people, who, for decades, have known exactly 
what NASA should do and they will take every opportunity to tell NASA 
what they should do. And they speak, you know, for one percent of the 
population and NASA didn’t think it was possible to turn those people off, 
to actually hear what, you know, non-NASA fanboys might be interested 
in. And so, in recruitment for that, there was specific questions like “Have 
you ever witnessed a rocket launch live?” And we took significant steps to 
… minimize the number of people that would fit that category, to try and 
weed out and make sure that the regular groups that would always attend 
NASA public outreach meetings were represented in a very small number 
(Parker Interview 10/10/17). 
This was one of only two explicit exclusion criteria discussed by engagement 
organizers and it illustrates an important principle about the construction of publics. 
Organizers wanted to represent the public writ large, the public “out there” in all its 
enormity. To the degree to which they were willing to represent already-interested 
publics or the oppositional publics, it was only in proportion to the numerical 
representation of those publics among the larger populace.38 This model of 
representation operated at the level of the group, but it also manifested, synecdochally, 
in the individuals selected as well. The Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation and 
the National Emerging Technologies Conference both wanted to recruit “average” or 
“ordinary” people. The NETC did this, in part, with a questionnaire that asked people if 
they had participated in any activism around nanotechnology to select people who had 
not engaged in such activism (Wickson et al. 2013). Average and ordinary people were 
                                            
38 Mark Brown (2009) gives an insightful critique of the idea that political representation refers back to a pre-existing 
populace. He proposes, instead, a model of political representation that recognizes the ways in which it actually 
constitutes publics. 
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supposed to represent the ideal every-person, instead of a person with biases or 
opinions either in favor of- or opposed to nanotechnology. They were supposed to serve 
as an indicator of how the public might reason and what issues they might find 
concerning. Furthermore, since they are not particularly special in terms of expertise, 
knowledge, or intellect, they help prove something that was important to the majority of 
the social scientists enrolled to do this work: that publics can meaningfully participate in 
science policy and decision-making. The final report for the National Emerging 
Technologies Conference made the case for the value of their event and for public 
participation more broadly in terms of their participants’ averageness (NETC Final 
Report 2008:2, 11).  
Average citizens very much want to be involved in the decisions that 
shape technologies that, in turn, shape their lives. Given good information, 
access to experts, and the time to discuss their concerns with other 
citizens, average people are able to learn the important details of even 
very complex issues, and to generate thoughtful, informed, deliberative 
recommendations.  
 
 
 
Later in the report, it also said that: 
These were thoughtful, committed, and well-informed panelists, not 
misinformed, hysterical, individuals being manipulated by outside groups.  
This quote from the final report of the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference was intended to justify the expansion of science policy to include 
deliberative democratic exercises. It did so, in part, with the promise that average 
individuals could be given a measure of technical expertise. Essentially, this was a 
promise that the discourse could be disciplined by disciplining participants. This idea 
that average people could learn and were not the result of hysterical groups influencing 
them assured agency administrators that citizens can have relevant concerns if properly 
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trained. In a larger sense, it is a promise to funders that deliberative public engagement 
in technoscience will not threaten the scientific endeavor itself. 
Hugh Davis, who participated in the National Emerging Technologies Conference 
and the Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation, as well as some of the World Wide 
Views conferences in Europe, explained how they tried to ensure that they got average 
or ordinary people. 
There were supposed to be mechanisms in place that would exclude 
people who weren’t ordinary, in the sense of, if you know they were too 
expert, if they had expertise, or if they had affiliations with organizations 
that were active on Nanotechnology, those you know, excluding 
mechanisms were supposed to be in place. (Davis Interview 9/24/2015). 
There could be real consequences for engagement events that do not recruit 
average citizens. Davis went on to explain this as well. 
The reason why something like this is credible is because you’re recruiting 
ordinary people. You’re not recruiting interested stakeholders. You’re not 
recruiting experts. You’re not recruiting people with prior opinions about 
the issue. And I think that the narrative is that, you know, we get these 
‘blank-slate’ people, kind of like a jury for a trial, where you would exclude 
the people who are likely to be biased. Also, if they are already interested 
or if they’re biased, then suddenly, you know, then what are you actually 
demonstrating? That was one of the critiques of the World Wide Views 
exercise, was that we were criticized for basically bringing a bunch of 
Greens [members of the Green Party] in the room, and that critique meant 
that we had no credibility to say anything about the power of the collective 
opinion of our participants, going beyond that little group of people. (Davis 
Interview 9/24/2015). 
The consequence here was that their research was considered meaningless by 
scientists and funders. He took this lesson with him when designing Midwestern 
Nanotechnology Deliberation. We also see another meaning to “average” here as well. 
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Average also means lack of bias. This emerges, in part, from the average person’s lack 
of expertise. Non-average are potentially biased and biased individuals cannot be 
disciplined through proper training as discussed in the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference final report. To engage non-average people, then, is to risk the credibility of 
the event. We can also see this in terms of democratic representation – the group they 
recruited in World Wide Views was not seen by funders to reflect accurately the 
thoughts and opinions of the larger public. Average returns, again, to an individualized 
potential to assess technologies, like the “reasonable person” in American 
jurisprudence. Because average people, in the sense of the larger citizenry, had no 
awareness of nanotechnology to have an opinion (Cobb and Macoubrie 2004, Fischer 
et al. 2013). 
Interestingly, average people, defined in these ways, are not that useful to 
funders for understanding public opinion and funding agencies’ goals of avoiding public 
backlash. Public awareness about nanotechnology has remained steadily low (Burri and 
Belucci 2007). If the goal was to understand the current public’s attitude to 
nanotechnology the answer is easy and requires little research: the public, as a whole, 
has no opinion. If the goal of engagement is to change opinion or even simply 
understand it, then the only people or publics that would matter would be those with 
existing opinions. These might be individuals with positive opinions, even in the form of 
“fanboys,” or negative ones, in the form of the civic groups and science dystopians 
discussed in the last chapter. Robert Wilson, one of the organizers for the Eastern 
Environmental Risk Forum, gave this as a reason why their event encountered so much 
difficulty. 
It continues to be a tricky issue with stuff like nanotechnology. If you've got 
something where there's a clear kind of public concern or like you've 
already got citizens that are organized and interested, like say you got a 
disease like breast cancer, you've got this engaged group of ready citizens 
and I think there you can have these really fruitful interactions with them 
and the scientific community. But something like nanotechnology, you 
mainly just have like these really like technophilic people who love new 
technology or technophobic [people]. You just get a few sort of really 
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contrasting perspectives and I feel like it's hard to get really interesting 
public engagement going (Wilson Interview 11/16/2015) 
In the terms of acceptable public engagement, the bias of technophobes or 
technophiles rendered them irrelevant. In terms of theories of public engagement, this is 
interesting. Dewey argued that publics emerge wherever there are issues of concern, 
especially when existing structures of governance do not address ([1927]1990). Where 
publics do not spontaneously form around an issue, and the issue is on for which the 
state has no strategy for governance, the state has a duty to help publics form 
themselves. In the case of nanotechnology, something quite the opposite of this 
happened. New and uninterested publics were formed despite the existence of publics 
who actually were interested in the issues, as small and unrepresentative as they might 
have been.39 They were considered too messy by both funders and social scientists for 
purposes of engagement because their discourse as not amenable to bureaucratic and 
epistemic discipline by experts in either nanoscience or deliberative democracy. I think 
this is interesting for another reason, beyond the question of expansion of science 
policy and the disciplining of discourse. Focusing on unbiased or otherwise average 
people may not help meet the NNI’s goals of understanding public perceptions and 
avoiding public backlash. As we saw in the last chapter, people involved in the NNI 
complained that the ETC Group was little more than a few people and a good fax 
machine. Even so, they effectively got the attention of Prince Charles, who then became 
a high-status voice critical of nanotechnology development. Public discourse about 
emerging technoscience is more likely to be driven by a vocal, if unrepresentative, 
minority than millions of uninterested average citizens. 
The discourse at these engagement events was also disciplined by virtue of what 
participants were recruited to discuss. To some degree, determining the content of the 
deliberation is inevitable as there is no such thing as an unframed message (Benford 
                                            
39 Felt and Fochler (2008, 2010) have studied the construction of deliberative publics in Austria and argue that publics 
push against the manner of their construction, forming their own identity as a public in the course of deliberative 
exercise. The point here is not so much that the publics so engaged were dupes hemmed in by the modes of their 
construction but rather the implications of the values behind the construction of the publics to agency administrators 
and scientists. 
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and Snow 2000). To varying degrees, however, these public engagement events 
framed nanotechnology positively.  
The Southwestern Nano Dialogue presented nanotechnology in the most 
favorable light of all the events. In the scenario for deliberation, participants were told 
that a new and deadly virus, the Pandora Virus, was on the verge of becoming a 
pandemic. Participants were to take on the role of either a scientist, a politician, or 
someone from the “general public” to discuss how a nanotechnology-enabled vaccine 
should be used to fight Pandora Virus. The materials described the nano-vaccine in the 
following way. 
After 5 years of work, last year, a famous interdisciplinary team of 
university nano-scientists, collaborating with other research institutes, 
successfully engineered a prototype of a kind of “nano-vaccine” to both 
treat and prevent the attack of some viruses. 
To help, the Food and Drug Administration fast-tracked approval of the 
university nano-scientists’ hybrid nano-vaccine that will help protect the 
country from a potential pandemic. As with the bird flu virus, where 
governments have already ordered that 150 million chickens be 
destroyed, millions of people could die if Pandora’s virus spreads into a 
pandemic. 
Victoria Harris, the main organizer of the Southwestern Dialogue and director of 
the STS program at that time, recognized that they framed nanotechnology positively. 
I think we had a fairly positive spin, because we wanted to get people 
involved in the excitement of learning about the science and becoming 
knowledgeable for active citizens, that was one of our…one of my main 
goals.  I didn’t want it to become a polarized situation where the scientists 
were kind of called to account. Rather, I wanted to draw on their good 
skills and enthusiasm for science. (Harris Interview 10/22/2015) 
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The National Emerging Technologies Conference also engaged in imagination 
work. For that event, participants were given background materials numbering sixty-one 
pages. It presented participants with six possible future possibilities to imagine and 
deliberate. These were: engineered human tissues, bionic eyes, a personal disease 
detector (“Doc in a Box”), a “healthy chip” that could monitor health in real-time and 
dispense medication as needed, a cognition enhancing “brain chip,” and the “barless 
prison,” a drug that is “injected into prisoners that becomes activated by radio control” if 
prisoners go beyond certain boundaries. The background materials noted that these 
“fictional scenes are extrapolations from current nanoscale research; they have been 
vetted for their technical plausibility by real scientists currently working in nanoscale 
research” (NETC Background Materials 2008:4). Organizers of the NETC were careful 
not to have citizens engage with concerns that scientists and funding agencies would 
discard as mere science fiction. 
In the face-to-face meetings for the National Emerging Technologies Conference, 
participants were asked to discuss their concerns and their “excitements” regarding the 
NanoScenarios presented in the background materials. They were asked to rate their 
excitement for the technologies based on several categories, including “Medical 
Enhancements,” “Cognitive,” “Military,” and “Humanity/Global” (NETC Georgia Notes 
2008:10). The final report for the group at one of the participating universities added a 
note in their report complaining that the background materials for the “Humanity/Global” 
category were “idealistic and utopian,” and they asked for “more skepticism” from future 
materials (NETC Georgia Notes 2008:10). None of the other groups explicitly 
complained that the background materials seemed overly positive, but people were 
clearly convinced that Nano-Bio-Info-Cognitive technologies held a great deal of 
promise. In another instance of imagination work, for instance, those background 
materials reprinted an NSF list of the most important promises of nanotechnology (see 
Appendix B). 
I do not have the full materials for the other events I studied here so it is difficult 
to know how positive the issues were framed.40 The Eastern Environmental Risk Forum 
                                            
40 There is sort of a Spanish Flu story behind my use of these materials and my discussion of the National Emerging 
Technologies Conference. What became known as the Spanish Flu was actually a disease ravaging most of Europe. 
Only Spain, however, publicly acknowledged the problem. For their honesty, they were saddled with the name of that 
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directed participants to design their own events, including finding their own 
nanotechnology experts, so it is difficult to know the degree to which they framed 
nanotechnology positively. The Western Risk Forum and the Midwestern 
Nanotechnology Deliberation both described efforts to achieve balance between risks 
and benefits. Still, as Jasanoff has explained, a focus on risks and benefits already 
frames the discussion in ways that certain public concerns cannot emerge (2012). By 
asking people about their concerns for how nanotechnology would be applied, for 
instance, organizers for these events may have framed the development of 
nanotechnology as inevitable. Inevitability is a core component of the modern 
technocratic approach to science policymaking (Porter 1996). Either way, the framing of 
nanotechnology and its possible issues constituted imagination work about possible 
futures and their desirability. In none of these, however, was anything like a moratorium 
presented or entertained. Furthermore, there is good reason to think that it never would. 
With the exception of the Southwestern Dialogue, all of these events had to report their 
findings and justify their grant funding to the NSF. The two Science and Society Centers 
had to conduct annual meetings with reviewers from the NSF. If they had had 
participants discuss anything truly heretical to the development of nanotechnology, it 
very well could have affected future funding. Again, though, there is no way not to frame 
discourse in a deliberation. It is a way in which discourse can be disciplined, however, 
especially if that discourse is funded upstream by federal science agencies and if 
scientists are enrolled as participants in the event, as they were for each of the events 
studied here. 
Discourse around nanotechnology was likely disciplined by the selection of 
publics to participate and the selection of issues. The publics engaged for the 
deliberation disciplined the discourse around nanotechnology in two ways. First, 
discourse was disciplined by the fact that organizers had trouble recruiting people. The 
people they were able to recruit were often more highly educated and political liberal, 
both of which are characteristics associated with more optimism about science and 
technology (Gauchat 2012). Second, discourse was disciplined by the need to recruit 
                                                                                                                                            
disease. Organizers of the NETC were the only ones kind enough to share all of their materials. Therefore, I want to 
be careful not to make it seem like that event was uniquely problematic in these ways. I simply know more about it 
than any of the others. 
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unbiased, “average” citizens who could both speak for the larger public and prove to 
science funding agencies that lay publics could play a valuable role in science policy. By 
virtue of engaging average and unbiased citizens, however, discourse did not include 
highly critical ideas about nanotechnology. It would have been nearly impossible for 
participants to bring up any of the apocalyptic scenarios around nanotechnology or 
ideas about a moratorium or relinquishment. Furthermore, the selection of issues made 
doubly sure that issues like these would not be discussed. At the micro-institutional 
scale, they were exercises in public reasoning. These events put issues on and off the 
table that drove discussion. There is no way to avoid this for any upstream engagement 
event since organizers inevitably guide discussion. Yet both of these are ways in which 
the expansion of acceptable science policy was met with a disciplining of discourse, 
whether or not this was intentional on the part of event organizers. 
The Outcomes of Engagement 
The question of outcomes for public engagement helps us to see to what degree 
it was an expansion of science policy and to what degree this expansion was 
disciplined, particularly by agency administrators. The most obvious measure for any 
policy mechanism is whether it influenced policy. While this section outlines the 
difficulties that organizers of these engagement events encountered in trying to affect 
policy, I do not want this section to suggest that engagement was useless or a failure. 
The first reason it was not a failure is that there are no standardized criteria for 
evaluating public engagement exercises (Guston 1999:457). Second, it is difficult to 
assess the full value and long-term impacts of public engagement on science policy 
processes as well as on the citizens who participate. Rather, the importance of policy 
impacts for this dissertation derives from the fact that those impacts, or lack thereof, 
demonstrate the degree to which public engagement was an expansion of science 
policy and to what degree it was constrained in order to minimize the expansion. 
Not all of these events were intended to impact policy, though documentation for 
all of them cite the importance of public dialogue for the responsible development of 
nanotechnology. The purpose of the Southwest Nano Dialogue was simply to “create a 
sense of wonder” in attendees about nanotechnology. In Ezrahi’s terms, their outcome 
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was simply the imagination work itself (2012). The Western Citizens’ Risk Forum was 
mainly a research project in deliberative exercises, intended to inform future deliberative 
efforts. The Eastern Environmental Risk Forums was also intended to test a deliberative 
format. Specifically, the EERF endeavored to foment the capacity for future, self-
directed public engagement in issues of science policy among existing civil society 
groups, such as the Elks Club or the Rotary Club. One of the major outcomes for each 
of these events was knowledge-creation around deliberative engagement. 
The primary evidence that knowledge had been created around deliberative 
engagement was publications. This is another outcome that all of these activities shared 
or were supposed to share. The NSF lists all of the publications for each grant it funds. I 
read all of the publications listed for the grants that funded each of these events. When 
reading the publications for the Eastern Environmental Risk Forums, however, I noticed 
that none of them mentioned the public engagement work of the grant. The EERF was 
funded through a larger Nanoscale Interdisciplinary Research Grant that funded a 
number of activities of which the public engagement aspect was only one. I asked 
Robert Wilson, one of the organizers, about this and he did not seem surprised. 
It's not an accident that you didn't find publications [laughter]. I mean, I 
think the goals were fantastic and I think that, you know, we totally should 
have yeah, gotten a lot more out of this. 
He went on to discuss the logistical difficulties of doing public engagement as 
well as the lack of a pre-existing scholarly relationship among the event’s organizers 
which made it difficult for them to work together. As he continued to talk, however, he 
became more ambivalent about the goals of the project. 
I guess…one needs to be clear in the particular context; what actually are 
we trying to achieve here? Are we trying to get a better decision? Are we 
trying to get people to get on board? Do we have political reasons or, you 
know, is it just the right thing to do to bring people together? So, tying all 
this back to our project, yeah, I'm not sure that we had a super clear goal. 
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Foster, another organizer for the Eastern Environmental Risk Forum, was more 
sanguine about the goals of their public engagement exercise. When talking about 
outcomes, I asked everyone about policy impacts, since they are so commonly cited. 
He said, “That’s not my main goal.” When asked what his main goal was, he responded: 
My main goal is to work in the university, teach my students, funnel as 
much money [to them] as humanly possible, and at the end of the day 
hopefully, you know, educate them. 
Unsurprisingly, outcomes were tied directly to the goals and organization of the 
activity, or lack thereof in the case of the EERF. It seemed that, for the EERF, the 
scholars involved did not all understand what their goals should be. 
The other outcome that every event shared was a positive participant 
experience. All of them, in different ways, measured the participants’ experiences of the 
deliberation. For the Western Citizens’ Risk Forum this was also data for the larger 
research project, since that event intended to understand some of the factors that made 
people comfortable and effective deliberators. For the others, it was largely a measure 
of whether or not participants enjoyed the activity. This may be seen as part of a longer-
term impact on citizen engagement and maybe even policy impacts since individuals 
who enjoyed deliberative engagement are probably more likely to do it in the future. 
Caroline Lee, however, has critiqued deliberative activities that do little more than 
provide participants with an emotional experience, however positive (2014). Again, 
though, it is difficult to gauge whether participant experience may have long-term 
impacts on the development of technoscience and future civic engagement (Guston 
1999).  
Not all of the events wanted to have policy impacts, but at least two did. The 
Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation and the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference both listed policy impacts as one of the goals of the project. Both met with 
difficulties in realizing that goal. 
The Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation was thwarted in its attempt to 
influence state policy by a change in state leadership. They had intended to bring the 
final document from the Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation to introduce into the 
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state legislature as a way to advocate for creating a nano-registry. The nano-registry 
was supposed to serve as a database for all existing products containing nano-
materials. One common concern among participants’ in the Midwestern 
Nanotechnology Deliberation was the fact that nano-enabled products, about which 
nothing was known in terms of toxicity or long-term effects on people’s health or the 
environment, were already in the marketplace.41 According to Nigel Martin, one of the 
organizers, this started off well. 
We had networks with the press, we had networks with people in the state 
legislature –I give [Jessica King] most of the credit in this regard – and we 
pushed hard on those. We felt we got a fair bit of press; some of our 
citizen participants were on TV, on the radio, etc. We held a press 
conference at the State Capitol. Legislatures came and some of them 
continued to be interested (Martin Interview 10/2/2015). 
As Jessica King, whom Martin credited with doing the bulk of this work explained, 
it crumbled with a change in the political climate. 
We were working with a couple of legislators who were really into this. And 
the very simplified version of what happened was, we basically gave up. 
Because once [a new Republican Governor] was elected, the legislators 
we were working with just said “It’s hopeless, we can’t do anything.” (King 
Interview 11/11/15). 
A changing political context seemed to limit the ability of these social 
scientists to translate the outputs of their engagement event into a policy 
influence, despite incredible efforts. The Midwestern Nanotechnology 
Deliberation did motivate one concerned participant, retired school Principal 
Larry Miller, to fly to Washington D.C. at his own expense to give his testimony 
before the Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology subcommittee in its 
                                            
41 It may be worth noting that the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Project for Emerging Nanotechnologies has something 
like a nano-registry, called the Consumer Products Inventory (CPI). Its value was limited, however, by the fact that it 
was consumer-generated. As documentation for the CPI states, the facts in the listings are unreliable at best and 
many products listed may not even exist. It can be found at: http://www.nanotechproject.org/cpi/  
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first ever public meeting. The meeting was to discuss the Environmental Health 
and Safety Aspects of Engineered Nanoscale Materials (2007). The 
nanotechnology newsletter Nanowerk notes that, without Larry in attendance, 
“this meeting would have been just one more ritual gathering of scientific and 
government experts, debating what to do next with little public input” (Nanowerk 
2007).42 Mr. Miller used the opportunity to submit a copy of the Midwestern 
Nanotechnology Deliberation final report and, according to Nanowerk, to 
complain about the event’s lack of policy impact, saying that in the two years 
following their report, he did not feel that the engagement event had had any 
impact on nanotechnology policy or decision-making (Nanowerk 2007). 
The National Emerging Technologies Conference was not met with a shift in the 
political climate like the Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation, but also seemed to 
struggle to impact policy. Penelope Brown, one of the social scientists who had 
participated, said that it was because the event had no mechanism in place for affecting 
policy.  
There was no task built in of ‘take this to your state legislature, let’s take 
this to Congress,’ whatever, and the main thrust of the report I would 
guess would be for the research community (Brown Interview 12/2/2015). 
 She seemed disappointed that the main focus of the exercise was research-
oriented. The main organizer of the project did attempt to bring public opinions from the 
National Emerging Technologies Conference to the attention of administrators at the 
NSF in a presentation about the societal implications about nanotechnology.  
[Elijah] coordinated a presentation to the Nanotechnology caucus in 
Washington D.C., I went to that meeting, there were presentations, and I 
sat on a panel and answered some questions and things like that.  But I’m 
just not sure, it’s really hard for me to say with any confidence that we had 
                                            
42 In its self-description, NanoWerk establishes its credibility, in part, by distancing itself from Drexler’s and Crichton’s 
visions that we saw in the last chapter. It begins “Why a newsletter about nanotechnology risks? Are we 
scaremongers? No; and we are not covering killer nanobots and grey goo either.” 
(http://www.nanowerk.com/nanorisk/nanorisk.php Accessed 2/15/16). 
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any sort of impact.  I mean I think we were part of the discussion, uh but, 
yeah, I don’t think that we had much impact there. (Davis Interview 
9/24/2015). 
For various reasons, including simple bad luck, a lack of planning, and optimism 
about citizens’ level of interest, engagement organizers proved unable to influence 
science policy and decision-making, at least according to the “magic bullet” model of 
policy influence (Guston 1999). There are two reasons why this might still be relevant, 
however. According to several people whom I interviewed, the promise of such policy 
impacts was used to enroll both social scientists and participants in the projects. 
Jacqueline Nelson, who worked on the National Emerging Technologies Conference 
and the Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation, argued that it was okay not to have 
policy impacts, as long as you do not promise such impacts to participants in order to 
recruit them. 
It also became clear pretty quickly that there wasn’t going to be a sort of 
feedback into any real policy process, which was a critique that…there 
were sort of promises made to recruit people, like “come and do this neat 
thing and affect the future of this new technology” when, in fact, these 
were really academics experiments more than anything. I think academics 
were overly optimistic about what would happen with the result of this 
(Nelson Interview 9/3/2015). 
Participants had good reason to think that they might affect decision-making 
around nanotechnology. The first sentence of the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference background materials given to participants stated: “In this project, you will 
be asked to help develop a set of guidelines that you, and the other panelists in your 
group, believe should steer the development of some very powerful, new technologies” 
(National Emerging Technologies Conference Background Materials 2008:1). Read 
closely, this statement does not promise participants that their opinions would have 
policy impacts, but it seems reasonable for them to have thought that it did.    
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Nelson, who joined the projects, in part, to affect policy, realized that her goal 
might not have coincided with the goals of the main organizers. Discussing both the 
Midwestern Deliberation and the National Emerging Technologies Conference, she 
expressed qualified frustration about the promise of impact. 
I was really attracted to some of the more democratic promises made by 
the organizers about what contributions the event could make to 
democratic decision making around science and technology. But I think if 
you probably asked like [Elijah] at the time, “Well is this going to have any 
impact on policy?” He probably would have said, “That’s beside the point.  
Just getting people in a room to deliberate is democratic in and of itself.” 
But I think, from my perspective, I sort of wanted, I wanted more from both 
of those exercises. There’s a disconnect between the sort of hope of what 
effect it would have in a concrete way and then it being more of an 
academic thing (Nelson Interview 9/3/2015). 
Many engagement organizers and practitioners fell back on this idea when 
describing the disappointing lack of impact these events had on science policy and 
decision-making. At least, as far as the logic went, engagement had happened and 
perhaps even had important outcomes they would never know. For some, like Elijah 
Anderson, this really was the main goal of engagement and not merely some secondary 
outcome. 
Another common goal, from the perspective of these engagement exercises was 
to train participants to act as engaged citizens. To what degree was this an outcome? 
We have already seen one success. Larry Miller from the Midwestern Nanotechnology 
Deliberation flew to Washington D.C. to represent the public about nanotechnology. The 
Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation was successful in another respect. It led to 
the formation of a citizens’ group called the Nanotechnology Citizens’ Engagement 
Organization or “Nano CEO” that met regularly about the issues surrounding 
nanotechnology. They met with one another, organized public events, and wrote opinion 
pieces. They were forced to stop meeting, however, once they began plans to test 
nano-silver imbued socks. They wanted to determine whether the nano-silver particles 
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came off in the washing machine, winding up in the water supply. Up until that point, the 
university had given them a small amount of funding to hold their meetings and plan 
events. They had plans in place to collaborate with a toxicology laboratory on campus to 
conduct the research. This should have been a stellar example of citizen science and 
just the kind of outcome public engagement was supposed to foster. It was not viewed 
this way by local nanoscience industries, however. 
Jessica King, the university liaison to the NanoCEO group and an organizer for 
the Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation, explained that the director of the 
university’s Nanoscale Science and Engineering Center that funded her post-doctoral 
research sent her a letter telling her that Nano CEO had to stop its research. 
Participant: Well my boss was an engineer who does Nano and science 
stuff. One day, I got a letter just completely and totally out of the blue.  I 
specified to NSF about the work [of NanoCEO] and everyone [there] was 
raving, all this great engagement and citizens and scientists! So, I got a 
letter out of the blue, “You need to stop this work immediately. I think this 
work is illegal.” 
Interviewer: Why illegal? 
Participant: Well, there was nothing illegal about it.  No, it’s not illegal.  In 
fact, a bunch of other professors and researchers were doing this work 
and have since. There was more to it than that. “You must stop this project 
and all of your projects immediately. Do not do any work.” That's crazy, 
okay? It was crazy. I was completely flabbergasted, of course, and a lot of 
things happened. I left academia and never looked back. But the Citizen 
component made them [industries] really nervous. And my boss admitted 
to me that the companies that support their work…basically told him “You 
have to shut this person down.” (King Interview 10/15/15). 
The Nano CEO group disbanded shortly thereafter. I reached out to the 
former boss she mentioned above but did not receive a response to my inquiry. I 
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then asked four other people with direct knowledge her story if they could confirm 
what King had said. Three of them clearly did not want to talk about it, one saying 
that I should just talk to her. Hall, quoted earlier, however, confirmed her story. 
So now, she and her group actually had a really tough time. I didn’t see 
any evidence of them actually drumming up concerns that were invalid.  
But I did see a lot of criticism about that. And, by and large, that criticism 
came from threatened groups within academia and business. It was a very 
clear case of a privileged few, in research labs in particular, being allowed 
to do what they wanted to do. And all of a sudden, somebody being in a 
position of questioning them. They didn’t like it, at all. (Hall Interview 
5/19/2016) 
What should have been a clear victory in terms of public engagement was shut 
down in order to protect the commercial possibilities of an emerging technology. As both 
King and Hall indicate, these were not the irrational and vocal publics that scientists and 
funding agencies feared. Rather, by working with university scientists and collaboration 
on laboratory research, these lay people worked within the realms of acceptable 
scientific credibility and expertise.43 Whether they realized it or not, the Nano CEO 
group inserted itself into an ongoing regulatory debate about the safety of nanosilver. In 
2007, the Korean technology company Samsung released an “antibiotic” washing 
machine that released nanosilver into its washing basin to sterilize clothing. The 
National Resource Defense Council had asked the Environmental Protection Agency to 
investigate the impacts of nano-silver, making it an issue of public concern (Laurent 
2017:102-103). King indicated her awareness of this when she said that research into 
the toxicity of nanoparticles was being done elsewhere. Had it not been for that ongoing 
issue then perhaps the NanoCEO group would have been seen positively. King 
stressed, multiple times in our interview, that the NSF regarded the citizen group very 
highly.  
                                            
43 As Jessica King asserted, this research was later done by toxicologists at ASU (Benn et al. 2010). They found that 
all but one of the products they tested did, indeed, leak nano-silver particles into wash-water. 
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Another surprising outcome related to the NNI’s most important goal for 
upstream public engagement: fostering public trust. In a published paper, Christian 
Jones and Nathan Reed, two organizers for the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference and the Eastern Environmental Risk Forum, found that another set of 
smaller engagement exercises they had organized around nanotechnology increased 
not only participants’ hopes but also participants’ fears. From the perspective of funding 
agency administrators, this is exactly what public engagement was not supposed to do. 
Lowell Evans, one of the former NSF program directors, recounted a discussion he had 
in a planning meeting in the early 2000s with the Department of Energy in which they 
discussed the worry that engagement would foster public fear. The purpose of that 
meeting was to determine how public engagement for the NNI should be organized.  
In my group, the discussion was about, to some extent, about how we can 
do this with the least amount of hassle. We need to spend this money, but 
how can we do this without…well, not without not “the least amount of 
hassle,” I shouldn’t put it that way. But without it getting out of control. You 
know? Without it getting wild. 
Upstream public engagement for nanotechnology was fine so long as it was 
disciplined. Concern about Jones and Reed’s findings came up in a 2008 workshop 
Communicating Health and Safety of Emergent Technologies at North Carolina State 
University. Dietram Scheufele, a SEIN researcher funded through the NNI, gave a 
presentation about the public’s capacity to learn about complex scientific issues. His 
work was part of the same NSF grant that funded the Eastern Environmental Risk 
Forums, among many other activities, in which Jones and Reed had both participated. 
Someone in the audience asked him about the finding that engagement can also 
increase public fear, saying “[Reed] found that in these consensus type programs…the 
more people have learned, the more likely they are to raise these vexing ethical kinds of 
questions about distributive justice, privacy, and other…non-technical kinds of issues” 
(2008)44.” Scheufele responded: 
                                            
44 Communicating Health and Safety of Emergent Technologies Workshop 
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Learning more [about science and technology], for a community activist 
going out to one of these meetings and [who] already has a problem with 
government regulations, maybe with GMOs and so on, and then goes into 
one of these groups, and then discusses this, well there very well [may] be 
a more critical view that comes out of that.  
That’s an important fact to keep in mind for a lot of these deliberative 
meetings, is that they’re self-selective. … It’s sometimes tempting, when I 
look at these issues, to say “Oh, it’s interesting that people think this” but 
it’s, no, it’s interesting to know that the people who actually took the X 
amount of dollars that they got and went and went through the effort to do 
three rounds over three weekends, that that particular group of people 
thought in a certain way. 
In effect, what Scheufele was saying here is that these were not average, 
ordinary citizens. They were interested and already biased individuals who came to 
participate or people who were only in it for the money. He discounts the increased level 
of concern among deliberative participants as a product of the bias with which they 
entered that deliberation.45 He also seems to discount upstream public deliberation as a 
whole, since it will always require some small sample of individuals who will always 
require an incentive to participate and who will always evidence some degree of 
selection bias. In any case, it seemed the Scheufele wanted to distance his own work 
from that of his colleagues and the potential of the latter to foment public fear. 
Furthermore, the person who first asked Scheufele the question about “vexing 
concerns” sounded like those were not necessarily his concerns but were rather 
common concerns about upstream public engagement. I asked Edward Hall, the 
scientist involved in the NNI since 2001, about whether administrators in the NSF were 
worried about public engagement increasing public concern. 
                                            
45 Incidentally, this contradicts Jones and Reed’s descriptions of their event participants, who they framed not only as 
average but as more often unrepresentatively knowledgeable and supportive of science. 
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Interviewer: [Jones’ and Reed’s] work shows that sometimes public 
engagement work actually makes people more concerned as they become 
informed. Did you hear that concern, you know, bounced around the [NSF] 
hallways at all? 
Respondent: Oh, yes. Oh, oh, absolutely, yeah. So that was definitely the 
control element, again, especially from the advocates of nanotechnology, 
investors in nanotechnology. So, they wanted engagement as long as they 
retained the power and they retained control of the narrative. If there was 
any indication that they were going to lose control of the narrative, they 
became very, very uncomfortable about it, and very uncomfortable about 
the fact that engagement might lead to consequences that they didn’t 
want, including people becoming more concerned about the technology. 
Clearly retaining control of the discourse around nanotechnology’s ethical and 
societal implications is a form of disciplining discourse around nanotechnology but so 
too was the lack of influence on policy. Policymakers and science agency administrators 
have the power to use the outputs of SEIN research and upstream public engagement 
to influence policy or to choose not to do so. There is no way for citizens or engagement 
organizers to compel them to listen or act. I do not mean to suggest that ultimate power 
should lie with citizens, necessarily, but rather simply point out that this is another way 
of ensuring that the expansion of acceptable science policy does not expand too widely. 
This is the power that administrators and policymakers have with upstream public 
engagement, as opposed to more adversarial forms, such as grassroots social 
movements. Since agency administrators had enrolled the participants in the first place, 
it was their prerogative as to whether or not they would act on participants’ concerns. As 
long as upstream public engagement did not foster too much ongoing civic 
engagement, like NanoCEO, or too much public concern, then agency administrators 
could control how upstream public engagement was incorporated into science policy 
domains. Passively listening to engagement participants’ concerns, without acting on 
them, was one way to discipline discourse around nanotechnology. 
182 
 
The End of Public Engagement in Nanotechnology 
Upstream public engagement seemingly disappeared from the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative. In part, it seems that it was difficult for the agencies of the 
NNI to figure out what they had purchased with SEIN research and public engagement. 
Documents for the NNI show that administrators struggled to figure out how to assess 
what public engagement had achieved. In its report about assessment for the NNI, the 
President’s Council Assessment of Science and Technology 2008 report on 
nanotechnology admitted that measuring progress “remains challenging” for all aspects 
of the NNI (PCAST Report 2008:11).46  
Nonetheless, appropriate metrics are essential… Commonly used 
measures include bibliometrics such as publications, patents, and 
citations; knowledge mapping; counts of research centers, networks, user 
facilities, principal investigators, new trainees, start-ups, new products, 
initial public offerings, and acquisitions; and amounts of funding support 
from public and private sectors (corporate R&D as well as venture capital). 
 The problem is that few of these work for public engagement and SEIN 
research. The only thing that might apply would be publications, but even that does not 
capture the purported democratic value of SEIN research and public engagement or the 
instrumental value to funding agencies and policymakers in helping inform science 
policy. Margaret White, one of the former NSF program directors I interviewed, 
elaborated on the difficulties of assessment. 
Well, I think it’s an issue broadly with research that, you know, the 
justification for research generally in the United States is that it is [a] 
wealth-creating or wealth-building endeavor. You know, “did it give us new 
transistors,” for example. It’s more difficult when you’re talking about social 
and behavioral sciences. 
                                            
46 Report to the President and Congress on the Second Assessment of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (2008) 
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If you look at the results of educational and ethics research, it can be 
assessed as creating a good deal of value. But it doesn’t prevent [people 
from] saying “Well how do we know that it creates value?” So, assessment 
can become used for not supporting some realm of research that does not 
fit into the major paradigm [of wealth creation] (White Interview 9/13/17). 
Jackson, one of the organizers for the Western Citizen’s Risk Forum, said 
something similar when explaining why she though that there was no longer deliberative 
public engagement for nanotechnology. 
I'm not even sure where we might go to fund more focused work on 
deliberative engagement. I'm not sure that it’s even a fundable…I mean 
it’s fundable when it touches down on another politically-sensitive risk 
object like synthetic bio[ology] or, you know, some other emerging tech 
that people are investing heavily in and are worried about public backlash. 
Then maybe. (Jackson Interview 4/13/16) 
The fact that publics seemed entirely uninterested in nanotechnology, to say 
nothing of a massive public backlash, did not help to justify continued upstream public 
engagement. A report reflecting on the Western Citizens’ Risk Forum recalled that they 
ran the event to “capture upstream views because we (wrongly) anticipated rapid social 
amplification” of concerns around nanotechnology. Without that pressure, support for 
public engagement seemed to dwindle, at least for nanotechnology. 
Societal and ethical implications of nanotechnology research, including public 
engagement, now manifests only as informal science education and environmental 
health and safety (EHS) research. Informal science education had always been a 
popular method of public engagement for scientists and administrators at the NSF and it 
was another site of innovation for the NNI. The Nanoscale Informal Science Education 
Network (NISEnet) endeavored to do “actual engagement around the social issues 
rather than just promotion of the technology” (Hall Interview 5/19/2016). I do not discuss 
the work of NISEnet in this dissertation only because no one involved in that work 
returned my request for an interview. 
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In a return to a more technocratic mode of governance, Environmental Health 
and Safety research seemed to absorb societal implications research, including public 
engagement, in the years following these public engagement events. We can see this 
reflected in the Program Component Areas for the National Nanotechnology Initiative 
Strategic Plans of 2004, 2007, and 2015. Program Component Areas, again, were 
areas of targeted funding and goal setting for the NNI. In the 2004 Strategic Plan, 
Societal Implications was the last Program Component Area. It was listed as the most 
important area for the goal of “supporting responsible development of nanotechnology” 
(NNI Strategic Plan 2004). See Figure IV.1 below. 
 
Figure IV.1 Program Component Areas from 2004 NNI Strategic Plan 
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In 2007 Environment, Health, and Safety was added as the seventh Program 
Component Area while Societal Dimensions was moved down to eighth and became 
Education & Societal Dimensions. Both were listed as supporting the responsible 
development of nanotechnology. See Figure IV.2 below. 
 
Figure IV.2 Program Component Areas from 2007 NNI Strategic Plan 
 
 
 
In the 2015 Strategic Plan (Figure IV.3), societal dimensions disappeared 
entirely, leaving only Environment, Health, and Safety. The format of the Strategic Plans 
had changed as well, focusing more on Nanotechnology Signature Initiatives rather than 
the Program Component Areas for setting goals and directing funding and research. 
The Nanotechnology Signature Initiatives cover all of the most important technical goals 
for nanotechnology research and development. 
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Figure IV.3 Program Component Areas from 2015 NNI Strategic Plan 
 
 
 
It appears that nanotechnology returned to a more technocratic model of dealing 
with issues related to nanotechnology. No vexing issues like distributive justice or 
ethical concerns were likely to emerge under these headings, nor would any of these 
categories necessarily fund anything like deliberative public engagement. 
Although societal and ethical implications research and deliberative public 
engagement did diminish for nanotechnology, one of the Science and Society Centers 
has shifted gears, becoming much larger and more broadly active in science policy. In 
fact, the growth of that center might be one of the most enduring impacts of the NNI and 
its societal implications program. When I asked the director of that Center what would 
have been different had public engagement work not happened for the NNI, a question I 
asked every engagement practitioner, he answered: 
So, we created a network of, in essence, of skilled professionals through 
the National Emerging Technologies Conference and that network of 
skilled professionals was in place when the solicitations for groups to 
participate in the first World Wide Views on Global Warming came out. We 
had a group of folks who then participated in World Wide Views on Global 
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Warming, then World Wide Views Biodiversity, and then World Wide 
Views Climate and Energy that we’re already there.  And, you know, quite 
frankly if we had not done the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference, I don’t know who if anybody would have participated in or 
invest in World Wide Views. That capacity and that experience became 
what was drawn on for the NASA awards and now for further awards 
directly related to the charges from agencies that we’re starting to work 
on. So yes, that’s us, but it’s the agencies as well. It’s a demonstration, a 
refinement of the technique [of public engagement] as a research tool and 
as a policy information tool. (Anderson Interview 11/18/15). 
The real value of the deliberative public engagement work, then, might come in 
the future. It may come from this cadre of social scientists trained not only in public 
engagement but the real politick of science policy that Kristyn Lee saw them lacking. 
The National Emerging Technologies Conference in particular has led to long-term, 
ongoing work through its Science and Society Center work. Its work has created a 
certain momentum around societal implications research and public engagement. 
Additionally, there have been and continue to be many smaller events, particularly 
around other sciences like synthetic biology. One interviewee said that I really had to 
look “beyond nanotechnology” to really see what happened with public engagement. It 
is beyond the scope of this project to look deeply into public engagement in these other 
scientific arenas. A cursory inquiry, however, does not indicate anything like the large 
deliberative events that happened around nanotechnology, nor the associated hope that 
such engagement would democratize science. Furthermore, Elijah Anderson above was 
something of an outlier in his answer to that question. Most of those whom I interviewed 
did not have the sense that public engagement might significantly inform the course of 
scientific development or science policy. In fact, most seemed quite disillusioned about 
the influence of their work on the NNI. 
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Conclusion 
Upstream public engagement in science was touted by its supporters as the 
answer to problems of public trust in science and more democratic science. Given the 
history of science and science policy, it also represented one of the largest expansions 
in ideas about acceptable science policy. Nanotechnology was seen as a unique 
opportunity to apply the theoretical tenets of public engagement to an emerging 
technology (MacNaghten et al. 2005). This chapter is not intended to take away from 
the value of public engagement to improving the relationship among scientists, science 
agencies, and publics. This is not the same as fostering public trust, which puts the 
onus on the public to trust technoscientific development seemingly irrespective of what 
it does (Wynne 2006). Nor is this chapter intended to question the value of upstream 
public engagement for democratizing science and science policy. 
Rather, this chapter intends to show some of the limits of upstream public 
engagement in practice and the ways that discourse can be disciplined, even passively, 
by the institutions upstream. Discourse was disciplined first by the selection of academic 
social scientists to run deliberations. In a different way than the Human Genome 
Project’s ELSI program, scholars were enrolled to reflect critically on nanotechnology 
but to do so within certain limits. Nanotechnology was framed by these events in either 
a positive light or a critical one, but never would an idea like deferral been made a 
matter of deliberation. The publics enrolled into these events were constructed to reflect 
the rationality of publics writ large for democratic engagement in issues of 
technoscience and science policy (Burgess and Longstaff 2011). To do this, organizers 
of these events described these publics in ways similar to the Rawlsian perfect 
deliberator: rational, willing to listen and learn, and ultimately arguing based in 
scientifically established facts. While not necessarily a bad thing in itself, this approach 
does leave out many real, existing publics who could potentially want to be engaged 
with issues related to nanotechnology. 
Finally, public engagement, and the discourse that emerged from it, was 
constrained by the fact that science agency administrators and policymakers had the 
ultimate power to decide whether or not to make use of its products. Dietram Scheufele, 
quoted earlier, has argued that upstream public engagement has not fulfilled its 
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promises, and perhaps promised too much (2011). David Guston, as mentioned earlier, 
argues that it is impossible to tell how much of an effect public engagement might have 
had, especially if we look narrowly at science policy as the only acceptable outcome 
(Guston 1999, 2014). Regardless of whether or not upstream public engagement has 
little effect or an important, long-term effect that it is difficult to identify, it will suffer from 
the constraints imposed by the very fact that it is organized by upstream actors. If too 
highly constrained, upstream public engagement risks reinforcing the deficit model and 
putting a veneer of democracy over otherwise technocratic modes of decision-making 
(Owen et al. 2012). With fewer constraints, public engagement may indeed realize 
much of its promise for democratizing science and science policy, but would risk 
fomenting public fear, giving voice to people from their echo chambers, and threatening 
the very endeavor that funds the exercise. It is hard to imagine science agencies, or any 
upstream funder, willing to tolerate those dangers. 
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CHAPTER V  
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation shows three cases in which a combination of internal and 
external pressures led scientists and science agencies to imagine and include new non-
technical concerns, non-scientific actors, and new forms of expertise to existing modes 
of science policy and governance. These changing ideas about the relevant concerns of 
technoscientific research, the role of publics in science policy, and forms of expertise 
that scientists and science agency administrators deemed relevant aggregated into new 
imaginaries about how science acquires its social legitimacy. I argue that scientists and 
administrators at science agencies were motivated to imagine new ideas about 
concerns, publics, and legitimacy because of a tension between their desire to maintain 
scientific autonomy and the imposition of civic epistemological pressures to do science 
in a manner consistent with public needs and values. Scientists and science agencies 
wanted to retain as much autonomy as they thought possible. This took different forms 
for the different cases studied here. This autonomy came into tension, however, with the 
public expectation of not only safe science but science for the public good. This 
expectation by the public came from many sources, including past scientific crises, 
contemporary scientific activism in Europe, contemporary non-scientific issues and 
activism, and the work of scholars in various social science disciplines. Scientists and 
science agency administrators were forced, by this public pressure, to reimagine 
relevant concerns, the role of publics, the limits to their own autonomy, and the nature 
of scientific legitimacy given the power of the civic epistemology. In each of these 
cases, scientists and science agency administrators learned from the past and from 
what was going on elsewhere to renegotiate the tension between their autonomy and 
the responsibilities of science to the larger society. In each case, the result was for 
scientists and science agencies to recognize new kinds of expertise and to share 
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authority with a new set of experts. In so doing, scientists voluntarily gave up a degree 
of autonomy to protect the autonomy they thought still possible to retain. These 
changes are summarized in Table V.1. 
Table V.1 revisits Table I.2 set out in the first chapter, which set the analytic 
categories of this dissertation research. In Chapter I, we were only setting the terms of 
comparison. Now we can see how each of these cases played out according to these 
categories. Since we now have the stories of each case, I have two columns, one in the 
imaginary, showing the imagined basis of the social legitimacy of science, and another 
showing the outcomes of these events in terms of autonomy and the public response to 
the upstream efforts of scientists and science agencies. Note first that outside pressures 
and the outcomes of previous endeavors have forced scientists and science agencies to 
negotiate their scientific autonomy and authority with non-scientific actors, particularly 
publics. The public backlash against Asilomar, for instance, led the Human Genome 
Project to make changes in their approach. Second, this process has been towards 
greater inclusion, at least nominally. The imaginary around relevant concerns, the 
relevance of publics, and the relevant forms of expertise has steadily expanded. All of 
these changes were motivated, in part, by the perception among scientists and science 
agencies of outside pressure in the form of possible public backlash. It was only for 
rDNA research that scientists perceived no significant public backlash, which led them 
to underestimate the publics’ response. A useful follow up to the research in this 
dissertation would compare the ELSI style programs and upstream public engagement 
work for research initiatives with no expectation of public concern or backlash. Finally, 
we see in these imaginaries a changing idea about the social basis of legitimacy for 
science in society. Scientists doing rDNA research reflected the idea that doing safe 
science was the extent of their responsibility to the public. This was consistent with 
ideas about the social contract of science, in which scientists were supposed to produce 
innovative new technologies but were otherwise left alone (Guston and Keniston 1994). 
This imaginary about the social legitimacy of science expanded to include scholarly 
non-scientists and eventually lay publics. The real and imagined consequences of their 
efforts to evidence the social legitimacy of scientific research have led scientists and 
science agency administrators to reimagine the role of science in society. This is  
192 
 
Table V.1 Cases and Analytical Categories Revisited 
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important to note, since their imagination work around emerging technologies shapes, 
to a significant degree, what is researched, how it is researched, and the role of publics 
in the process of scientific development (Frickel et al. 2010).  
This imagination work was also important for emerging areas of technoscience 
for what they indicate about power. Scientists, by virtue of their temporal priority to 
these areas, get the first chance to perform this imagination work. If this imagination 
work is an exercise in future-making, consistent with Jasanoff’s observations about the 
co-production of “is and ought,” then scientists get the first chance to make the world in 
which these new technoscientific areas emerge (Ezrahi 20120, Jasanoff 2012:16). That 
is the power associated with vanguard visions (Hilgartner 2015). As we saw in the 
example of the Asilomar conference, this is not a monopoly power. Bioscientists 
working in rDNA research tried to retain full control and authority over the world of rDNA 
research, full autonomy in short, by addressing all possible concerns before the public 
got interested in rDNA research, but they failed to do so. Furthermore, in so doing, 
rDNA researchers inadvertently made themselves responsible for the future of rDNA 
research and became the focus of people’s concerns. The inclusion of journalists, 
supposed to satisfy the requirements of transparency and public witnessing demanded 
of scientific development in a democratic society, did not satisfy publics’ concerns 
(Ezrahi 1990). Publics wanted more than just transparency. They wanted research that 
was both safe and, on the whole, oriented towards the public good. Scientists realized 
too late that they were not in a position of power relative to these concerns. Public 
concerns about rDNA research turned into bureaucratic, political action in nine towns in 
the U.S. and in Congress, who took the power of the imaginary around rDNA research 
out of the hands of scientists. I will not recount each of the cases, but Asilomar set the 
stage for both the Human Genome Project and the National Nanotechnology to engage 
in re-imagining the role of concerns about science, the role of publics, and especially 
the degree of scientific autonomy that was possible. 
The failure of rDNA researchers to retain authority over their field raises 
questions about who gets to participate in the imagination work, the vanguard visions, 
around emerging technologies. Since these imaginaries can become contested and 
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adversarial, it often boils down to questions of power. To what degree do those in an 
emerging technoscientific area have the monopoly power to imagine their field and the 
modes of governance to which it subject? As we saw with these cases, they do not 
enjoy monopoly power over these visions. The question then becomes, who can they 
enroll to legitimize their imagination? This question comes second because of the 
temporal primacy afforded to scientific insiders to an emerging technoscience. This 
affords them the opportunity to enroll allies before most outsiders would know that a 
new technoscientific area was even emerging. In effect, enrolling sympathetic outsiders 
to participate in imagining relevant issues and risks is a way of retaining authority and 
autonomy. Through this enrollment, insiders get to determine, to an extent anyway, the 
actors who will scrutinize them. Finally, who can insert themselves uninvited? This last 
question refers, most obviously, to social movements and civil society actors but might 
also refer to the NASA fanboys that Johnathan Parker described in Chapter IV (Epstein 
1996, 2000, Hess 2010a, 2010b, Kinchy 2012).  
The bioscientists in the rDNA controversy learned from their experience when it 
came time to develop the ELSI program of the Human Genome Project. They could not 
effectively claim the legitimacy to define and deal with rDNA’s uncertainties. As the 
attorneys present at Asilomar had tried to warn them, the public did not trust them to 
serve as a one-stop shop for scientific development and governance. In the end, publics 
had inserted themselves uninvited. Thus, when it came time to start the Human 
Genome Project, James Watson expanded ideas of acceptable science policy to 
include ethical and societal concerns and new actors, seemingly to avoid the problem of 
publics inserting themselves. These were new actors enrolled, in part, to do the 
imagination work around the implications of knowing the human genome. Having 
learned from Asilomar, Watson understood that they did not have monopoly power to 
imagine their own regulatory world into existence free from outside influences. Put 
another way, he understood that a practice of public reasoning, through a state-
sanctioned science agency, was the new normal for large, federally funded projects like 
the Human Genome Project. In his capacity as Director of the Human Genome Project, 
he was both a scientific insider and one of the most important bureaucratic actors for 
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this new effort of public reasoning around genomic research. He had the power to 
enforce his own imaginary but seemed to understand that outsiders had to be included.  
For this dissertation, the inclusion of outsiders was the most significant way in 
which the ideas about acceptable science policy had been expanded. Watson made 
sure to enroll outsiders who accepted the limits he set on the possible imaginaries for 
regulating genomic research. For him, the only real limit was to avoid repeating the 
discourse about a deferral of research, which he saw as the key mistake of Asilomar. 
When Francis Collins took over the Directorship from Watson, however, the limits to the 
ELSI working group and its power to direct its own imagination work about the ethical 
and societal concerns of mapping the human genome became more evident. Collins 
used his power to set budgets and his authority to attend meetings to micro-manage the 
working group. Collins made sure that it only studied the things he found important. 
Collins’ imaginary about the ethical and societal issues of the human genome trumped 
the new experts in ethics and social science that had been enrolled into the project. 
Recall, too, that the working group was supposed to direct the course of rest of the ELSI 
program, in effect, through its imagination work. Controlling that group went a long way 
to controlling the ELSI program as a whole. In the National Nanotechnology Initiative, 
this process of selection was subtler but more streamlined. Years of scholarship in 
science policy and the ethical concerns of science and technology gave credibility to the 
scholars whose Science and Society Centers were eventually funded. Those scholars 
had a great deal more freedom than the social scientists enrolled for the Human 
Genome Project, but it was clear that they would not be discussing the gray goo or a 
nanobot terror with the publics they engaged. 
This intersection of power and imagination work points to a larger point of this 
dissertation about the tension between expanding science policy and containing that 
expansion. In each of these cases, we see an expansion. Scientists in the Asilomar 
conference came, often reluctantly, to accept the idea that they had a moral and ethical 
commitment to public health and safety even in doing their laboratory research. They 
adopted the idea, new to them, that deferring otherwise sound scientific research was 
an acceptable way to approach these concerns. They accepted these new ideas, in 
part, to retain their own autonomy and their authority to determine the course of rDNA 
196 
 
research. In other words, it was an expansion motivated by a desire to constrain a 
potentially larger expansion, with the inclusion of non-scientists and non-allies. The 
Human Genome Project’s ELSI program expanded to include new actors, social 
scientists and ethically minded scientists, and institutionalized the idea that 
technoscientific projects should deal with ethical concerns and societal implications in 
addition to health and safety concerns. Here, again, we have new ideas and new actors. 
The discourse around these new ideas, particularly ethical concerns and societal 
implications, was disciplined by Watson when he enrolled people to serve on the ELSI 
working group and by Collins when he began directing their work. They also took a 
technocratic approach to these quite non-technical concerns. Watson and Collins, 
particularly, limited what was possible discursively, what I have been calling “disciplining 
discourse.” In terms of public reasoning, they got to enjoy the legitimacy that came from 
having such a group while not necessarily having to do anything different in terms of the 
larger project, other than spending money on an ELSI program (Fisher 2005, Lopez and 
Lunau 2012, Rabinow and Bennett 2009). Many scholars have criticized that ELSI 
program for being ineffective. Finally, with the National Nanotechnology Initiative, we 
see another expansion. For the NNI we see ethical and societal concerns 
institutionalized and a more established role given to the actors that had been new for 
the Human Genome Project. The real expansion, however, came with the inclusion of 
lay publics in processes of policy- and decision-making. The ethical and societal 
concerns discourse under the NNI was disciplined in far subtler ways than for the 
Human Genome Project. These ways were not altogether intentional. The realm of 
possible discourse around societal concerns was shaped early on by discarding ideas 
deemed by scientists to be science fiction. It was later disciplined by the selection of 
social scientists to participate, the selection of publics to engage, and by the power of 
science agency administrators to listen, or not, to what publics had to say. With every 
expansion came a concomitant constraint on what it was possible to imagine and 
discuss in terms ethical concerns and societal implications. 
Finally, I want to point out why scientists and science agencies embraced these 
expansions in the first place. In every case, they were motivated by the threat of 
potential public backlash and even state action following such a backlash. For rDNA, 
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bioscientists feared that they might create a tumor-causing virus. Later, they were 
concerned that the public might discover the possibility that they would create a tumor-
causing virus and shut down their research. For the Human Genome Project this is less 
clear. Watson was clearly motivated by a desire to avoid what had happened for rDNA 
research. This was likely made more important, however, by the fact that the project 
emerged under internal conflict among bioscientists who did not support the project. 
Already on unstable ground internally, any amount of serious public opposition early on 
would have constituted a serious threat to the Human Genome Project. Finally, people 
in the National Nanotechnology Initiative talked a great deal about the importance of its 
Societal and Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology program. Nothing beyond laboratory 
safety was funded or approved, however, until administrators in the NSF began to fear a 
serious public backlash. When that fear was shown to be overblown, public 
engagement in nanotechnology seemed to disappear. As people interviewed for this 
project seemed to suggest, it is only when scientists or science agencies perceive a 
threat to a scientific endeavor that they will expand what they take to be acceptable 
science policy to include new ideas like ethical concerns and new actors like publics. 
That depends, however, either on the imminent threat of public concern or at least the 
perception among scientists and those in science agencies that such a threat is 
imminent. I think this is why public engagement has moved from nanotechnology to 
fields like synthetic biology and geoengineering (Buck 2009, Rabinow and Bennett 
2009). These emerging fields seem strange and threatening. Do they pose the most 
important pending ethical issues, however? Geoengineering is purely an imagined field 
at present. You do not see public engagement work around artificial intelligence and 
robotics or cyber-terrorism, technological issues with far more immediate consequences 
than either synthetic biology or geoengineering. I think the reason is that even though 
people have a lot of concerns around artificial intelligence and robotics, for instance, 
calls for a boycott on research or commercial applications of these technologies have 
not been socially amplified (Pidgeon et al. 2003). 
All of this points to the fact that an upstream focus on ethical and societal 
concerns and public engagement in science will likely have serious limitations. Every 
expansion in ideas about acceptable science policy was met with efforts to constrain 
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and discipline the discourse that comes out of these efforts, containing the changes that 
might otherwise result from those newly expanded boundaries. From an institutional 
perspective, the primary motivation is not more democratic science but the protection of 
the research project in question and scientific autonomy more generally. This is not to 
say that individual scientists are not themselves committed to doing responsible 
research and, potentially, even more democratic science. The initial motivation for rDNA 
researchers was to do the right thing ethically. Rather, I think that institutional logics and 
values will ultimately drive and constrain these endeavors. With respect to public 
engagement, Jurgen Habermas envisioned a more communitarian model for creating 
social change (1991). It was intended to replace, in an ideal world anyway, the 
conflictual models of social change evidenced in the anti-Vietnam war movement, the 
Women’s Liberation Movement, and the Civil Rights Movement. Habermas’ model has 
been critiqued in a number of ways (Bohman 1996). I will only enlist that of Chantal 
Mouffe, however, who uses Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction to say, in part, that 
people should not expect their enemies to create appropriate conditions for deliberation 
such that their views will be heard and respected (Mouffe 2000). We should not trust 
upstream ethical bodies or public engagement exercises to serve as a one-stop shop 
for dealing with issues of scientific ethics or even imagining what issues and what areas 
of science might be important for doing science democratically. 
What would all of this indicate for future large, federally funded research projects 
in emerging technologies like the Human Genome Project and the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative? Whether or not we will see continued upstream attention to 
ethical and societal concerns and upstream public engagement or the development of 
new modes of dealing with issues and publics depends on three elements: (1) the 
degree of learning among such initiatives, (2) public pressure on the initiative, and (3) 
the vanguard visions that scientists and science agencies have about public concerns, 
the role of publics, and the autonomy that scientists can reasonably expect and hope to 
maintain. 
As each of the cases of this dissertation illustrate, federally funded science 
borrows from past projects in refining their approaches to both issues of concern and to 
publics. These projects need not share substantive similarities. The Human Genome 
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Project and the National Nanotechnology Initiative had very little in common in terms of 
science. They had a lot in common, however, in terms of being large-scale projects that 
courted potential controversy. Furthermore, none of the projects studied in this 
dissertation emerged in a context of strong public controversy. Only the Human 
Genome Project might be said to have had any real public knowledge of the research 
initiative. Rather, the administrators of each were responding to the controversies of 
past projects and an imagined future controversy. I would argue that the culture around 
science and science policy has shifted in the U.S. such that it is now incumbent upon 
large, federally funded science projects to give attention to ethical and societal 
implications. The 2014 Strategic Plan for the Brain Research through Advancing 
Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative, for example, has a section dedicated 
to “neuroethics” which is explicitly described as an ELSI program (NSTC 2014:13). This 
is true even for research that does not have a single umbrella initiative like BRAIN or the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative. Research into synthetic biology and geoengineering, 
for instance, have borrowed from the National Nanotechnology Initiative in their 
approaches to ELSI issues and publics (Buck 2009, Parkhill and Pidgeon 2011, 
Rabinow and Bennett 2009). Attention to ELSI concerns have become, as a scientist 
once observed to Human Genome Project ELSI working group member Jonathan 
Beckwith, a “political tax,” if nothing else (Beckwith 2002:116). Smaller federally funded 
research projects might not have to organize a full-fledged ELSI program. Nonetheless, 
they will likely have to show some attention to ethical issues and public concerns. Even 
individual grant recipients must attend to the “broader implications” of their research. 
The Nanologue public engagement event described in this research, for instance, was 
motivated by scientists who had to fulfill the broader implications requirements of their 
NSF grants (Harris Interview 10/22/2015). Although, as we have seen, scientists can 
meet the broader implications requirements in a number of ways that do not require 
public engagement or attention to ethical issues. Often simply making data and findings 
widely available is enough to satisfy broader implications. For the near future, some 
kind of ELSI program will almost certainly accompany any major federally funded 
research. 
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The imagination work of the scientists and science agencies involved in an area 
of research shapes whatever ELSI style programs or public engagement that follows. 
While something like an ELSI program has become the norm, such a program may not 
engage publics or give authority to the new experts (e.g. social scientists and ethicists) 
that the program enrolls. Scientists and science agency administrators will likely base 
their ELSI programs on what they perceive as the likelihood for publics to become 
concerned and their dependence on the initiative for funding their research or their field 
as a whole. If scientists and science agencies imagine the public as very likely to 
become fearful about their research and if they see themselves as more dependent on 
a particular initiative for their funding, the more likely scientists and science agencies 
are to engage both issues and publics in an upstream manner. They would take this 
view because they would already perceive the possible public response as a threat to 
their autonomy and the future of their research. While an upstream ELSI program that 
engages publics and enrolls non-scientific experts diminishes a certain aspect of 
scientific autonomy, particularly scientists’ role as the only relevant voices in the 
initiative, it protects scientific autonomy in a larger sense, by allowing potentially 
controversial research to move forward.  
 
Table V.2 Expected Approaches to Ethical Concerns and Publics 
 
 Low Dependence on Initiative 
by Scientists 
High Dependence on 
Initiative by Scientists 
Imaginary of 
High Public 
Concern 
• ELSI 
• Researchers move to other 
initiatives or areas of research 
• Broader Implications grant 
requirements 
• ELSI 
• Upstream Public Engagement 
(Consensus Conferences, 
Deliberative Exercises, Town 
Halls) 
• Broader Implications grant 
requirements 
Imaginary of 
Low Public 
Concern 
• Technocratic approaches 
• Broader Implications grant 
requirements 
• ELSI 
• Technocratic approaches 
• Broader Implications grant 
requirements 
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Remove or diminish any one of these elements, however, and I argue that it will 
be less likely that scientists and science agency administrators will voluntarily engage 
publics and empower non-scientific experts. If they imagine public concerns to be low or 
non-existent, then there would be little reason to diminish, voluntarily, their autonomy to 
make space for non-science experts and publics. Larger research projects would still 
likely have an ELSI style program, but non-scientific experts would likely have little 
authority and autonomy, as we saw with the Human Genome Project. Decision-making 
about what issues to pursue and how to pursue them would likely take a more 
technocratic form. By this, I mean that the approach would resemble that of rDNA 
research in which scientists would deal with technical issues of health and safety but 
give little to no attention to larger issues like ethical concerns, societal implications, and 
public response. Scientists would keep to a technocratic approach because it allows 
them to retain greater autonomy and authority over their work compared to programs 
that include ethicists, social scientists, and publics. If scientists are not dependent on 
any particular research initiative for funding or if any particular initiative is only one 
among many, then scientists might decide to reframe their research and look elsewhere 
for funding. This would be the opposite of what we saw for nanotechnology, in which 
scientists reframed their research as nanotechnology to pursue funding. The initiative 
may still have an ELSI style program attached to it and scientists would still have to 
fulfill their broader implications requirements, but they would have little reason to reduce 
their autonomy to incorporate non-scientific experts and publics. Finally, if scientists 
imagine public concerns to be low and they also do not depend on that particular 
initiative for their funding, then I think we can expect to see little in the way of an ELSI 
program or upstream public engagement. To whatever degree scientists choose to deal 
with the non-technical issues of an initiative, they will likely take a technocratic 
approach. Otherwise, they will rely on the broader implications requirements of their 
grant to evidence their commitment to doing responsible research. 
Regardless of whether a future research initiative takes a more technocratic 
approach or gives a role to non-scientific experts and publics, the initiative will constrain 
the latter to fit with its primary goals. Upstream public engagement and attention to 
societal and ethical concerns can only ever be an addendum to the main goal of the 
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research endeavor: to produce scientific knowledge. Individual research projects have 
often been postponed or relinquished, particularly in the medical, social, and behavioral 
sciences because they work directly with people and their bodies. This is usually the 
result of institutional review board (IRB) determinations but sometimes due to the 
decisions of researchers themselves (Fox and Swazey 2002). Large-scale research 
initiatives are less likely to get postponed or relinquished, at least due to upstream 
ethical research and public engagement. One reason is that by the time they reach the 
point of becoming a large-scale research initiative they have usually undergone a 
lengthy review process that includes the initiative’s political viability. Both the Human 
Genome Project and the National Nanotechnology Initiative took years to reach the 
point of a major initiative. Second, and more in line with the data from this dissertation, 
administrators for these initiatives will ensure that the ethicists, social scientists, and 
publics whom they enlist will be favorably disposed to the research initiative. If they are 
not so disposed, then administrators will find ways to contain their views or their impact. 
While upstream research into ethical issues and societal implications and 
upstream public engagement are moves in the direction of more responsible and more 
democratic science policy in the United States, they should not be seen as a 
replacement for civil society organizations, citizens’ groups, and other kinds of social 
activism around science and science policy. Indeed, these upstream modes of engaging 
publics and ethical and societal concerns only emerged because of the threat of more 
adversarial, grassroots forms of public engagement in science. Scientists and science 
agencies are likely to enlist publics and non-scientific experts only if they continue to 
feel pressure by the latter group to do so. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
Descriptions of Nanotechnology Public Engagement Events 
There were four deliberative public engagement events funded by the NNI, either 
directly, in the form of an NSF grant, or indirectly, through one of the Centers for 
Nanotechnology in Society or through one of the Nanoscale Science and Engineering 
Centers. A fifth, called the Southwestern Nano-Dialogue, was funded through its host 
university, not the NNI, but was initially motivated by scientists doing research on 
nanoscale technologies who needed something to fulfill their “broader impacts” 
obligations for NSF grant funding.  
How do deliberations usually take place? Deliberations usually begin with some 
informational session to provide a framework for the discussion and to ensure that all 
deliberators operate with a similar foundation of knowledge. Sometimes this is sent out 
to participants ahead of the event, in the form of reading materials, videos, and surveys, 
and sometimes the event begins with lectures that provide this foundation. Deliberations 
usually follow afterward with varying levels of structure to them. Some have structured 
questions that deliberators are supposed to discuss. Others have a more open format, 
allowing deliberators to discuss whatever comes to their minds. Finally, participants are 
often asked to vote on a set of prescribed issues or to produce a final statement or 
report of the group’s deliberations. Usually the participants discuss and vote until they 
achieve a consensus. In fact, these events often go by the name “consensus 
conferences.” Each of these stages – information-provision, deliberation, voting or 
reporting – may be repeated several times for any given event.  
 
Southwestern Nano-Dialogue 
Although Southwestern Nano-Dialogue does not perfectly fit the other cases 
here, because it was not funded through the NNI, it provides an interesting contrast to 
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what came later. Since it was not funded through a science funding agency, it did not 
have to make justifications back to funders or provide any deliverables. Southwestern 
Nano-Dialogue was the only deliberative event that was not organized primarily as a 
research endeavor but for engagement and interdisciplinary collaboration. Its host 
university was satisfied that the event would serve as an opportunity for collaboration 
between social scientists and scientists. The university had an explicit commitment to 
such collaboration and Southwestern Nano-Dialogue was a valuable opportunity to 
evidence that commitment publicly. In terms of publicity, it was an incredible success. 
Victoria Harris, a co-organizer of the event, estimated that roughly four hundred people 
attended, including the Mayor, who gave the formal introduction to the event. This 
makes Southwestern Nano-Dialogue the largest single deliberative event around 
nanotechnology. Southwestern Nano-Dialogue stands out in several other respects as 
well. First, instead of asking participants their own hopes and fears about 
nanotechnology, they were asked to role-play as another kind of social actor. 
Participants took on roles as academics, business-people, government actors, or 
general public. The only rule was that a participant was not supposed to play a role that 
they already had47. Second, the event broke from standard deliberative practice in that it 
was not supposed to produce a final consensus. The goal was the deliberation itself and 
to foster empathy among participants for those acting in other social roles. Finally, 
Southwestern Nano-Dialogue was probably the most overtly positive event about 
nanotechnology. Participants were asked to make decisions around a fictional viral 
outbreak, called the Pandora Virus, in which fictional “nano-vaccines” were presented 
as the best solution. The deliberations centered on how to best deploy the vaccine and 
the ethical concerns in doing so. The materials described the nano-vaccine in the 
following way. 
After 5 years of work, last year, a famous interdisciplinary team of 
university nano-scientists collaborating with other research institutes 
successfully engineered a prototype of a kind of “nano-vaccine” to both 
treat and prevent the attack of some viruses. Their research was backed 
                                            
47 Of course everyone could count as “the general public,” whether they are also a scientist or policymaker. Harris 
acknowledged this fact as an aside when describing Southwestern Nano-Dialogue’s format. 
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by grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of 
Health, and an increasing percentage of private sector funding. 
To help, the Food and Drug Administration fast-tracked approval of the 
university nano-scientists’ hybrid nano-vaccine that will help protect the 
country from a potential pandemic. As with the bird flu virus, where 
governments have already ordered that 150 million chickens be 
destroyed, millions of people could die if Pandora’s virus spreads into a 
pandemic (Harris Interview 10/22/2015). 
The positive focus was purposeful and was likely influenced by the relative 
newness of the collaboration between scientists and social scientists and, thereby, the 
role of the STS program as a boundary organization. Harris was the director of the STS 
program at that time and this was the first collaboration of its size at the university 
between scientists and social scientists. Although the scientists involved in the project 
initially joined because they had to fulfill the grant requirement of broader implications, 
she said that, in terms of the larger importance of public engagement, they were an 
“already sold group” who were “interested in a much better relationship between 
scientists and the public.” This included framing nanoscience and the work of 
nanoscientists positively. 
I think we had a fairly positive spin, because we wanted to get people 
involved in the excitement of learning about the science and becoming 
knowledgeable for active citizens, that was one of our…one of my main 
goals.  I didn’t want it to become a polarized situation where the scientists 
were kind of called to account. Rather, I wanted to draw on their good 
skills and enthusiasm for science. (Harris Interview 10/22/2015) 
The social scientists involved in the Southwestern Nano-Dialogue event were just 
the kind of boundary actors that Roco had described in the Societal Implications of 
Nanotechnology hearing (2001). That is, they were mediators between science and the 
public and enrolled to foster public enthusiasm and trust. Interestingly, the event itself 
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also mirrored this mediating role by asking participants to role-play as the very same set 
of actors that social scientists were supposed to mediate among and represent: 
scientists, business, government, and the public. In the end, Harris identified this 
boundary spanning role as ultimately detrimental to their STS program. 
I probably should tell you too that the STS program got defunded in front 
of the budget cuts with the university and so we weren’t really able to 
continue with what we had started and all the good work that we had 
done.  
We had gotten ourselves into the position in between social sciences and 
the sciences, 
kind of mediating, and I think that made us a bit vulnerable in hindsight. 
So, the liberal arts people thought “Well why should we be funding 
something that’s helping the sciences?” And the scientists, they thought 
“Well in order [to do this work, social scientists need] to get trained in 
science or engineering or any of those fields, you know, and we don’t 
have time to do that.” You know [have time] to do much with social impact 
[work] (Harris Interview 10/22/2015). 
 Doing boundary work can be costly. The Southwestern Nano-Dialogue 
event itself was a success, according to Harris, as indicated from participants’ exit 
surveys and a few subsequent events that followed its format. Furthermore, the 
scholars who did the work framed themselves as just the kind of mediators for which 
Roco had advocated and did work that reviewers at the NNI would have likely 
supported. Ultimately, though, the program seemingly could not satisfy parties on all 
sides of the boundary they were spanning.  
 
Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation 
The 2005 Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation was the second major test 
on U.S. soil of the Danish Consensus Conference model of deliberation. The 
207 
 
Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation followed the standard model for deliberation. 
Participants had readings and presentations by scientific experts and then discussed, 
over the course of three weekends, the hopes and concerns around emerging 
nanotechnologies. Several of the organizers of Midwestern Nanotechnology 
Deliberation had previously participated in a European technology deliberation World 
Wide Views which brought lessons learned through that deliberation into Midwestern 
Nanotechnology Deliberation.  The Midwestern Nanotechnology Deliberation was 
funded through its host university’s Nanotechnology Science and Engineering Center. It 
had been planned and approved just prior to the establishment of the two Science and 
Society Centers and the host university for this event was already in the network of 
Institution A’s SSC. 
 
National Emerging Technologies Conference 
The 2008 National Emerging Technologies Conference (NETC) was the first 
major deliberative event that came out of a Science and Society Center and had been 
the keynote public engagement offering in Institution A’s original application for SSC 
funding. The National Emerging Technologies Conference was not strictly concerned 
with nanotechnology, but rather the “nano-bio-info-computational” (NBIC) interface. In 
other words, participants did not only learn about and discuss developments in 
nanotechnology. Rather, they discussed nanotechnology in terms of its intersection with 
these other technological innovations. 
As an experiment in deliberation, the National Emerging Technologies 
Conference tested a modern update of the Danish Consensus Conference Model. It 
was conducted at eight participating universities using alternating face-to-face (F2F) 
meetings at each university and online, keyboard-to-keyboard (K2K) meetings where 
everyone came together at once. It addressed a criticism of the Danish model, that it 
worked in a country as small and homogenous as Denmark but would not translate to a 
country as large and heterogenous as the U.S. 
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Western Citizens’ Risk Forum 
The Institution B event was the most straightforward research project of the five. 
Through three consecutive deliberations, this project endeavored to test how certain 
demographic factors influence the act of deliberation itself. Organizers mainly focused 
on gender as their explanatory variable. Unlike the other events, organizers made a 
special effort to control for political leaning and education. It was also unlike the others 
in that it never framed itself to participants as anything more than an academic research 
experiment. This project promised no policy influence to its participants from the public 
and made no grand claims about democratizing science, despite the fact that the three 
organizers involved all described a deep personal commitment to this. 
 
Eastern Environmental Risk Forums 
This project was funded through one of the Nanotechnology Interdisciplinary 
Research Teams (NIRT). The NIRT structure was intended to fund interdisciplinary 
collaborations and pre-dates the establishment of the Science and Society Centers. 
This grant funded two different but interacting projects. One focused on laboratory 
scientists and their understanding of toxicology in the lab and beyond. The other 
involved public engagement work.  
The engagement work endeavored to move beyond the practical and theoretical 
issues involved with constructing publics for the purpose of engagement. Instead of 
recruiting people to participate in an engagement event held at a university, the NIRT 
grantees took engagement to existing publics, or what one organizer dubbed 
“vernacular communities.” Furthermore, instead of planning the event for these 
communities, they helped the communities plan their own events. One respondent 
explained that they went to the Elks Lodge and talked to them about having a 
nanotechnology deliberation. They then helped the group find speakers and acquire 
relevant materials to prepare themselves. From there, they let the deliberations unfold 
as they may.  
Although I was able to interview five people who helped organize the EERF’s 
engagement work, I found neither any documents from the NIRT project nor any 
publications. For each funded grant, the NSF hosts a web-page that gives brief details 
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about the grant and lists all publications associated with the grant. I read all of these for 
each of the four NSF-funded engagement events. All of the articles listed on the NSF’s 
grant page for this project, though, concerned only the toxicology research with 
scientists. When I asked about this, interviewees commonly gave two answers.  One 
was that the research did not have the results they had expected. There was little to no 
actual deliberation. The organizations that organized nanotechnology events, with the 
help of the NIRT team, listened attentively but passively. The events were little more 
than exercises in informal science education.  They had hoped for more. The other 
reason was that the collaborative group doing the engagement did not work effectively 
with one another.  This is not to say that they disliked one another. As Robert Wilson, 
one of my interviewees, explained: 
When one develops interdisciplinary work, you know, I think that 
sometimes you can get these really fruitful synergies and other times 
…the links don't form super well and so it's interesting; sometimes I think 
you get the best stuff when you already have people who have been 
collaborating and then they pursue a project like this. In this case, we just 
kind of sort of found each other and tried to do this. I'm just not sure that, 
you know, we just totally jelled, and we were all busy doing other things 
and so on.  So anyway, no need to belabor it. But it's not an accident that 
you didn't find publications. 
Unlike the other events, then, what I know of the Eastern Environmental Risk 
Forums and their work with vernacular communities comes solely from my interviews 
with participant-organizers and the grant description given to the NSF. 
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Appendix B 
List of Future Nanotechnology Applications 
1. Direct broadband interfaces between the human brain and machines, 
transforming work in factories, controlling automobiles, ensuring 
military superiority, and enabling new sports, art forms and modes of 
interaction between people. 
2. Wearable sensors and computers enhancing individuals’ awareness 
of health condition, environment, chemical pollutants, potential 
hazards, etc. 
3. Robots and software agents useful for human beings, operating on 
principles compatible with human goals, awareness, and personality. 
4. Individual learning more reliable and quickly. 
5. Communication and co-operation possible across traditional barriers 
of culture, language, distance, and professional specialization, 
increasing effectiveness of groups, organizations, and multinational 
partnerships. 
6. A human body more durable, healthy, energetic, easier to repair, and 
resistant to many kinds of stress, biological threats, and ageing 
processes. 
7. Machines and structures constructed of materials with desired 
properties, with ability to adapt to changing situations, high-energy 
efficiency, and environmental friendliness. 
8. Combinations of technologies and treatments compensating for 
physical and mental disabilities. 
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9. National security strengthened by lightweight, information-rich war 
fighting systems, uninhabited combat vehicles, adaptable smart 
materials, invulnerable data networks, superior intelligence-gathering 
systems, and effective measures against biological, chemical, 
radiological, and nuclear attacks, as well as instantaneous access to 
tailored information. 
10. Expanded creative abilities for engineers, artists, and architects by a 
variety of tools and improved understanding of the wellsprings of 
human creativity. 
11. Human welfare benefiting from the ability to control the genetics of 
humans, animals, and agricultural plants; widespread consensus 
about ethical, legal, and moral issues will be build in the process. 
12. Outer space and the Moon, Mars, and near-Earth asteroids will 
exploited by means of efficient launch vehicles, robotic construction of 
extraterrestrial bases. 
13. New organizational structures and management principles based on 
fast, reliable and relevant communication and information increasing 
the effectiveness of administrations. 
14. Individuals will have improved awareness of the cognitive, social, and 
biological forces operating their lives. 
15. Factories will be organized around CT and increased human-machine 
capabilities (intelligent environments) achieving maximum benefits of 
both mass production and custom design. 
16. Increased yields and reduce spoilage through networks of cheap, 
smart sensors monitoring the condition and needs of plants, animals, 
and farm products. 
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17. Safe, cheap, and fast transportation thanks to ubiquitous real-time 
information systems, high-efficiency vehicle designs, and use of 
synthetic materials and machines fabricated from the nanoscale. 
18. The work of scientists will be revolutionized by importing approaches 
pioneered in other sciences. 
19. A transformation of formal education by a unified but diverse 
curriculum based on a comprehensive, hierarchical intellectual 
paradigm for understanding the architecture of the physical world from 
the nanoscale through the cosmic scale (Roco & Bainbridge, 2002) 
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